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Abstract
Mobile devices allow people to collect and share health and health-related infor-
mation with recipients such as health providers, family and friends, employers
and insurance companies, to obtain health, emotional or financial benefits. People
may consider certain health information sensitive and prefer to disclose only what
is necessary. In this dissertation, we present our findings about factors that affect
people’s sharing behavior, describe scenarios in which people may wish to collect
and share their personal health-related information with others, but may be hesitant
to disclose the information if necessary controls are not available to protect their
privacy, and propose frameworks to provide the desired privacy controls. We intro-
duce the concept of close encounters that allow users to share data with other people
who may have been in spatio-temporal proximity. We developed two smartphone-
based systems that leverage stationary sensors and beacons to determine whether
users are in spatio-temporal proximity. The first system, ENACT, allows patients
diagnosed with a contagious airborne disease to alert others retrospectively about
their possible exposure to airborne virus. The second system, SPICE, allows users
to collect sensor information, retrospectively, from others with whom they shared
a close encounter. We present design and implementation of the two systems,
analyse their security and privacy guarantees, and evaluate the systems on various
ii
performance metrics. Finally, we evaluate how Bluetooth beacons and Wi-Fi access
points can be used in support of these systems for close encounters, and present
our experiences and findings from a deployment study on Dartmouth campus.
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Mobile health (mHealth) technologies, including health text messaging, mobile
phone apps, remote monitoring, wearable devices, and portable sensor devices,
have grown rapidly in the past decade and are expected to play an important role
in improving access to health information, resources, and clinical care. mHealth
devices and applications can be used to monitor activities [14], emotions [7, 25],
vital signs like blood pressure [11, 169] or fetal conditions [17]. Users can collect
their personal health, physical and social activity information and upload it to a
vendor website, social networking website, a personal health record (Microsoft
HealthVault [112] or, formerly, Google Health [73]), or a health-provider-operated
1
electronic health record. Once the data is uploaded, users can share the information
with health providers who help diagnose their illness or monitor their treatment.
Family and friends can motivate them as they work towards a healthier lifestyle.
People can also share their experiences with their peers (e.g., others suffering from
similar medical conditions) and provide support while in recovery [70]. New
mHealth technologies might also enable users to share health information with
pharmacists, insurance companies, drug companies, employers, or others involved
in their healthcare.
1.1 Motivation
Studies of mobile location-based services highlight the tension between the utility
of location sharing and concerns with invasion of privacy [127, 157]. We want
to understand what privacy concerns users might have when they use mHealth
devices and technologies to collect and share their personal information. Learning
about users’ privacy concerns regarding collection and sharing of their data could
give us better insights into developing privacy-preserving mHealth applications.
In some cases, users may also want to share health and health-related infor-
mation with strangers. Since users’ privacy concerns about sharing with strangers
may vary, one option could be to build a system that provides privacy by design, to
incentivize use by people who may be discouraged from using a system due to con-
cerns about privacy. We identify scenarios where people may want to share health
information, but the information is relevant only to strangers in spatial-temporal
proximity; we focus on such scenarios in this dissertation and build systems that al-
low users to share only with other users in spatio-temporal proximity. For example,
consider the following scenario: Contact tracing is used to contain the spread of a
contagious disease outbreak, by alerting people who came in direct contact with
2
a sick patient about the possibility that they may have been exposed to the virus.
Unfortunately, people may not remember where they went or whom they met; we
expect smartphones can aid in contact tracing as they can be leveraged to retrieve
the locations an infected person visited. In some cases, the contagious virus can live
on a surface and particle aerosols from an infected person can stay suspended in the
air for hours even after the infected person leaves. We must notify those individuals
whom an infected person encountered, of course, but we should also notify the
individuals who were at the same location as the infected person, hours later, since
the virus may survive for hours. The scenario highlights the need for a system
that allow users to share information with others based on their spatial-temporal
proximity to each other. But how can people share information with others in
spatial-temporal proximity, even when they may have never encountered each
other, and do so in a privacy-preserving manner?
1.2 Approach
To understand the privacy concerns users have when using mHealth devices and
applications, we conducted several exploratory focus-group discussions. People’s
stated privacy preferences and concerns, however, may differ from their actual
sharing behavior [53, 89]; so we conducted a user study where participants used a
real mHealth device and shared their own personal health information with family
and friends.
To allow users to share information with strangers in a close encounter, i.e.,
an incident of spatio-temporal proximity, in a privacy-preserving manner, we
designed two smartphone-based systems that leverage stationary sensors and
beacons and developed cryptographic protocols to ensure that data is shared only
with relevant users in the close encounter. To evaluate the effectiveness of beacons
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in supporting these systems, we deployed Bluetooth beacons on Dartmouth campus
and conducted a EMA-based user study.
1.3 Challenges
mHealth technologies were not common at the time we conducted the focus groups,
so we developed futuristic, but realistic, scenarios for the focus groups. One of
the challenges of conducting studies to understand privacy preferences is to avoid
self-selection bias; we used deception (approved by the Institutional Review Board)
to advertise our user study as a study of a new device to help individuals trying to
lose weight and/or improve fitness and health.
Two challenges arise when building a system to determine close encounters:
How can a user share information with other users who they may have never
encountered? Also since users may be concerned about sharing their location,
how can we allow data-sharing between the devices without revealing the users’
location history? We address the two challenges by leveraging stationary sensors
and beacons to determine whether users are in spatio-temporal proximity. Our
system never collects or records users’ location; instead, the users’ smartphones
collect and store information from nearby wireless broadcasting devices and the
system later matches this information to determine whether the users experienced
a close encounter.
1.4 Contributions
We make the following contributions:
• We report our findings from the exploratory focus groups and experimental
user study (with 40 participants) that we conducted to understand users’
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privacy preferences when using mHealth devices to collect and share their
personal information.
• We propose two privacy-preserving smartphone-based systems to share data
between users in a close encounter.
• Our smartphone-based systems use cryptographic primitives to ensure that
data is shared only with relevant users in a close encounter, without disclosing
the identity or location history of a user to other users or to the system.
• We describe our experiences from a deployment of Bluetooth beacons on
the Dartmouth campus, and our findings from a user study to determine
the effectiveness of the Bluetooth beacons in determining close encounters
and participants’ experiences using a location-based application that used
Bluetooth beacons to determine their location.
1.5 Outline
The remaining chapters are organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we present the findings from the exploratory focus group we
conducted to better understand privacy concerns people might have when using
mHealth devices for collecting and sharing their personal health information. We
also describe the user study where 40 participants used a Fitbit for five days,
and shared their activity information with family and friends, and the post-study
interviews, where the participants explained the factors that affected their sharing
behavior.
In Chapter 3, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of the
ENACT (Encounter-based Architecture for Contact Tracing) system that allows
patients, diagnosed with a contagious airborne disease, to alert users in spatial
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and temporal proximity that they may have been exposed to the virus, without
disclosing the identity or location history of the patient to other users or to the
system.
In Chapter 4, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a
general framework for detecting close encounters, the SPICE (Secure Proximity-
based Infrastructure for Close Encounters) system that allows users to collect data
from users in spatio-temporal proximity, retrospectively.
In Chapter 5, we evaluate the effectiveness of Bluetooth beacons and Wi-Fi
access points as broadcasting devices in support of the ENACT and SPICE systems.
We also describe our deployment of Bluetooth beacons on the Dartmouth campus
and our user study to determine how accurately Bluetooth beacons can be used to
determine when users are in a close encounter.
Finally, we present our conclusions in Chapter 6.
The goal of the thesis is to highlight the need for usable sharing controls that
allow users to share their health information, without worrying about unnecessary
exposure of their information and to demonstrate, by example, the privacy-by-
design approach, to build privacy controls into the system design and reduce the




Studies of location-based services (LBS) show that users vary in their willingness to
share location information depending on the benefits [128], place and context [29],
or by recipient [54]. We set out to examine whether similar variations in patterns of
use existed with mHealth technologies.
2.1 Focus Groups
We conducted exploratory focus-group discussions to gain a preliminary under-
standing about users’ privacy preferences. The discussion protocol was approved
by Dartmouth’s Institutional Review Board. We conducted eight focus-group ses-
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sions with 3-7 participants each, who were college students (aged 19-30), hospital
outpatients (aged 80-85), or residents of a retirement community (aged 65-100).
Each focus group lasted for not more than 90 minutes and all participants were paid
for their time. We chose these groups since we wanted to talk to users who have
some health experiences – some who have been recently hospitalized and others
who are monitored continuously outside the hospital – and users who have limited
healthcare-related experiences.
Since mHealth devices are not yet common, the focus group participants
were presented with hypothetical scenarios where mHealth devices were used.
There were four scenarios, in which an mHealth device was used to collect a user’s
personal information (measuring medication intake, diet and exercise, location or
social interactions); the collected data was uploaded to a private website and then
shared with health providers, family or friends. The scenarios for the young and
the old differed in the age of the protagonists and their medical condition, but were
similar in every other aspect like the information collected and the manner in which
it was collected, stored and shared; the scenarios are available in Appendix A.
We presented each scenario to the participants, after which they were asked
about the advantages and disadvantages of using mHealth sensors in that scenario.
They discussed their concerns regarding the collection of the particular health
information in each scenario, and whether there were certain times and places when
they did not want to collect that information. The participants talked about why
they would want to share certain health information types with health providers,
caretakers, family members and friends. They also raised some concerns regarding
storage and transmission of the collected information.
We recorded the discussions. We coded the discussions manually, and grouped
the statements into categories – privacy concerns were broadly classified into three




Unintended disclosure. One student brought up the issue of how someone could
make sensitive inferences from seemingly trivial information, “You can draw some
kind of analogy or trend [from the collected health information] that could be misused”.
Some participants were worried about the information being sent to a website, via
the Internet. A student was concerned about “the level of encryption and transmission
[of information from] the device and [to] the website. Also how is [the website] catego-
rizing [the user]? His name, date of birth, social security number?”. Another student
was more open to using the device if it did not have any Internet connectivity; he
said, “If you connect to the Internet, I start to become skeptical in terms of privacy, the
information has the ability to leave the device.” Another student was worried about
losing the device; she asked, “What if you misplace the device? Is there security on the
device”.
Misuse of information. A majority of the participants were worried that their
personal information might be used by people they had not intended to share it
with. A few students were worried that potential employers might not hire them,
if they wear the device to a job interview. Some participants were worried about
discrimination by insurance companies. After hearing the scenario about Jack
who uses an mHealth device to track his medication intake, an elderly participant
said that “insurance companies might not want to insure Jack if he is lax about taking
his medication”. A student was worried about the information being misused by
the government; he said, “I’m not too into the government knowing where I am going
and what I am doing”. Some participants were worried about their information
being used for marketing purposes. A student commented, “Wouldn’t people want
[our personal information] for other things, to sell products and to target [a specific]
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audience?” Another student was concerned about stalkers, she said, “If someone can
hack into the website, then someone can track you like a stalker.”
Change in trust relationships. A student was concerned about using a device
to monitor patients’ adherence to their treatment because it meant that “the doctor
didn’t trust [the patients] to be honest.” An elderly participant said that he would not
use the mHealth device unless he trusted his doctor; he said, “More the information
you collect, more trust you need to have that information is secure.” A few students felt
that constant patient monitoring would improve the doctor-patient relationship;
according to one student, “They are working together, it’s like a partnership.” Another
student pointed out that “[The device] holds [the patient] accountable a lot more,
compared to when she could lie to her doctor and say that [the treatment] is not working.”
Some elderly participants were concerned about sharing information with their
family. One said, “[Suppose you share sensitive information] with one family member,
then there is a family gathering and they discuss [the medical situation].” Another
elderly participant said that if a patient’s wife was to constantly monitor his location
and his activities, “it would destroy the trust [he had] in [his] wife.” One elderly
participant was open to sharing his information only with his daughter, since she
took care of him. One student, on the other hand, pointed out that sharing health
information with family would lead to “more arguments in the family.” Most students
agreed that they would trust their doctor with their health information more than
their family. One student said, “If I like had a medical condition, I would feel obligated
to talk to a doctor, but less obligated to talk to a sibling about it on a daily basis.” Most
students were not open to sharing their health information with their friends and
some felt that if they had to share their health information with their friends, they
would trust only their closest friends.
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2.1.2 Benefits vs. Privacy Tradeoff
Some participants wanted to use the devices, because they understood the benefits
of the device, since they or their family or friends had suffered from a similar
condition and they agreed that they would wear the device at all times. One student
said, “If I’m being tracked and for my own benefit, I’ll keep it on whenever I can and as
long as it is with my doctor and at most with my family.” Another student said, “If you
want [the device], it makes you a bit more willing to put more information up there. If it is
something that is forced upon you, you might not respond well to it.” A few participants
felt that they would not be concerned about privacy if they were using the device
to get better; one student pointed out, “If I was really concerned about the disorder, I
think I would definitely not be concerned about the privacy.”
2.1.3 Challenges to reduce privacy concerns
Some participants were concerned that a lot of unnecessary information was being
collected by the devices in the scenarios. According to some elderly participants,
“The doctor should not be spending time on [unimportant] details during the appointment”
and “It might not be in the doctor’s expertise to analyze the collected information, so they
might have to share it with others [without the patient’s knowledge]”. One elderly
participant was worried that devices could collect wrong information, he said “a
pedometer doesn’t get correct values always.” Some students pointed out that some
devices might collect information about people around the patient without their
knowledge and their consent.
Need for clarity of information collection and usage. Most participants ex-
pressed the need to be aware of what information was being collected by the device.
A student pointed out that his privacy concerns depended on what information
was being collected; he said, “[If the device takes] into account details of someone’s life,
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that is going to affect the way they act and get into privacy issues”.
Ignorant users. One student could not understand why anyone would steal
or misuse her health information. A user who cannot comprehend the consequences
of a privacy breach might end up disclosing more information than necessary.
Providing adequate control to the user. All the participants wanted the
control to decide what information to share and with whom and under what
circumstances. Some of them felt that having the control to turn the device on or off
or to take the device off would defeat the purpose of using the device. After hearing
the scenario about a patient using an mHealth device to track his medication intake,
one student said, “If you have to remember to turn it on or off, it becomes optional. Its like
taking your medication in the first place.” Another student wanted the control to delete
some information collected by devices before it was shared with others. An elderly
participant said she wanted complete control over all the decisions she made; she
said, “People [at the retirement home] like to have control over their lives as much as
possible. Unless I became incapable, I will consider everything intrusive unless I can choose
what to do with the information.”
Flexibility of privacy controls, based on recipients. We discovered that pri-
vacy concerns varied with the data recipient. One student wanted to share the data
with someone who could help him understand the data that was collected. A few
students said they would share their information only if it could not be traced back
to them by strangers, one student said, “I wouldn’t mind if [my information] wasn’t
associated to my name in any way, if I was purely a number”. Some participants wanted
to share information only with sharing partners who they felt could offer some
medical help. One student said sharing decisions “depend on kind of help [family and
friends] can give based on the position I’m in”. A few participants were not happy
about being compared with their peers; one elderly participant said, “It might be
discouraging if you fall behind others. [I would be] happier when I didn’t know”. Most
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participants were more open to sharing their health information with doctors than
with their family. One student said, “Your doctor has your health in mind. Your parents
have like so many other interests in mind”, while another student said, “What the parents
view as social norm, whereas the doctor views it from medical point of view.” On the other
hand, one elderly participant said, “We want to be independent [from our family] as
long as we can. We just want to be dependent on people [at the retirement home]. But I
will be okay sharing it with caregivers.” One elderly participant said, “I didn’t want my
wife to know [about my stroke] since I didn’t want her to worry, since she was [out of
town]” while another elderly participant said, “I would tell her, [she] would worry less
if [she] knew early.” According to a few students, health information should not be
shared with family unless the patient could not make decisions on their own, e.g., if
the patient was a minor or an elderly person.
Flexibility of privacy controls, based on information type. We discovered
that privacy concerns varied with the type of information that was being collected
and shared. After hearing about the different scenarios, most participants felt that
they would be more open to sharing their diet and exercise information with others
than medication, location and social interactions, though one student said that even
though she would base her sharing decisions on who the information was being
shared with, she would be most concerned about sharing her location and her diet
with others. Some students said that collecting information about location and
social interactions would be desirable if the patients had a criminal record, if they
were suspected to be terrorists or if they were in prison.
Laws. A few students were concerned about privacy laws. One student was
worried about their complexity, “Some things are difficult to be explained to people,
especially the huge privacy laws” while another student was worried whether his
information will still be protected when laws change in the future, “Laws change.
[Suppose] right now, no third party can [access the information collected using the
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mHealth devices] . What if ten years down the road, the supreme court says [the third
parties] have the right?”
Device Form Factor. A majority of the students said that they would not wear
the device if it was conspicuous because they were worried about being judged
by others. A student said, “If it’s like conspicuous, you know, people would always be
like asking, what does that device do?”. Elderly participants were concerned about
physical comfort (one participant gave an example of his watch: “I used to wear it 24
hours a day, now it keeps me awake, so I take it off but forget to put it on”) and they did
not want the device to disrupt their normal routine, with notifications.
The focus groups revealed that if users are not comfortable with the way their
information is being collected or shared, they may not use mHealth technologies
at all, or use them in limited ways, thereby reducing the potential for mHealth
technologies to improve health and healthcare. In addition, users’ preferences for
collecting and sharing information are likely to vary depending on the types of
information, the types of recipients and how the information was to be used.
Prior work, including the preliminary study we mentioned above, studied
users’ sharing behavior through focus groups, surveys and interviews; in these
cases, study participants either were given hypothetical scenarios about health data
management, had a brief opportunity to use a health device, or were assumed to
have experience with collecting and sharing health information. People’s stated
privacy preferences and concerns, however, may differ from their actual sharing
behavior [53, 89]; thus, it is important to examine actual sharing behavior with real
mHealth devices that can share real data with real people.
To study how new mHealth users share different types of personal information
with different recipients over time, we conducted a user study with n=41 partici-
pants. Our subjects could decide whether to share the information and if so, how
much information to share with others. The device we used for our study is one of
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the most popular devices, a fitness device called Fitbit. None of the participants in
the user study had ever used a Fitbit prior to the study. At least ten participants
had previously used a pedometer but had never uploaded its data to a website or
online application.
First, we describe users’ privacy preferences based on the results of the focus
group. Then we use the findings from our user study to answer the following
questions:
• Did participants share different types of personal or sensed information more
or less frequently?
• Do participants’ decisions about sharing health information differ across types
of sharing partners (family members, friends, third parties, and the public)?
• Does sharing behavior change over time, that is, are participants’ privacy
preferences dynamic?
We confirmed that people’s sharing behavior depends on the type of informa-
tion being shared and the sharing recipient. Our results showed that participants
were generally less willing to share personal demographic information or context
information collected by the mHealth device, than about sharing the health in-
formation that the device is meant to collect. Our results also showed something
surprising – study participants were more willing to share some information with
strangers than with their own family and friends; among strangers, they were more
willing to share some information with specific third parties than with “the public”
at large. We also confirmed that people’s privacy behavior is dynamic; participants’
sharing behavior changed during the course of our study. It is important to under-
stand people’s willingness to share, so that mHealth devices can provide patients
with the controls to share their information in a manner such that they can enjoy
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the benefits provided by the device without disclosing more information than is
necessary.
2.2 Fitbit User Study
During the focus groups, the participants voiced concerns that they thought they
might have about the collection and sharing of their health information, based on
the hypothetical scenarios that we presented to them. To better understand what
concerns people might have when they actually share their health information, we
conducted a social experiment to examine users’ decisions to share particular types
of information with various types of information recipients (and requesters) over
a 5-day period. Participants carried a device that collected their personal health
information and shared the collected information with family, friends and third
parties. From the focus groups, we found that exercise was considered to be the
least sensitive type of personal health information when compared to medications,
location and social interaction. So we decided to conduct a user study where users
would use a device that collects exercise information, to understand whether users
would have privacy concerns when sharing seemingly insensitive information like
steps, calories and sleep.
2.2.1 Study design
During the study, users were asked to carry a Fitbit [69], a popular mHealth device
that uses an accelerometer to estimate a user’s calories burned, steps taken, distance
traveled, and sleep quality. During the five days of the study, each subject was
asked to wear the Fitbit at all times, except when swimming, bathing, or any time
they felt uncomfortable wearing it. They were asked to upload the collected data
at least daily to fitbit.com. Unfortunately, fitbit.com only provided users with
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limited coarse-grained data sharing options, and no mechanism for monitoring
sharing behaviors. So, we developed a custom web interface that displayed both
uploaded Fitbit data and personal traits and allowed users to share data with others.
Participants used this interface (instead of fitbit.com) to view their data and make
sharing decisions, throughout the study.
The goal of the user study was to understand people’s willingness to share
their personal health/fitness information with family, friends, third parties and
the public. Previous work has shown that young and old people have different
views about sharing health information [159, 61, 85]. So, we recruited a sample of
college students, working adults, and retirees for the user study. We recruited 21
undergraduate students, 12 adult workers from the local area including Dartmouth
employees, and 8 female elderly residents of a local retirement home, as shown in
Table 2.1. It was not an aim of the study to understand the influence of gender and
occupation on privacy concerns, so we did not focus on the distribution of partici-
pants among these categories. The recruitment flyer (see Appendix B) presented the
study as a study of a new device to help individuals trying to lose weight and/or
improve fitness and health. To avoid self-selection bias, the participants were not
told that the study was about privacy. Subjects were required to own a computer,
to be injury-free, to be able to walk and carry the device with them during the five
days. Study participants were paid for their time.
We did not retain any sensitive information, like the participants’ fitness
information collected using the Fitbits, after the study; we stored only the sharing
settings that they chose. Study participants were debriefed after the study to make
them aware of the deception used in the study and to inform them that the goal
of the study was to understand their privacy concerns and not just to collect their
activity data, and that we shared their data only with the people they chose as
their sharing partners. This study, including our use of deception and subsequent
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Male Female Total
Students 8 13 21
Working 5 7 12
Retired 0 8 8
Total 13 28 41
Table 2.1: Participants
debriefing procedure, was approved by Dartmouth’s Institutional Review Board.
To study participants’ willingness to share secondary information, apart from
the primary sensed information, we also collected other related personal informa-
tion about each participant, including his or her age, gender, height, weight, health
goals, overall activity level and academic major. Henceforth, we refer to these seven
characteristics as “traits”.
To understand how participants share information with real people, we asked
them to select family members and friends to receive their shared information.
Throughout the study, participants also received requests to share data with specific
third parties. These specific third parties represent academic researchers, medical
labs, private companies, and the government. The third parties were real, but the
requests were fake. (For example, one of the email requests was from a fictitious
group of students at Harvard University, requesting activity data for use in a
machine-learning class. See Appendix B.) Each participant also had a “public
profile” available on the website with their Fitbit data; we told the participants that
this profile was visible to anyone who had the url (unless they changed the setting,
as described below).
The website provided opt-out sharing settings; by default, all the collected
information was shared in the finest detail unless participants changed the settings
to “opt-out” of sharing. We used an opt-out policy (instead of opt-in) to be consistent
with the majority of online applications now available in which the default privacy
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setting is to share, with the option to “opt-out” of sharing. We understand, though,
that people’s sharing decisions are influenced by default settings [152]. Although
we agree that opt-in settings give more control to the user, for our study we used
opt-out to provoke action (visit website and change settings) that we could observe
among those with privacy preferences.
We wanted to study people’s willingness to share their information, and not
how they adapted to the device and controls on the website. So, the study was
divided into two phases; a learning phase in which participants were given two
days to get used to the device and website, and the study phase, in which we
observed participants’ sharing settings during days 3-5 of the study.
The learning phase — day 1 and day 2. The researchers met with participants,
individually, on both days to answer any questions they had about using the device
and the website. On the first day of the study, participants were asked to select at
least one family member and two friends with whom to share their information.
An email was sent to these sharing partners, informing them about the study and
asking them to be a part of the study.
On the second day, we told the participants that their information would be
shared with their family and friends from the next day onwards and that they could
decide, by using the controls on the website, whether and what they wanted to
share with their family members and friends. We also informed participants that
over the next few days they might get requests from third parties to share their
information but that they could use the controls on the website to limit sharing
of their information; they were required to visit the website for each third-party
request so that we could observe their sharing choices. Similarly we informed
them that their data on the website would be open to the public but they could use
controls to opt-out of sharing. We did not tell the participants that the third-party
requests were fake or that their information was not actually exposed to the public;
19
we revealed this deception only at the end of the study.
The sharing phase — day 3 to day 5. On the third day of the study, an email
was sent to the family members and friends with a link to a webpage where they
could see the participant’s shared Fitbit information and traits. Throughout the
study, participants could change the sharing settings for each type of information
and for each sharing partner. The Fitbit-collected activity data (i.e., steps, calories
and sleep) could be shared in 5-minute, hourly, 6-hourly, or daily summaries, or
it could be not shared at all. By default, activity data was shared at the maximum
setting, i.e., 5-minute granularity. Participants were also able to share or hide their
personal traits (age, height, weight, gender, activity level, health goals, academic
major), independently by type and for each sharing partner. Participants also
received emails everyday during the five-day period of the study, containing status
information. From the third day of the study onwards, these mails explained who
was receiving their information and what sharing settings they had chosen for each
information type for each sharing partner. The message also contained a link to the
site where they could change these settings at any time.
The web interface showed different views of the same information. The
default view, shown in Figure 2.1a, was the participant’s view. The interface also
had views corresponding to each sharing partner; see Figure 2.1b. On these views,
the participant could decide what information she wanted to share with her sharing
partner, make changes with the click of a button and observe exactly what her
sharing partner will be able to see; the goal of our website design was to reduce the
disconnect between sharing controls and the information being shared.
The emails from third parties, requesting to access participant information
from the website, including all information and their email addresses, were sent by
us as if from 6 different organizations/groups. Each third-party email explained
who the group was and why they wanted the data. The groups identified were:
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(a) Own View
(b) Sharing partner’s view (Mom’s view)
Figure 2.1: Screenshots of views on the study website
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college students, a research lab, a government agency, an engineering company,
a wellness institute and a pharmaceutical company. Here we do not examine
differences in willingness to share between these different types of third parties.
Instead we analyze sharing behavior with all third parties as a category to compare
to other sharing partner categories (family, friends, public). We told the participants
that the data on the website to be shared with third parties was not anonymous
(email address was shared), but that their email address would be used by the
third parties only if the researchers needed to contact them. The email address
was, however, not visible on their public profile and hence not shared with the
“public”. The order of third-party email requests was randomized, and the number
of requests varied across the days (three on the third day, one on the fourth and
two on the last day). We did not actually share the participants’ data with any
third-party organizations, but crafted the messages to be as believable as possible.
We monitored participants’ website activity through logs, that recorded when
they logged in, when they looked at their own data view or the views of their various
sharing partners and when they changed the sharing settings. To understand
reasons behind participants’ sharing behavior, we conducted post-study interviews
in which we asked the participants several questions: whether they ever took off
the device to hide any information, whether they ever changed the sharing settings
and why, and whether they fell for our deception (that the study was really about
privacy-related behavior, and that no data was actually shared with the public or
with third parties). After the interviews, we revealed the deception and explained
to them that the goal of the study was not to collect their fitness information, but to
observe their sharing behavior. We recorded the interviews, then transcribed and
coded them manually. For interview questions, see Appendix B.1.
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2.2.2 Analytic methods
We conducted quantitative analysis of the website logs to understand the partici-
pants’ sharing settings and a qualitative analysis of the post-study interviews to
give us insight into the reasons for their sharing behavior. We use the analysis to
answer the questions listed earlier.
2.2.3 Measuring sharing behavior
To measure participants’ willingness to share their information with a group of
sharing partners, we defined a sharing score for each participant. The sharing score
was computed as follows:
s(u, p, t, d) is the setting chosen by user (u) on day (d) when sharing informa-
tion type (t) with sharing partner (p). For steps, calories and sleep, the setting can
be 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4, which corresponds to the five possible settings: hide, share daily
summary, share 6-hourly summary, share hourly summary, and share 5-minute
detail respectively. For the other information types, the setting can be either 0
(hide information) or 1 (share information). By default, s(u, p, t, d)=4 for t={steps,
calories, sleep} and s(u, p, t, d)=1 for t={age, gender, health goals, height, activity
level, academic major, weight}. That is, the default setting is the maximum sharing
setting. We normalize each score by dividing by max(t).
max(t) =
 4 ∀t ∈ (steps,calories,sleep)1 otherwise (2.1)
To represent the amount of information shared with a category of sharing
partners (i.e., family, friends, third parties, public), we computed an overall sharing
score for that category, labeled as “group sharing score”. Equation 2.2 defines the
group sharing score for participant (u) on day (d) as the mean of all sharing scores
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for type (t) for each member of the sharing partner group (g). For example, if a
participant identified two friends then the friend group sharing score for weight
would be the mean of the sharing scores for weight for the two friends.
grpscore(u, g, t, d) =
1
|g| ∑∀p∈g
s(u, p, t, d) (2.2)
To measure how personal traits were shared, we also computed a combined
sharing score for traits, which is the average of the sharing scores of all the personal
traits, labeled traits.
We focus most of our analysis on two snapshots: the initial sharing score,
grpscore(u, g, t, 2) for the last setting on day 2 for each type t, and the final sharing
score, grpscore(u, g, t, 5). We normalize each score by dividing by max(t), on
day 5. Unless mentioned otherwise, we used t-tests to compute the difference
between normalized sharing scores, to understand how different information types
were shared with the different groups; paired sample t-tests were used to compare
different behaviors of a single subject, whereas independent sample t-tests were
used to compare one subject to another. We used analysis of variance (ANOVA)
post-hoc testing using Bonferroni’s method to compare the sharing behavior of
students, employees and retirees; whereas the t-test is used to compare the means
between two groups, ANOVA is a statistical procedure used to compare means
between three or more groups.
2.2.4 Results
We present below the results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis.
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Website visits
We analyzed the number of visits to the different web pages and changes in settings
to understand participants’ interest in their data and how the information was
shared.
We first observed how many times participants visited the different views on
their account on the study website. From the logs, we extracted the number of times
participants visited their own view and views of their sharing partners. When a
participant logged in to her account, she was directed to her own view. The mean
and standard deviation for the number of times participants visited their own view
(including distinct logins) was 6.32 and 5.37 respectively; the maximum number of
visits was 23.
More interest about sharing controls with public and third parties than
family and friends. We computed the number of times participants looked at the
views of their sharing partners. The female student who visited her own view
23 times also had the maximum number (120) of total visits to the views of the
third parties (20 visits each to the views of the third parties). Table 2.2 shows the
number of times participants looked at the views of their sharing partners averaged
across the number of partners they chose (in the case of family and friends) and
the number of requests they received (in the case of third parties). We are not
distinguishing between participants who visited the view of just one partner in a
group and those who visited the views of all the partners in the same group. We
conducted paired sample t-tests and found a statistically significant difference in
the number of times participants looked at the views of friends and family and
the views of third parties and the public, as shown in Table 2.2. Participants were
clearly interested in how their information was shared with the public and third
parties, more so than their family and friends; based on their interest, we expected
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Table 2.2: Table shows mean and (standard deviation) of the number of
visits to public view and average number of visits to views of friends, family,
and third parties.
Family views Friend views Public view Third-party views
1.33 1 8.78∗∗ 3.17†
(3.53) (2.76) (8.32) (4.31)
∗∗ Visits to public view > visits to family, friends and third-party views (p ≤
0.01).
† Visits to third-party views > visits to family (p ≤ 0.1) and visits to friend views
(p ≤ 0.05).
them to share less information with public and third parties.
Young participants changed default settings more than elders. By default,
activity information (to 5-minute detail) and participants’ personal characteristics
are shared with all their sharing partners. The participants could restrict sharing
information about their activity information by selecting settings like hide infor-
mation or share a daily, 6-hourly, or hourly summary of the information. They
could also hide their personal characteristics. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of
participants who changed the default setting at least once. Figure 2.2a shows the
percentage of male and female participants who changed the default settings at
least once and Figure 2.2b shows the percentage of students, employees and retirees
who changed settings at least once. We can see that more than 80% of students and
nearly 70% of female participants changed the default settings, whereas 75% of
elderly participants never changed the default settings for any sharing partners,
not even for the ‘public’ partner. Using post-hoc ANOVA test with Bonferroni’s
method, we discovered that there was a statistically significant difference in the
number of students who changed the default setting when compared to the number
of retirees. The above percentages were based on all 41 participants, including
those participants who had not selected a family member or a friend to share their
information with. Even though we told all the participants that their information
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was being shared with the public, we speculate that some participants might have
forgotten that they were sharing the information, since they did not select any one
to share their information with. This could be one of the reasons for the difference
in behavior (especially since only three retirees selected at least one family member
or friend), although it may appear that students were more concerned about their
sharing settings than retirees.
Among the 73% of participants who selected at least one family or friend to
share their information with, we discovered that 80% of the female participants
and 60% of the male participants changed the default sharing settings at least
once for at least one partner. Basing our comparison on profession, we found
that 80% of students, 70% of employees and 33% of the retirees in this group
changed the default settings at least once for at least one partner. Using post-hoc
ANOVA test with Bonferroni’s method, we discovered that there was a statistically
significant difference in the number of students who changed the default setting
when compared to the number of retirees (p < 0.01).
Among the 90% of the participants who received the third-party requests, we
discovered that 75% of the female participants and 54% of the male participants
changed the default sharing settings at least once for at least one partner. Basing
our comparison on profession, we found that 80% of students, 64% of employees
and 33% of the retirees in this group changed the default settings at least once
for at least one partner. Using post-hoc ANOVA test with Bonferroni’s method,
we discovered that there was a statistically significant difference in the number
of students who changed the default setting when compared to the number of
employees and retirees (p < 0.05).
It appears that students are more concerned about their sharing settings than
retirees. This difference in behavior could be due to several reasons: we speculate






































(b) Sharing partner’s view (Based on profession)
Figure 2.2: Percentage of participants who changed default settings at least once. *Number
of students who changed the default settings is significantly greater than retirees (p ≤ 0.05
with ANOVA post-hoc testing using Bonferroni’s method).
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family and friends by sharing with them information that the retirees feel will not be
of interest; when they do share this information with others, they are less concerned
about the information than students. We expect students, on the hand, to be used
to the technology and used to sharing information electronically with others. We
speculate that they might have changed the default settings either because they
were curious about the different settings or because they were really concerned
about what they were sharing with others. We expect students and employees
to have more reasons to be worried about their activities and hiding it from their
family and friends than retirees; either because they were embarassed about some
information, maybe their weight, or they wanted to hide some information, like
partying or sexual activity. Students and employees were more engaged in the
study than retirees. In Section 2.2.4, we present anecdotal evidence of such behavior
and concerns.
Information sharing analysis
27 of the 41 participants identified both a family member and friends with whom
to share information. Among the 27 participants, the mean number (and standard
deviation) of family members and friends that the participants chose were 1.26
(0.44) and 2.11 (0.5) respectively. Two participants did not identify a family member,
but did identify friends, while 11 participants did not select any friends or family
members (the reasons given by these respondents included privacy concerns, not
wanting to bother them, and expectation of lack of interest, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.4). These 11 participants, however, were not considered when we computed
sharing scores for friends and family. Similarly, when comparing sharing scores
between family and public, we used the scores of all participants who selected at
least one family member.
Did participants share different types of personal or sensed information
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† Sharing score for sensed information (steps, calories and sleep) is
significantly higher than for weight and goals, sharing score for weight
is significantly less than the score for most personal traits (age, gender,
academic major, height and activity level) and sharing score for goals is
significantly less than the score for age, p ≤ 0.1
more or less frequently? Table 2.3 shows the final normalized sharing scores for
family used to evaluate within-subject differences in sharing different types of
information.
Table 2.3 shows that with family members, the study participants shared
weight and health goals less than age, academic major, activity level and the sensed
information (steps). It is not surprising that participants were willing to share
obvious information known to their family members such as age and gender, but at
least some participants seemed to consider information like weight and health goals
as more private. In the post-study interviews, some participants were reluctant to
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share this information because they worried that family members might judge them
and even reprimand them. A web interface might influence sharing behavior, but
in the web interface we built, however, sensed information was more prominent
than personal traits, so the sensitivity of weight and health goals had nothing to do
with the interface layout.
Do participants’ decisions about sharing health information differ across
types of sharing partners (family members, friends, third parties, and the pub-
lic)? Table 2.4 shows the normalized final group sharing scores for sensed informa-
tion (steps, calories, sleep), traits (the combined score), weight, goals and academic
major across three comparison categories: family vs. friends, family vs. public,
public vs. third parties. Recall that a score of 1 implies that the information has
been shared to its maximum with all the sharing recipients in that group.
More information shared with family than friends. Subjects shared weight
with family significantly more often than with friends. The sharing scores for friends
were marginally less than that for family members for all other information types
as well, but the differences are not statistically significant. From the interviews, we
learned that some participants were more concerned about sharing their information
with their friends because they were worried of being judged by their friends more
than by their family, especially in the case of students, since they see their friends
everyday.
More information shared with family than public. Table 2.4 shows that
participants shared more information about their steps, calories and sleep with
family than with the public. Participants said that they felt uncomfortable sharing
sensed information with strangers because it made them feel like they were “being
watched”. Not surprisingly, participants also shared personal traits significantly
more with family than with public.
Less information shared with public than with third parties. Table 2.4
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Table 2.4: Final normalized sharing scores for family vs. friends, family vs. public, and public
vs third parties (TP)
Family vs. Friends Family vs. Public Public vs. TP
Family Friends Family Public Public TP
Steps
0.96 0.94 0.96 0.91∗ 0.89 0.89
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25)
Calories
0.96 0.94 0.96 0.89∗ 0.89 0.89
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)
Sleep
0.96 0.95 0.96 0.87∗ 0.87 0.87
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
Traits
0.91 0.83 0.91 0.78∗ 0.80 0.83
(0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32)
Goals
0.85 0.73 0.86 0.61∗ 0.68 0.82∗
(0.36) (0.42) (0.36) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38)
Major
0.94 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.98 0.82∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.00) (0.16) (0.38)
Weight
0.83 0.64∗ 0.84 0.54∗∗ 0.59 0.74∗
(0.37) (0.46) (0.36) (0.51) (0.50) (0.43)
n=27 n=28 n=37
† Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.01
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shows that participants were generally more open to sharing weight and health
goals with specific third parties than with the public. In the post-study interviews,
some participants said this was because they perceived some benefit in sharing
information with specific third parties. Third-party request emails contained a
reason for wanting the participants’ data and at least some participants apparently
expected the third parties to use their data for the purposes mentioned in the email.
In contrast, some participants expressed concern about who among the public
would be accessing their information or how they might use it.
Surprisingly, participants were less willing to share academic major with the
specific third parties than with the public. Some participants said during the post-
study interview that they shared information with specific third parties because
they thought that the information would be useful, based on the purpose stated in
the third-party request. Some of them felt that academic major was not relevant to
the request.
Given the comparison on personal traits, we were surprised to see no differ-
ence in sharing of sensed information between public and third parties.
Does sharing behavior change over time; are participants’ privacy prefer-
ences dynamic? In Table 2.5, we show select traits and sensed information by the
initial (end of day 2) and final (end of day 5) sharing scores for three sets of sharing
partners: family, friends and public.
Sharing sensed information. For family, participants did not change sharing
behavior of sensed information over the course of the study, while for friends,
there was a slight (non-significant) change. For the public, however, we found that
there was a statistically significant reduction in sharing scores for steps and sleep.
Some participants felt uncomfortable sharing their steps and sleep, as the study
progressed; they said that they felt like they were being watched.
Sharing traits. Similarly, in the case of the trait information, there was a
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slight (non-significant) reduction in sharing scores for family. However, there was
a statistically significant difference between the initial and final sharing scores
for friends and for the public. We learned from the post-study interviews that
some participants were embarrassed to share certain personal traits with friends
and concerned about sharing their personal traits with strangers; they might have
realized it only seeing their data over time. More details of the post-study interviews
are given in Section 2.2.4.
Demographic differences. Though the study was not designed to examine
differences in sharing by characteristics like occupational status or gender, we did
find some differences across these characteristics and so present them as preliminary
findings that are suggestive of future study. As shown in Table 2.6, independent
sample t-tests revealed that females shared traits (the combined score), weight
and goals with friends, significantly less than did male subjects. The table shows
only the difference in sharing with friends, but there was a statistically significant
difference in the extent personal traits, weight and activity level were shared with
public and third parties as well [133].
As shown in Table 2.7, students shared their weight with family more than
employees shared with family. In contrast, they shared their health goals less with
the public, than employed adults did with the public. Some of the employees said
they did not want to share weight information with their family to avoid discussion
about weight management. Students considered health goals to be sensitive and
did not want to share this information with the public, but surprisingly, employees
were more willing to share this information with the public.
Students were much more concerned than retirees about sharing their personal
traits, weight and goals with the public, as shown in Table 2.8. (Caveat: Recall that
we had only female retirees; given that females shared less than males with friends
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Table 2.5: Initial and final normalized sharing scores for family, friends and public
Family Friends Public
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Steps
0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.88∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.22) (0.26)
Calories
0.96 0.96 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.88
(0.19) (0.19) (0.02) (0.17) (0.23) (0.27)
Sleep
0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.87†
(0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.30)
Traits
0.95 0.91 0.93 0.84∗ 0.92 0.80∗∗
(0.19) (0.23) (0.13) (0.26) (0.17) (0.29)
Activity
0.96 0.93 0.95 0.84† 0.98 0.85∗
(0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.36) (0.16) (0.36)
Goals
0.93 0.86 0.88 0.75∗ 0.83 0.68∗
(0.26) (0.36) (0.29) (0.41) (0.38) (0.47)
Weight
0.89 0.84 0.80 0.63∗∗ 0.83 0.61∗∗
(0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (0.46) (0.38) (0.49)
n=28 n=29 n=41
† Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.01
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Table 2.6: Final normalized sharing scores based on gender
Female Male
grpscore(u, Friends, Traits, 5) 0.78 0.95 †
grpscore(u, Friends, Weight, 5) 0.47 0.95 ∗∗
grpscore(u, Friends, Goals, 5) 0.64 0.95 ∗
† Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.01
in Table 2.6, we are not sure why female retirees shared more with the public than
students.) There are several possible reasons for this difference in behavior: we
speculate that the retirees are not used to the technology or do not want to bother
their family and friends by sharing with them information that the retirees feel will
not be of interest; when they do share this information with others, they are less
concerned about the information than students. We expect students, on the hand, to
be used to the technology and used to sharing information electronically with others.
We speculate that they might have changed the default settings either because they
were curious about the different settings or because they were really concerned
about what they were sharing with others. We expect students and employees to
have more reasons to be worried about their activities and to hide it from their
family and friends than retirees; either because they were embarrassed about some
information, maybe their weight, or they wanted to hide some information, like
partying or sexual activity. Students and employees were more engaged in the
study than retirees. In Section 2.2.4, we present anecdotal evidence of such behavior
and concerns.
To summarize, we found that weight and health goals appeared to be most
sensitive among the information collected during the study. Participants exhibited
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Table 2.7: Final normalized sharing scores - students vs.employees
Students Employees
grpscore(u, Family, Weight, 5) 0.90 0.50 †
grpscore(u, Public, Goals, 5) 0.48 0.83 †
† Sharing scores of students and employees are different, p ≤ 0.1
Table 2.8: Final normalized sharing scores - students vs.retirees
Students Retirees
grpscore(u, Public, Traits, 5) 0.74 1.00 †
grpscore(u, Public, Weight, 5) 0.48 1.00 ∗
grpscore(u, Public, Goals, 5) 0.48 1.00 ∗
† Sharing scores of students and retirees are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Sharing scores of students and retirees are different, p ≤ 0.05
disparate and dynamic sharing behavior of this information. We found some
evidence that sharing behavior might vary with occupational status and gender.
After observing the participants’ sharing behavior, we wanted to understand the
reasons for their sharing behavior, as discussed in the next section.
Post-study Interviews
To give us insight into the reasons for participants’ sharing behavior, we conducted
post-study interviews. We discuss the answers to the following questions: “Did
you change the sharing controls on the interface at any point? If so, what influenced that
decision? Did you change the sharing controls for X? If so, why?”. For answers to other
questions, please refer to our technical report [133]. We recorded the interviews.
We coded the interviews manually and grouped the statements into categories. We
discuss below the reasons for the participants’ sharing behavior.
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Amount of information collected. Three participants mentioned that they
felt the information was not sensitive because the device collected information only
for five days. One female student said that the reason she shared the information
with third parties was because “it was a study and it wasn’t very long.”
Context of data collection. A few students were concerned about sharing
information that was collected by devices while they were at parties or staying up
late. A male employee asked, “would [the device] be something you would keep on
during sexual activity or when you go to the bathroom?”
Sensitivity of the data. One male student shared all his information with
others, but said that he might have had concerns about sharing “if maybe I was
someone who [was] trying to exercise more and I exercised less.” A few female students
did not want to share their activity information because they felt like they were
being watched. One of them said, “they can see every step I take, that was just a little
weird.”
Information utility. Some participants decided to share their information
with others depending on how they would use the information. One female student
said, “I think I hid my weight from almost everybody, except for people who actually needed
it for medical purposes.” One employee, being a researcher, was open to sharing her
health information with other researchers. Some participants considered the third
parties differently, based on their reason for requesting the data. One female student
said, “I was fine with sharing things [with universities]; for some reason, they felt a lot
more legitimate, you know what they would be doing, studying. It was random people that I
didn’t know what they were doing that I [did not want to share my information with].”
One male student said he would share information with everyone, as long as it
would not affect him in the future when he was applying for insurance or jobs. He
said, “I would be fine with all of those, with the exception if that has an impact on the ability
to apply for insurance or something of that nature, in which case I would start to worry.”
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Anonymity. A few students felt their information would not be linked to
them (even though they were aware that their email was being shared), so they
were comfortable sharing it with third parties. According to a female student, “They
don’t know who I am, they are just doing research.” One male employee felt that his
identity is linked more to his name than his email. He said, “It’s my name, but I
control [my email]. I control what I get, I can change my email address.”
Sharing partners. Most participants said they would share information de-
pending on who it was being shared with. One female student said “If there was
someone who was a lot heavier than me, I probably would have given them the 5 minute
calories, because they might feel bad that I used so many calories throughout the day. With
friends who were less active than me, I would have shared less.”
Partner involvement. One male student was happy to share his activity
information with others; he said when you share activity information, “you feel like
other people are in this with you, it makes it easier to keep going”, and he said encouraging
feedback from his friends made him feel good about sharing his information. A
female student shared her Fitbit information with third parties, because according
to her, “when I was wearing [the device] and getting data requests all the time, it felt like
what I was doing was important” and she was disappointed that the requests were
fake, and to her, it meant that “no one actually cares about your data and no one’s going
to use it, it was all for nothing kind of thing.” Some students did not want to share
certain information due to fear of being judged by others. A female student said,
“With my friends, I wasn’t sure whether to share my height and weight, because sometimes
especially if I am sharing with my girlfriends, oh they are like you are heavier than me,
lighter than me.” Another female student said, “I don’t mind articulating [my health
information] in person, but on a website, I feel it is more easily judged in the wrong way
that I can’t fully explain what is going on.”
Negative experiences. A female student was concerned about sharing infor-
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mation with the government, because she grew up in a country where “everything
was monitored by the government.” One female employee was sharing all her infor-
mation with the third parties during the study, until she noticed that she started
getting spam about weight loss, which must have been coincidental.
Relationships. One elderly participant was not comfortable with sharing
her activity information with her children. She said, “I didn’t want them to have to
encourage me to walk more. They don’t need to know. We are very very close but they don’t
need to know how much I walk.” A male student said, “I told [my mom] I would tell
her of any results of any significance, but I told her that I was hiding the data and I wasn’t
going to let her see it. Honestly, my friends didn’t care about the data.”
Some students were more comfortable sharing their information with family
than their friends. One said, “If it was someone I didn’t know I would share everything.
Friends they know you, but you are not close enough to share everything with them. I shared
everything with my mom.”
Some female students were more comfortable sharing personal information
with their family and third parties than with their friends. One student said “I might
have left height and weight with family, but friends don’t need to know that. I shared it with
companies and researchers, because I think it is pertinent.”
Some students were more comfortable sharing their information with family
and friends than third parties. Two of them said, “I didn’t share any information with
the extra researchers. I don’t know who they are and I have no affiliation with them.” and
“I don’t know [the requesters]. I don’t think it is weird that they were asking for [the
information], but it was weird sharing with them. From teammates, hid my weight and
my health goals. From my mom, I didn’t hide anything.”
Some students wanted to share their information with third parties more than
with people they knew, like their family and friends. They said they wanted to
share less information with family and friends: one participant said “because I know
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them personally, whereas the third parties they seem, not that personal... so I felt like more
of a pressure to hide more specific activity levels from [my family and friends].” Another
said “Because my parents are people who are big on exercise. If I don’t do much exercise,
they wouldn’t like that”, while a third participant said “A bunch of researchers looking
at the data, I don’t care. But I might think twice about some people I know, depending on
who they are.” Another participant said “People who don’t know me it would be fine. My
age doesn’t bother me, it would be mostly my weight. It all depends on who gets it, what is
the purpose. If it is somebody studying what is the better way to do things.”
Some participants did not want to share information with private companies.
A male student said, “I’m against corporations. I probably wouldn’t want any of them
[to have access to my information], except students.” A male employee said, “Oh
yeah, I would share that info [with students]. With individuals, with family members or
friends who are interested and people doing research I have no problem. It is just third-party
companies [that I wouldn’t want to have the data].”
One elderly retiree was not tech-savvy; her husband was helping her manage
her Fitbit account and he might have had an influence on her sharing decisions.
Information types. We asked the participants whether they would use a mo-
bile device that collects personal health information like their heart rate, breathing
rate, pulse rate, medication, diet and exercise, location, social interactions, if it gave
them similar sharing controls as the Fitbit in our study. Most students considered
medications to be most sensitive. A male student said, “Just like bodily functions,
you can’t really use that against you, whereas medication you are taking, that’s something
like, there are some medications people don’t want other people finding out that they are
taking.” Some of them were worried about sharing location and social interactions.
Students who were athletes were concerned about sharing their vital signs and
exercise information. One female employee was open to sharing any information
“as long as [she] could control who saw what”.
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2.3 Discussion
In addition to the focus groups, the user study helped us identify the key factors
that influence privacy decisions regarding health and fitness information collected
using mHealth devices. The findings from this study can help guide mHealth
device and application developers and privacy advocates to build flexible privacy
controls for mHealth devices, with sensible defaults and expressive controls for
users to change the settings thereafter.
We discovered that people were concerned about sharing more information
than necessary with their sharing partners. They based their decisions to share
information on the type of information being shared and people the information
was being shared with, i.e., the sharing partners. While making the sharing decision,
people take into account the volume of information that is shared, why the sharing
partner needs the information, the context in which the information was collected
and how sensitive the information is to them. People considered a certain type
of information to be sensitive if sharing partners could misuse the information
to cause harm to them or if sharing the information could cause a change in the
relationship that the people shared with the sharing partner. So their decision
to share information with sharing partners also depended on how they expected
the sharing partners to use the information and whether their relationship with
the sharing partners would be affected if the sharing partner was aware of this
information. On the other hand, they shared information if it was already known
to the sharing partners; for example, they shared age and gender with family and
friends.
People were more willing to share their health information with sharing
partners who had a positive influence on their health decisions, while they were
hesitant to share it with sharing partners with whom they have had prior negative
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interactions. People seemed to be willing to share their personal information
when they felt that the sharing partner would use the data for the betterment
of society, e.g., by using the data for research; in such cases, the sharing did not
directly benefit them, but it benefited society. Even in these instances, some people
ensured that they would not be harmed; they were particular about their anonymity
and wanted to ensure that their health information could not be linked to their
identity. On the other hand, people also took into account their prior experiences
with sharing partners when making the decision to share their information; some
participants had prior negative experience with the government and refused to
share any information with government agencies.
We also observed that participants changed their sharing settings during the
course of the study after receiving (negative and positive) feedback from sharing
partners. For example, one female employee was sharing all her information with
the third parties during the study, until she noticed that she started getting spam
about weight loss; she assumed it was from one of the third parties involved in the
study and stopped sharing her data with all third parties.
When designing sharing controls for a system, especially a system that handles
sensitive information like personal health information, it is important to ensure that
the controls are easy to use, flexible, and convenient and account for ignorant users
and changing privacy laws. Care should be taken that only adequate control is
given to the patient since they should not restrict the sharing partner from accessing
information that could be crucial to their healthcare; determining how much control
is adequate remains a challenge.
Our study revealed three interesting findings about people’s privacy concerns
regarding their sensed health information.
1. Demographic information shared less than sensed information. The
study revealed that participants were less willing to share the demographic infor-
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mation we collected than the activity information that was sensed by the device. For
example, initial sharing scores for weight and health goals were less than the initial
sharing scores for other information types, including the sensed information. We
expect users to be concerned about sharing certain context information, depending
on how it might affect the value they perceive in the information being shared. For
example, a user might share her location information when it is being collected by
her asthma sensor and shared with her mother, but she might not want to share
her location, when it is collected as part of her activity information by her fitness
device.
2. Willingness to share with strangers, sometimes, similar to or more than
friends. We discovered that sharing scores for friends were lower than scores for
family, while sharing scores for friends were lower than for third parties. However,
sharing scores for public were mostly the same or less than friends. The focus
groups and the post-study interviews revealed different reasons for people’s sharing
behavior, including their relationship with the sharing recipients. Participants were
more willing to share if they perceived benefits in sharing, especially when it
came to sharing with specific third parties, as opposed to the public. This finding
encouraged us to explore scenarios where individuals shared information with
strangers, and understand their reasons for sharing and what privacy concerns they
may have; in the following chapters, we discuss the systems we developed to allow
privacy-preserving sharing of information with strangers.
3. Dynamic sharing behavior. We confirmed that privacy concerns are not
static; mHealth device users may change their sharing decisions over time.
Given these findings, we elaborate on two recommendations that will help
guide the development of flexible privacy controls that enable users to express their
sharing preferences easily.
Flexible controls need to support both fine- and coarse-grained approaches
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to sharing. Throughout the study we observed a wide diversity in sharing behavior,
which was in accordance with the varied privacy preferences of the focus group
participants. Some study participants used a very coarse-grained approach, while
others took the time to fine-tune their privacy settings. Sensible default settings
are required to support those users who never change their sharing settings, either
because they are busy, lazy, not tech-savvy or want immediate benefits from the
system. The availability of granular controls encouraged participants, who were
averse to sharing everything, to share some information, instead of hiding all
information. Participants expressed disparate sharing preferences and exhibited
dynamic sharing behavior in our study, which implies that default “one size fits all”
settings are not enough.
We observed contradictory behavior among participants; some participants
shared more with their friends than with family, while others shared more with their
family than with their friends. We also observed dynamic sharing behavior; some
participants changed the amount of information they shared during the course of
the study. Granular levels of sharing and expressive controls, which we discuss next,
can help such users change their sharing setting easily to map their preferences.
Reducing disconnect between information and granular controls. Users
make their sharing decisions based on what information they are sharing and who
they are sharing it with. Since sharing decisions are dynamic, the information
should be clearly presented and the controls flexible and easy to use, to allow the
participant to map their privacy preferences easily. Narrowing the gap between
settings and what is actually shared can help users change their behavior easily to
suit their sharing preferences. For example, in our study, the website home page
for every participant was divided into different views, one view corresponding to
one sharing recipient, where the participant could decide what information she
wanted to share with that recipient. View for sharing recipient “Mom” on the
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participant’s home page displayed exactly what Mom would see as the participant’s
health information. By combining the information and the granular controls, the
interface made it possible for the participant to observe what Mom would see for
different choices of sharing settings and finally, choose the setting that best mapped
her privacy preferences. We did not test the usability of the system, so we cannot
claim that our design is the best way to provide granular controls for sharing health
information. Designing an interface for an mHealth device and application that
collects a large amount of sensed, personal demographic and context information
and whose user has the option to choose a large number of sharing recipients is an
interesting and challenging problem.
User studies, like ours, could benefit from a bigger sample size, better popula-
tion sampling and longer duration. Nevertheless, the study helped us understand
people’s willingness to share and their dynamic sharing behavior. We expect these
findings to hold broadly for other mHealth devices and applications as well. A
general privacy setting for all mHealth devices is not possible, given the disparate
sharing behavior among users for even a single mHealth device. We recommend
seeking a general approach to health information visualization: a flexible design
that supports all mHealth devices and allows users to also visualize how they are
sharing their health information with others.
2.4 Related Work
Previous work has looked at people’s willingness to share information with others.
Prior work suggests that users will change behavior when the context of informa-
tion sharing varies [122]. For example, studies of location tracking show that at least
some users will vary their willingness to share depending on place and social con-
text [29], time since the start of information sharing [139], recipients [54], and their
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closeness to the recipients [167]. Other studies of context show that users are more
likely to reveal information when the reward from the exchange increases [128],
but less likely to do so when risk of identity theft increases [35]. Our findings
confirm that these results hold even for people’s willingness to share their health
information.
Willingness to share. Researchers have studied user attitudes toward security
and privacy for smartphones and how they may differ from attitudes toward more
traditional computing systems [49]. Previous work has shown that people make
privacy decisions based on the information being shared and the person they are
sharing it with. It has been shown, through surveys and interviews, that users share
location information based on the sharing recipient, why the recipients want the
information, what would be useful to them and whether the users want to disclose
that information with them; during the study, users received hypothetical sharing
requests from family and friends [54]. (Our findings confirmed that people use the
same sort of logic to make privacy decisions with health information). An online
survey showed that participants do not understand the value of sharing location
information and their privacy decisions depend on the sharing recipient [157].
The above two studies, however, never gave the participants an opportunity to
actually share the information with real people, but just learned about their sharing
preferences through interviews and surveys. People may not be aware of real
privacy risks until they actually share the information with others and receive
feedback about the sharing [53]; our study gave participants the opportunity to
actually share the information with real people. Our study showed that people did
have privacy concerns about sharing certain information types, but they changed
their sharing settings during the course of the study. Our findings confirmed results
from previous work, which showed that participants change their privacy policy
decisions with time, but participants in that study knew the information was not
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being shared with real people [111]. The manner in which people think they might
share their information changes once their information is actually shared with real
people; the findings from our study are more valid than previous work, because
our study participants actually shared information with real people. Also the other
studies were focused on understanding privacy concerns while sharing other types
of information; we wanted to understand how sharing behavior changes when it
comes to health and fitness information. Certain types of health information might
be more sensitive than other types of personal information, like location, so it is
important to study people’s privacy preferences regarding health information.
Disclosure Policies. Prior work suggests that applications which support
varying levels of location granularities are associated with sharing rules that are
less convoluted, are less likely to be negatively phrased, and can lead to more open
sharing [151]. Lin et al. identify a small set of privacy profiles to help users manage
their mobile app privacy preferences [102]. Researchers have proposed different
techniques to help user manage disclosure of their personal information, using
feedback [142, 158], and using expressive controls [92, 37]. On the other hand, prior
work shows that educating users about privacy risks before letting them set their
privacy policies may actually increase the exposure of private information [156], so
we need to build controls that require less user introspection.
Health information. Maitland et al. conducted interviews to understand the
role of peers in weight management and what information people are willing to
disclose to their peers [91]. Caine et al. studied people’s desires for sharing their
health information, using questionnaires, card tasks and interviews [44]. We, too,
wanted to understand users’ willingness to share their fitness and health informa-
tion, but we gave users an opportunity to actually share their own information with
family, friends and third parties. Olson et al. conducted surveys with employees
(median age of 35) to study people’s willingness to share their personal information,
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including pregnancy and health status, with others and they identified similarities
in what people wanted to share and who they wanted to share it with [123]. Our
work is different from theirs in that we conducted a study with young students,
employees and retirees, where subjects collect information about themselves and
actually share that information with real people (or in some cases, believe that their
data is being shared with actual people).
Information collected using sensors and mobile devices. Klasnja et al. study
the privacy concerns of patients using a fitness device by conducting interviews [96].
We also study privacy concerns of patients using a fitness device, but we focus on
their willingness to share the collected information. Raij et al. showed that people
are more aware of privacy risks once they receive feedback about their shared health
information, collected using mobile sensors, and have a stake in the data, i.e., if the
shared health data is their own [134]. The study participants (in this case, students)
filled out a survey after seeing feedback about their information for 10-15 minutes.
In our study, we allow the participants to share the collected information with real
individuals chosen by them and study how willing they are to share their activity
and sleep information with friends, family and third parties. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first study that explores users’ privacy concerns by giving
them the opportunity to actually share the information collected about them using
mHealth devices.
Our work focuses on the privacy concerns that people will have when they
share their health information; we expect people to have these concerns irrespective
of the system used to share the health information. In our study setup, health
information was collected using a mobile device called Fitbit and uploaded to a
private web server and shared with sharing partners through the web. However,
health information can also be shared via electronic health records and social net-
works. Below we highlight research that focuses on the privacy concerns that users
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have when sharing health information using these systems. The following research
complements our work since it addresses privacy concerns that people have when
using systems, other than private websites, to share their health information.
Electronic health records (EHR). In the context of EHRs, several studies have
showed similar results as ours. Shaw et al. conducted a literature review of 21
articles (with publishing dates between 1994 and 2008), that focused on the pri-
vacy concerns that patients and healthcare providers have about EHRs in various
countries [147]. The study revealed that patients’ willingness to share health infor-
mation depended on how sensitive they considered the information to be; sexual
and mental health were considered to be most sensitive. Patients were willing to
share their health information with healthcare providers involved in their care, but
were against sharing it with other medical and non-medical individuals. In a recent
study, Caine et al. showed that sharing preferences varied by type of information
and recipient, and overall sharing preferences varied by participant [44]. Haas et al.
presents a set of design requirements for privacy-preserving EHRs; their require-
ments, however, are for controls to manage privacy policies and, unlike ours, will
not be able to support the actual sharing behavior of patients [78]. Researchers have
also highlighted the need for a balance to protect individuals from potential harm
that may be caused by exposing personal information and the quality and safety
expected of the health care system [145]. Finally, Aleman et al. presents a survey of
all the security and privacy issues and proposed solutions for EHRs [26].
Social networks. Prior research describes the privacy risks introduced by
social networking in health care domain [100, 168, 82]. Newman et al. conducted
interviews to understand health interactions on online health communities and
social networks and propose design recommendations for future systems that
will support health-oriented social interactions [120]. Thompson et al. discovered
how medical professionals violated patient privacy by posting protected health
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information on their publicly available social networking sites [154].
2.5 Future Work
Our study revealed that people share the information with recipients to receive
benefits. The benefits the subject wants to receive by sharing her information with
the recipients, i.e., the value perceived by the subject in sharing is referred to as
utility. For the subject to receive the benefits they desire, i.e., to maximize the utility,
the information disclosed must be useful to the recipients so they can help the
subject achieve her goal. Unfortunately many subjects limit the information they
share out of privacy concerns that stem from the fact that they are not aware of
how their information will be used by the recipients; this leads to under-sharing
of their information, i.e., limiting disclosure and utility of the information. On
the other hand, most subjects are incapable of deducing what sensitive inferences
could be made from their data. Also, to receive benefits, subjects might share more
than necessary because it is unclear to them what information the recipients really
need. The latter two cases might lead to over-sharing, i.e., increased disclosure of
information but with almost no increase in utility. If the sharing does not reflect
their privacy preferences, subjects might become frustrated and ultimately limit or
stop using the device. Mobile technologies should strive for a balance, allowing
subjects to limit disclosure of information but obtain meaningful utility, so that
subjects can enjoy the benefits provided by the technologies without worrying
about the disclosure of their sensitive information.
Our preliminary design of a privacy-aware architecture that helps subjects
achieve this balance is called ShareBuddy. ShareBuddy allows subjects to review
requests from recipients on their mobile phone; these requests describe what in-
formation they need to share and why. ShareBuddy also provides flexible sharing
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controls that warn subjects about sharing information that could be used to make
sensitive inferences about them. We conducted a lab study with 21 participants
using a prototype of ShareBuddy to explore the effect of displaying benefits and
risks of requested information on subjects’ sharing behavior.
Our next step is to conduct a study to understand how different message-
framing tactics emphasizing benefits and/or risks affect people’s trust in mo-
bile/web applications and their willingness to share health information online,
and how these tactics can prevent people from sharing unnecessary sensitive per-
sonal information. For the follow-up study, we will be using Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Using MTurk is to reach to broader populations rather than students only.
2.6 Summary
To provide flexible and expressive privacy controls, it is important to understand
users’ willingness to share their personal health information collected using the
device. Other researchers used interviews and surveys to understand people’s
willingness to share; their results might not not reflect real privacy concerns, since
people remain unaware of real privacy risks until they actually share the information
with others. We conducted a user study to understand how willing users were
to share their personal health information that they collected using an mHealth
device that they carried with them at all times for five days. We recommend a
flexible design for sharing controls that narrows the gap between controls and the
information being shared, allowing patients to visualize how they are sharing their




In the previous chapter, we described our efforts to better understand users’ privacy
concerns when using mobile devices to collect and share their health information.
One of the findings from the studies was that many individuals were willing to
share information with strangers, even when there was no immediate perceived
benefit. In the following chapters, we explore the notion of “altruistic” sharing and
the privacy concerns that may arise with altruistic sharing and present the design
and architecture of a smartphone-based system that allows smartphone users to
share information with strangers while protecting their privacy.
Researchers have studied people’s altruistic sharing behavior in several scenar-
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ios: when people shared smartphone resources (such as sensors [63] and network
bandwidth [172]), information about their environment (participatory mobile sens-
ing applications to contribute information about potholes using Pothole Patrol [65]
and noise using Earphone [135]) and location-related information (tourist experi-
ences such as [161] and objects such as images and videos using SmartP2P [97]).
Accurate location readings have supported the growth in usage of location-based
apps and services. Location-based altruistic sharing involves users carrying smart-
phones that can determine their location, using a combination of cellular, Wi-
Fi, and GPS technology. Location-based sharing apps (such as social discovery
apps) leverage location-based services to allow users to connect with other users
near them [10, 115], and to find other users whom the user encountered in the
past [24, 109]. Other location-based applications, as mentioned earlier, allow users
to share and collect information from others who were in spatio-temporal proximity
altruistically, such as images and videos using SmartP2P [97] or sensor data [63].
Our work addresses the following question: How can smartphones help
individuals share information that is relevant to strangers because of their spatial
and temporal proximity to each other, in a privacy-preserving manner, with minimal
changes to the existing infrastructure?
To narrow the scope of the research problem, consider the following scenario
where individuals may want to learn relevant information from strangers. Contact
tracing is used to contain the spread of a disease outbreak, by alerting people who
came in direct contact with a sick patient about the possibility that they may have
been exposed to the virus. For serious illnesses, by using contact tracing, new
cases can be discovered quickly so they can be isolated to stop further spread. For
example, a person diagnosed with Ebola was isolated, and asked about people
she may have come across; her contacts were then isolated and monitored for
symptoms [9]. Unfortunately, people may not remember where they went or
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whom they met; we expect smartphones can aid in contact tracing, as they can be
leveraged to retrieve the locations an infected person visited and notify the people
he encountered about their possible exposure to the contagious virus and to request
them to get help immediately. In cases of less severe illnesses, smartphones can also
be used to notify people that they may have been exposed to the virus and educate
them about the necessary steps they need to take to prevent the onset of the illness
or the symptoms they need to watch for before getting medical attention.
People may be exposed to an airborne virus during an encounter with a
sick person, when a sick person coughs, sneezes or breathes. In some cases, the
contagious virus can live on a surface and particle aerosols from an infected person
can stay suspended in the air for hours even after the infected person leaves; the
measles virus, for example, can live on a surface for up to two hours [1, 15]. We
must notify those individuals whom an infected person encountered, of course, but
we should also notify the individuals who were at the same location as the infected
person, hours later. To notify users who were at the location at a time after the
patient, our system should be able to match two or more smartphones that were
at the same location but at different times. Prior work defines an encounter as an
incident of co-location, i.e., when two devices are at the same location at the same
time. Our work introduces close encounters, an incident of spatio-temporal proximity.
Two devices are in spatio-temporal proximity of each other if they were (i) at
the same location almost at the same time, (ii) almost at the same location at the
same time, or (iii) almost at the same location at almost the same time. By detecting
close encounters, it is possible to determine who may have been exposed to the
virus due to their spatio-temporal proximity to the infected person.
Before implementing such a system, we need to consider several questions
regarding privacy, such as who has access to the user’s location history and how the
location history is used to determine the user’s encounters. To analyze the privacy
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issues, we consider a system with a moderate-sized user base that covers thousands
of users on a college campus. (A nation-wide or world-wide contact tracing method
would require billions of smartphones to cooperate with each other and run the
same system; we discuss scalability in Section 3.7.)
Students, faculty and staff on the college campus would install a mobile appli-
cation that registers their smartphones with the college health services, allowing
their smartphones to send alerts about the disease to other users, when a health care
provider diagnoses them with a contagious disease, and receive alerts when they
may have been exposed to a contagious virus because of the spatio-temporal prox-
imity to the infected user. An alert includes the name of the disease, the symptoms
the user should watch for, the time during which the user must be cautious, and
the measures the user should take to stay healthy and avoid onset of the illness. To
reduce panic, the alert emphasizes that receiving the alert does not imply that the
user is infected, but that there is a probability the user may have been exposed to
the virus. We anticipate users, after being diagnosed, will consent to sending such
alerts to other users, with the expectation that their identity will not be disclosed or
be discernable to other users. Prior work shows that people are willing to disclose
sensitive health information to “virtual humans” [105]; we expect diagnosed pa-
tients will exhibit similar willingness to disclose information about their disease, as
they are sharing the information with smartphones and not with people directly.
We expect our smartphone-based system and the alerts will be used in addition
to campus-wide alerts about the disease outbreak. It is possible for people to ignore
campus-wide alerts as the campus-wide alerts are not personalized and people
may not be able to ascertain their risk of exposure to the virus. One option for the
system could be to send alerts to anyone who may have visited the same location
as the diagnosed patient, instead of restricting the alerts to those who were within
spatio-temporal proximity of the diagnosed patient. Location-specific alerts may
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cause people visiting the location to panic and be concerned about visiting the
location; in some cases, the location may be unavoidable such as a classroom.
Having personalized alerts may reduce the burden on the health-care providers
to manage concerns of a larger population. To prevent social gossip regarding a
patient, we want to limit the amount of information revealed about the patient and
ensure that only relevant users who may have been exposed to the virus are alerted.
Our system addresses two challenges: finding devices in close encounters with
minimal changes to existing infrastructure, and ensuring privacy of the infected
and possibly infected users. Prior work focuses on matching devices that shared an
encounter, but does not support close encounters [56, 99, 108, 109]. The goal of the
encounter-related systems was to connect two people, so they primarily involved
exchanging keys between devices in close proximity for possible use in the future.
But two people in spatio-temporal proximity may never encounter each other, so we
need a different solution for close encounters; our system leverages existing wireless
broadcasting devices at that location. We must also alleviate users’ concerns about
social gossip, lest it act as barrier to the adoption of the system; even if user names
or identifiers are not shared, systems must limit the exposure of a user’s location
history, which may be used to identify the user [41]. Prior research has presented
numerous solutions for location privacy, especially privacy-preserving techniques to
match two people who were at the same location [119, 140, 107, 60, 173]; we present
a survey of location-privacy work later. Our system never collects or records users’
location; instead, the users’ smartphones collect and store information from nearby
wireless broadcasting devices and the system matches this information later to
determine whether the users experienced a close encounter.
We make five contributions:
• We introduce a new problem: detecting close encounters, i.e., incidents of
spatial and temporal proximity.
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• We present the design and implementation of a smartphone-based system
called ENACT to detect close encounters, while providing strong privacy
properties.
• We describe two cryptographic protocols for the ENACT architecture that
send alerts to the users who were in spatial and temporal proximity of the
infected user, without disclosing the identity or location history of the user to
other users or to the system.
• We present a security and privacy analysis of the system.
• We implement a prototype of the ENACT system on an Android smartphone
and measure the effects of the mobile application on smartphone resources.
Using the prototype, we also calculate the time taken to send and view an alert,
and estimate the network bandwidth required to send and receive an alert.
We found that the application only uses 1% of the total battery capacity on a
normal day, when no user is diagnosed with a contagious disease, and uses at
most 9.6 MB storage (assuming data is erased after a month). Preparing an
alert to send takes a few seconds to a few minutes (depending on the duration
of the contagious period) on the patient’s smartphone and checking whether
the alert is relevant to the recipient takes less than a second, after the alert is
downloaded by the recipient’s smartphone.
3.1 The ENACT System
In this section, we introduce the ENACT (Encounter-based Architecture for Contact
Tracing) system and some key terms related to the system.
User: an individual using the ENACT system.
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Smartphone: a wireless device carried by the user at almost all times. In this
document, we primarily refer to a user’s smartphone, but it could also be a
tablet or a laptop; in the future, it may be a wearable device. We allude to a
user and the user’s smartphone interchangeably in this chapter.
Health provider: a user who can authorize another user’s smartphone to send
alerts about virus exposure.
Patient: a user who is diagnosed by a health provider and whose smartphone, once
authorized, can send alerts about the disease.
Recipient: a user who was in a close encounter with the patient and may have
been exposed to the virus and who can view the message sent by the patient
about a possible exposure to the virus because of the same close encounter. A
user may be both a patient and a recipient, at different times.
Wireless broadcasting device: a wireless device that broadcasts beacons to an EN-
ACT user’s smartphone; a wireless broadcasting device could be a Wi-Fi
access point or a Bluetooth beacon.
Broadcast interval or period: time between two consecutive broadcasts from a
wireless broadcasting device.
Beacon: a message that the broadcasting device sends at periodic intervals to all
the wireless devices in its vicinity; note, a beacon is a wireless packet and is
different from a “Bluetooth beacon”, which is a broadcasting device that sends
periodic messages over Bluetooth to smartphones listening for advertisements
from the Bluetooth beacons. Henceforth in this chapter, unless specified
otherwise, the term “beacon” refers to the message.
We list below some terms specific to contagious airborne diseases.
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Contagious area: the space around an infected person where the virus may have
survived, as a result of a sneeze, breath or cough.
Virus survival time: the time duration for which a virus can survive in the air or
on surfaces. This value is specific to the disease. However, we expect the
probability of an active virus to be contagious to decrease as the time increases.
Incubation period: the time duration between exposure to an infection and the
appearance of the first symptoms. For example, the incubation period (time
from exposure to rash) for measles ranges from 7 to 21 days.
Contagious period: the time duration during which an infected user is contagious.
In case of measles, patients are considered to be contagious from 4 days before
to 4 days after the rash appears.
3.1.1 System model
The ENACT system comprises six main components: users, smartphones, wireless
broadcasting devices, health providers, the PKI certificate server and the ENACT
server. We make the following assumptions about each type of component.
Users. Users are people who have installed the ENACT mobile application on
their smartphones and carry their smartphones at nearly all times; a study
conducted in 2013 with 7,446 participants showed that 79% of smartphone
users have their phone on or near them for all but two hours of their waking
day and 63% keep it with them for all but one hour [16].
Smartphones. Smartphones have wireless capabilities to receive beacons from
nearby wireless broadcasting devices and connect to the Internet. A user’s
smartphone stores the beacons that it receives from nearby wireless broadcast-
ing devices.
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Wireless broadcasting devices. A wireless broadcasting device distributes bea-
cons that include cryptographic keys to ENACT users in its vicinity. The
ENACT application on the patient’s smartphone later uses the keys it received
(and stored) to encrypt alerts and the application on the recipient’s smart-
phone later attempts to decrypt the encrypted alerts using the keys it received
(and stored). If the recipient’s application succeeds in decrypting the alert,
it implies that the recipient may have been at (or near) the same location as
the patient (i.e., near the same wireless broadcasting device) at (or near) the
same time and may have been exposed to the virus. By sharing time-varying
keys via broadcast messages, ENACT ensures that users who were near the
broadcasting device can receive alerts about possibility of virus exposure in
the vicinity of the broadcasting device. Note, that the ENACT application
never collects the user’s location – the application only collects and stores the
cryptographic keys it receives from nearby broadcasting devices. Either Wi-Fi
access points (APs) or Bluetooth beacon devices can act as ENACT broadcast-
ing devices as they are capable of sending broadcasts at periodic intervals
and can perform simple cryptographic operations such as key generation. We
assume the broadcasting devices are immovable or can disable themselves
when moved.
Health Providers. Only an authorized health provider can diagnose a patient to be
sick and contagious, and authorize a patient’s smartphone to send alerts about
the disease. The health provider never learns the identity of the recipients,
who can view the alert in virtue of being in a close encounter with the patient.1
ENACT Key Server. The PKI server issues certificates for users and keys for the
broadcasting devices.
1In serious cases, such as Ebola, a health provider may want to learn who was exposed to the



















Figure 3.1: ENACT Model: 1) Wireless broadcasting device sends keys to nearby devices. 2)
Health provider diagnoses patient, sends signed alert to the patient’s smartphone. 3) Patient
encrypts signed message and sends it back to health provider. 4) Health provider sends
signed and encrypted alert to server. 5) Recipient receives alert, verifies its authenticity, and
decrypts alert.
ENACT Server. The server receives encrypted alerts from the patient and forwards
them to all other users. The server cannot decrypt the alerts as it does not
have access to the cryptographic keys used to encrypt the alerts, and will
not learn about the disease. The server also does not store any information
about the users and their smartphones, and will not learn which user was
diagnosed, which users may have been exposed to the virus, or any user’s
location history. Indeed, once the server has received and validated the alert,




The ENACT system works as follows, as shown in Figure 3.1.
1. All smartphones in the vicinity of the wireless broadcasting device collect
a cryptographic key. Different wireless broadcasting devices send different
keys periodically, but at the same broadcasting period. The smartphone
receives a series of different keys and stores them all. The smartphones store
cryptographic keys for as long as the longest incubation period among all
diseases being monitored; the default expiration period is one month.
2. When a user is diagnosed by the health provider, the health provider generates
an alert using the ENACT application using disease and patient-specific
parameters. She signs the message and sends it to the patient, via the ENACT
app.
3. The patient’s smartphone encrypts the signed alert using all the keys included
in the beacons it received during the time the patient was contagious and
sends it back to the health provider.
4. The health provider signs the encrypted alerts, and sends the signed and
encrypted alerts to the ENACT server.
5. A recipient’s smartphone receives and verifies the signature on the message.
If the signature is not valid, the message is discarded. If not, the application
retrieves the relevant keys stored on the smartphone, and tries to decrypts the
alert using the keys. If none of the keys decrypt the message, the message is
discarded. If not, the smartphone verifies the signature on the decrypted alert
and compares it to the signature on the encrypted message. If it is a match, the
alert is presented to the recipient. The smartphone also checks for freshness
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of the message, and discards the message if the alert was more than an hour
before the current time.
The system and other users cannot determine the identity of the patient who
was diagnosed with the disease, the name of the disease and the identity of the
recipients who were exposed to the virus. A user’s smartphone locally determines
for itself for only its user that its user may have been exposed, based on an alert
disseminated to all users. Only those users who encountered the patient (i.e.,
recipients) can decrypt the relevant encrypted parts and view the alert. A recipient,
on viewing the alert, cannot determine which location she was at when she was
exposed to the virus. All users’ (even the patients’) key history, a form of location
history, never leave their individual smartphones.
3.1.3 Design Goals
We develop our proposed ENACT system, based on the following design goals:
accuracy, user privacy, and alert authenticity.
Accuracy: To support personalized alerts based on spatio-temporal proximity to a
patient, the system must encrypt alerts in a manner that only a recipient who
was in the contagious area (where the virus survived) within the survival time
(during which the virus remains active) can decrypt and the view the alert
about the virus exposure.
User privacy: Although patients may be willing to alert others about the virus,
they will likely wish to do so anonymously [41]. Recipients will also want to
remain anonymous, so other users will not know that the recipients could be
infected. Adversaries should not be able to link a user’s identity with their
location history or the spread of the virus, or even to assemble a decoded
location history.
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Alert authenticity: Only the smartphone of a patient diagnosed to be sick and con-
tagious, by an authorized health provider, can send alerts about the disease.
3.1.4 Security model
ENACT has the following security properties:
P1. Unlinkability. No ENACT user, server operator or external adversary can link a
user to her location or even assemble a decoded location history.
P2. Confidentiality. Only users who shared a close encounter with the infected user
within the contagious space in the contagious period can decode alerts about
exposure to the virus. The server learns nothing about any user.
P3. Authenticity. Recipients can verify the authenticity of alerts.
We are concerned about the following threats:
T1. Threat to privacy: An adversary may link a user to a certain location, link one
user to multiple locations, link multiple users at the same location, assemble
the complete location history of any user, or identify a user.
T2. Threat of fake alerts: A malicious user may send fake alerts about a disease to
spread alarm.
We achieve the security properties based on the following trust model:
TR1. No collusion. We expect users to not share keys with other ENACT users
or with the server; we discuss our reasoning behind this assumption in Sec-
tion 3.7.
TR2. Proper key generation. The users trust the wireless broadcasting devices
to generate keys according to the ENACT protocol and not to share keys
otherwise.
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TR3. Proper message routing. The patient trusts the server to forward the encrypted
alerts to all users.
TR4. Trustworthy app. Users trust the ENACT app not to disclose the location or
infected states of a user except via the ENACT protocol.2
We assume that all wireless beaconing devices, smartphones, and external sources
have sufficient processing power and storage capabilities to support cryptographic
primitives.
We expect an adversary has the following capabilities.
A1. Eavesdrop on communications. The external adversary can eavesdrop on com-
munications between smartphones and the server.
A2. Access to data at rest. The server operators may be curious and can read users’
data stored on the server.
A3. Access to application. An adversary can install the application on their smart-
phone and collect keys from broadcasting devices or send alerts. For now, we
assume the adversary cannot set up fake broadcasting devices or send keys to
other smartphones.
A4. Access to keys. We assume a malicious user cannot install malware on smart-
phones to collect keys from all users. A user who visits different locations to
collect keys is not considered an adversary and can receive alerts if they were
in spatio-temporal proximity with a patient at those locations, even if their
reason for collecting the keys was malicious. We also expect a malicious user
may be able to collect some, but not all the keys received by all other users,
simply by visiting the locations.
2At this time, we do not consider a compromised smartphone that gives an adversary access to




We begin with a simplified outline of the proposed architecture, for the purpose of
exposition. The notations used in the system model are shown in Table 3.1 and the
communication steps are numbered as shown in Figure 3.1.
1. Beacon broadcast:
B⇒ u : k
The wireless broadcasting device B broadcasts a random number, the crypto-
graphic key k, to all nearby users u. Actually, the broadcasting device sends
a series of different keys. For now, we denote a key sent at a certain time as
k; we later describe how the keys are generated. The broadcast occurs once
every b minutes; b is the broadcasting interval. Recall that each broadcasting
device sends a different key, i.e., B1 sends k1, B2 sends k2 and so on. For the
purpose of exposition, we assume a smartphone u receives only one key k at a
time T; we describe how the protocol works with multiple keys. So for now,
assume that at time T, a smartphone adds a timestamped record to its internal
database d for the beacon it receives from one broadcasting device: (T, k) ∈ d.
Note, the application does not record or store the smartphone’s location; the
application only stores the keys it receives from the wireless broadcasting
devices at that location. The timestamps are used, in the event of a diagnosis,
to retrieve the keys collected during the contagious period C.
A malicious recipient may be able to modify the stored data, i.e., the broad-
casting devices they heard and when, to obtain alerts at locations they never
visited. By encrypting the alert, we make it harder for a curious recipient to
determine who the patient is and prevent social gossip about the patient.
Alternatively, suppose broadcasting devices did not send cryptographic keys;
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the smartphone stores the broadcasting device identifier and timestamp of
when the user heard the broadcasting device, alerts are never encrypted but
include the broadcasting devices heard and the timestamps when the patient
heard the broadcasting devices. On receiving such an alert, a curious recipient
can determine some of the location history of the patient and with additional
information, even identify the patient.
2. Sending alert:
HP⇒ p : m = {m′, sig(HP, m′)}
p⇒ HP : M = {E(k, m) | {(T, k)} ∈ d, {T} ∈ C}
HP⇒ S : M, sig(HP, M)
The user u, on later observing symptoms, visits the health provider HP. HP
diagnoses u as ill, whom we now refer to as the patient p. HP signs into the
ENACT application, and enters the patient-specific disease parameters. The
application signs the message m′ on her behalf and sends it to the patient p’s
ENACT application. On receiving the signed alert message, smartphone p
retrieves, from its internal database, a list of keys that it received from all the
broadcasting devices during the duration C when the patient was contagious.
The message created by the application based on the input from the health
provider is separately encrypted using all the keys, i.e., the application pro-
duces a series of encrypted messages, each encrypted separately using each of
the keys received during the contagious period. The patient’s phone sends it
back to the health provider’s device for “authorization”; the health provider
signs the encrypted message and forwards it to the ENACT server S. The
server S forwards the encrypted message to all the users.
Note the messages do not identify the patient to the ENACT server or to the
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recipients, or contain any explicit location or time information. We assume
the smartphones use authenticated, confidential and integrity-preserving
channels, such as HTTPS, for all communications with the servers and use Tor
for additional anonymity [22, 62].
3. Viewing Alert:
S⇒ u : M, sig(HP, M)
u : verify sig(HP, M)
u : ∀m ∈ M, D(k, m)|{(T, k)} ∈ d}
u : verify sig(HP, m)
The application running on the smartphones of the other users receive the
encrypted message from the server. The application verifies the signature on
the message set. Once verified, the application uses all the keys stored in its
database to decrypt each encrypted message. Once the message is decrypted,
the application compares the signature on the message with the signature on
the encrypted message. If the signature is invalid, message decryption fails,
or both the signatures do not match, the message is discarded.
Recall our assumption that the keys received from the broadcasting devices
will be stored for as long as the longest incubation period among all diseases being
monitored; the default expiration period is one month. The user may delete the
keys at any time to free up space on their smartphone, at the risk of not being able
to alert others or receive alerts, in the advent of an outbreak.
Any recipient who was within range of the same broadcasting device as the
patient will be able to view the alert because the alert was encrypted using the








B Wireless broadcasting device
n Number of broadcasting devices at any time
g Threshold of broadcasting devices at any time
b Broadcasting interval





C Contagious time range
τ Virus survival period
w Broadcast range of the wireless device
δ Virus contagious space
v Walking speed of user
d Internal database on smartphone
k, a Symmetric keys
PS, PrS Public/private key of S
h(X) Message digest (hash) of X
E(k, X) Encrypt X using key k
D(k, X) Decrypt X using key k
Sig(B, X) B’s signature on text X
Table 3.1: Notations used in the ENACT system model. The type of encryption performed by
E() is implicitly symmetric.
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remains the same, a user can access all the alerts that was distributed within range
of the device at any time, allowing even a user who may not have been exposed
to any virus to view the alert. In the next section, we improve on the protocol so
that only those recipients who may have been exposed to the virus based on her
location/time with respect to an infected user, can view an alert.
3.3 ENACT security techniques
If one wireless broadcasting device sent the same key all the time, every user in
range of a broadcasting device can have access to all the alerts sent by patients
who were at that location. Alternately, if all broadcasting devices sent the same
key at the same time, all users within range of any broadcasting device at the same
time can have access to all the alerts sent from any location. To ensure that only
those users who were in a close encounter with the infected user can decrypt and
view alerts, the broadcasting devices send keys that vary across time and space.
The time-varying nature of the key should be such that the patient’s smartphone
can generate keys for the duration when the virus is active, for each location they
were at during the contagious period, because the patient may not stay in or near
one location for the entire contagious period and may receive only one or a few
keys from the same broadcasting device when she was at that location. A recipient
can only view the alert if she was at the same location as the infected user within
τ minutes, i.e., the virus survival period, the time duration for which a virus can
survive in air or on surfaces. For now, assume that any user within spatial range of
the wireless broadcasting device can view the alerts, irrespective of how close they
were to the infected person’s location; we discuss spatial controls in Section 3.3.2.
ENACT uses the following techniques to ensure that only those users who
were present at the same location as the patient, but within the virus survival period,
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can decrypt the alert. Again, throughout this protocol, we assume the users’ devices
communicate with the server over an authenticated, confidential, and integrity-
preserving channel, e.g., using HTTPS and, if desired, an anonymity-preserving
mix network such as Tor [22, 62].
3.3.1 Temporal encryption
The broadcasting device uses hash-chaining to generate and broadcast a series of
related keys; it broadcasts a new key every b minutes and the base key is reset every
z minutes. The updated protocol with the hash-chaining technique is as follows:
1. Beacon broadcast:
B⇒ u : k where k = hx(a)
k is the xth key in the hash-chain whose base key is a. The key is sent x ∗ b
minutes from the moment of base key reset. A wireless broadcasting device
broadcasts a fresh key a every z minutes, i.e., at the start of every key reset
period. At the end of the broadcasting interval of b minutes, it sends h1(a),
where h1(a)=h(a). After another b minutes, it sends h2(a)=h(h1(a)), and so
on. The xth key is hx(a)=h(hx−1(a)). It sends h
z
b−1(a), just before hash-chain
resets. Figure 3.2 shows a user receiving three different keys when within
range of one wireless broadcasting device. On receiving the key, the user’s
smartphone stores the key k included in the beacon in its internal database d,
along with the current time T.
2. Sending alert:
p⇒ HP : M = {E(hx(a), m), E(hx+1(a), m), E(hx+2(a), m) . . . E(hx+ τb (a), m), sig(HP, m)
| {(T, hx(a))} ∈ d, {T} ∈ C}
HP⇒ S : M, sig(PS, M)
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Suppose hx(a) is the first key the infected user receives at a certain location.
The application on her smartphone generates a series of τb encrypted alerts,
each encrypted using keys in the hash-chain, starting from the most recent
key hx(a), assuming the virus was active from the time when the user was
first seen at the location, i.e., at the xth broadcast. τb denotes the number of
beacons the broadcasting device will send during the virus survival period of
τ minutes. Assume for now, z is set at a value larger than the largest value of
τ
b across all diseases monitored by ENACT, so the patient can generate all the
keys that were sent during the virus survival period at that location.
Consider an example scenario to better understand the key-generation process:
suppose the patient is at a location for an extended period of two hours, the
beacon interval is one minute, and the contagious period is three hours; it uses
the key it received when it reached the location as the base key to generate keys
for the remaining duration of the hash-chain for up to three hours (assume
for now, the hash reset does not happen until after the contagious period or
it happens when the patient was at the location). So the application on the
patient’s phone will generate 180 encrypted copies of the alert message, using
the 120 keys it received during the two hours, and generate the rest of the 60
keys by applying the hash function repeatedly, starting with the last key it
received when at the location.
3. Viewing alert: A user arrives at a later time and receives hy(a) from the wireless
broadcasting device. If y < x + τb , the application on the recipient’s smart-
phone will be able to decrypt the encrypted alert and present the alert to the
recipient.
Unfortunately, based on the above protocol, a user who reaches the location













Figure 3.2: xb minutes after the base key is reset, user receives hx(a) from B. User receives
hx+1(a) after b minutes and continues to receive keys from B when still within B’s range.
at the location within the survival time; we suggest extensions to the protocol to
address this issue in 3.7.
Until now, we assumed that every user within the broadcast range of the same
wireless broadcasting device, as the patient, may have been exposed to the virus.
But the broadcast range might be large in the order of 30m, for Wi-Fi access points,
and 15m for Bluetooth beacons. Furthermore, especially in academic and corporate
communities, a user could be in the range of multiple broadcasting devices, so a
smartphone will receive beacons from multiple broadcasting devices at any location.
3.3.2 Spatial encryption
ENACT uses distance-bounding techniques to prevent a user outside the contagious
space from viewing the alert. Ideally, the distance boundary for spatial encryption
will be the contagious space, i.e., only those users who were present within a
circle of radius δ , the center being the location of the infected user, can view the
alert. For distance bounding, we explored several existing methods for outdoor
and indoor localization, but no method is sufficiently accurate in determining
the distance between mobile devices. ENACT does not attempt to find the exact
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distance between two devices, but only whether two devices are approximately
within a certain distance of each other, a distance equivalent to the contagious space.
To approximate this distance-bounding, ENACT leverages the finding that two
devices in close spatial proximity will be within range of almost the same set of
wireless broadcasting devices [30]. A patient can use the keys she received from
all the different wireless broadcasting devices nearby to encrypt the alert, as only
someone spatially close to her would have received keys from the same wireless
broadcasting devices. Due to vagaries in wireless transmissions, however, nearby
clients may not always receive keys from a wireless broadcasting device, even if in
broadcasting range. To account for missing keys, ENACT allows users to decrypt
alerts if they have keys from some, not all, of the wireless broadcasting devices
seen by the infected patient, by using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to encrypt
alerts [146].
Instead of using the keys it received at time {T} ∈ C for encrypting the alert,
the patient’s smartphone computes a secret message using the keys it received from
the wireless broadcasting devices and uses the secret message to encrypt the alert.
For a predetermined threshold number g, if another user has at least the same set
of g keys from g of the same broadcasting devices for the same time T, she will
be able to compute the secret message and use it to decrypt the alert; this is called
“g-out-of-n” secret sharing. A recipient can view the alert, as long as she has g of the
same set of keys as the patient and anyone with less than g keys in common with
the patient cannot decrypt the alert.
The central idea of Shamir’s g-out-of-n secret sharing is to choose the secret to
be the constant term of a polynomial, and to share n encrypted points randomly
chosen on a polynomial of degree g− 1, along with the alert encrypted using the
secret; each of the n points are encrypted using each of the n keys. So anyone
with at least g of the same keys can decrypt and obtain g points, use Lagrange
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interpolation to obtain the coefficients of the polynomial, and solve for x = 0 to
obtain the constant term. Since the secret used to encrypt the alert was set as the
constant term, any smartphone that can obtain the constant term can decrypt the
alert and present to the user.
The revised technique follows:
1. Beacon broadcast: Suppose there are n wireless broadcasting devices around
the patient. Each wireless broadcasting device sends one key every b min-
utes. At the start of every reset period, i.e., after every z minutes, a wireless
broadcasting device i sends key ai, after b minutes, it sends h(ai), and so on.
2. Sending alert:
keys = ∀i ∈ {1..n}{ki | where ki = hx(ai)}
M = E( f (0), m), ∀i ∈ {1..n}{E(ki, (yi, f (yi))), sig(HP, m) | yi ∈ R}
p⇒ HP : M
HP⇒ S : M, sig(HP, M)
The patient receives a key containing hx(ai) from each wireless broadcasting
device i, xb minutes after hash key reset. The application chooses a secret
message and sets that as the constant term f (0) of the polynomial f . Threshold
g is known to all ENACT devices, so the patient device chooses random
integers as coefficients to generate a polynomial of degree g − 1. A new
polynomial is created each time an alert is sent. After choosing n random
integers {y1 . . . yn} for the polynomial, for each record T, k1, k2..kn ∈ d, where
T ∈ C, each point (yi, f (yi)) is encrypted using each of the n keys and the
alert itself is encrypted using the secret, i.e., the constant term f (0).
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Note, a record contains all the keys obtained from different broadcasting
devices within one minute; keys may arrive at different times within the same
minute.
3. Viewing alert:
S⇒ u : M, sig(PS, M)
M = E( f (0), m), ∀i ∈ {1..n}{E(ki, (yi, f (yi))) | yi ∈ R}
keys = ∀i ∈ {1..g}{ki | where ki = hx(ai)}
points = ∀i ∈ {1..g}{D(ki, E(ki, (yi, f (yi)))}
message = D( f (0), E( f (0), m))
On receiving the encrypted message, the user’s device retrieve all the keys
k they have stored in the database, of the form (T, {k1, k2 . . . kn}. The device
chooses all of the subsets of size g from the set of keys to attempt to decrypt
at least g of the n encrypted sub parts in the encrypted message, i.e., the
encrypted points. If g messages of the form (y, f (y)) are retrieved, the device
uses the points to determine the g− 1 coefficients of the polynomial f using
interpolation following Shamir’s method [146] and solve for f (0). Finally, the
recipient’s device uses the secret message f (0) to decrypt the alert.
The computation on the recipient’s device to decrypt the points may be ex-
pensive, especially if the device has to choose many subsets for each of the
key sets for each record stored in the past month. To reduce the computation,
the patient’s device also includes the date of the record whose key set was
used to encrypt the message sub parts, in plaintext, along with the encrypted
77
message, i.e., the encrypted message becomes
M = date(T), E( f (0), m), ∀i ∈ {1..n}{E(ki, (yi, f (yi))) | yi ∈ R}
p⇒ S : M, sig(PS, M)
where date(T) is the date part of the timestamp T, and (T, ∀i ∈ {1..n}{ki}) ∈ d
and T ∈ C. On receiving the encrypted message, the user’s device only re-
trieves all the keys k they have stored in the database of the form (T′, {k1, k2 . . . kn})
where date(T′)=date(T) from the message.
In the next section, we present the security analysis of the ENACT system.
3.4 Security Evaluation
First we analyse how the ENACT architecture achieves the security properties.
Unlinkability: We consider the following three attack scenarios to show that EN-
ACT prevents a malicious user, a curious server operator, or an external
adversary from linking a user to her location or even assembling a decoded
location history.
• Suppose a malicious recipient wants to learn about the patient and the
location where she may have been exposed to the virus. The alert she
can view contains only information about the disease, such as the name
of the disease and the disease parameters and has no information about
the patient or the keys that were used to decrypt the message. Even if
she learned the keys, she will not be able to decipher the location where
the keys were collected, since the application does not collect or store
location.
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• Suppose a server operator is curious and wants to learn the location
history of users. The server operator cannot learn any location about the
patient from the message sent by the health provider; he may be able to
deduce that the patient was most likely in the health provider’s office or
clinic. The server operator cannot learn the location of any other user,
who is not a patient, since their smartphones never submit any message
to the server. (They do need to fetch the alert message from the server, but
if necessary they can poll the server through an anonymity-preserving
mix network such as Tor [22, 62].)
• Suppose an adversary gets unrestricted access to a user’s smartphone.3
The application stores a database that contains a sequence of records
of the form (T, {k1, k2, . . . kn}). Since the application never collects or
stores the location, the adversary does not get access to the users’ location
history, but only to a collection of records, each a set of integers associated
with a timestamp. Suppose the adversary had installed the ENACT
application on his own phone and had access to keys that he collected at
different locations at different times and kept track of his locations, and
some of the keys he obtained match the integers in the user’s database,
then he may be able to deduce some of the users’ locations when she
obtained those keys. But even then, the adversary will only be able to
guess some of the locations, not the entire location history of the user,
since we assume it is not possible for the adversary to get access to all
the keys ever broadcasted by all the wireless broadcasting devices.
Confidentiality: Only users who shared a close encounter with the patient almost
within the contagious space almost in the contagious period can decode alerts
3Of course, if this happens, the user has much to worry about; our point is that ENACT gives the
adversary no additional useful information including about locations prior to the compromise.
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about exposure to the virus; even the server learns nothing about any user. We
consider four scenarios where people not in a close encounter with a patient
receive an alert, and show that it is not possible for them to view the alert.
• Suppose a user who was never at the same location as the patient receives
the encrypted alert. Suppose further that, at time T ∈ C, the user heard
broadcasting devices {B′1, B′2, . . . B′n′} and the patient heard broadcasting
devices {B1, B2, . . . Bn}. At time T ∈ C, she obtained {k′1, k′2, . . . k′n′}
and the patient obtained {k1, k2, . . . kn}. Assuming every broadcasting
device follows the ENACT protocol and generates hash-chain sequences
different from other broadcasting devices, the keys the user obtained at
time T will not be equal to the keys obtained by the patient at time T and
so she will not be able to decrypt the messages in the alert.
• Suppose a user who was at the same location but after the virus sur-
vival time receives the encrypted alert, i.e., both patient and the user
hear broadcasting devices {B1, B2, . . . Bn}, but the patient hears them
at time T ∈ C, and the user hears them at time T′ > T + τ. For each
location they were at during the contagious period, the patient’s device
encrypts the alert message τb times, using keys of the form Ki where Ki ⊂
{∀i ∈ {0 . . . τb}{h
i(k1), hi(k2), . . . hi(kn)}} and (T, {k1, k2, . . . kn}) ∈ d of
the patient’s device. Since the user received keys from the broadcasting
devices at a later time, following the property of the hash-chains, the
user will receive keys that came later in the hash-chain sequence, i.e., of
the form {hi(k1), hi(k2) . . . hi(kn)}, i > τb . Following the one-directional
property of hash-chains, the user cannot determine the keys earlier in the
hash-chain and cannot decrypt the alert message.
• Suppose a user who was at the same location at the same time T as
the patient but farther away from the patient outside the contagious
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space, such that he cannot be exposed to the patient’s virus. Based on
our assumptions, since he is farther away, the user sees a different set
of n broadcasting devices out of which the patient and the user sees (at
most) the same g′ = g− 1 broadcasting devices. The user can decrypt
g′ = g− 1 sub parts of the message. But with only g− 1 points, he cannot
use interpolation to determine the coefficients of a polynomial of degree
g− 1. So the user cannot obtain the constant term of the polynomial, i.e.,
the secret message, and decrypt the alert.
• Suppose a server operator is curious and wants to learn the content of
the alerts, i.e., the disease parameters. The server operator does not have
access to any keys since we assume users do not collude with the server
operator. So he cannot decrypt the encrypted messages sent by a patient’s
device, to learn any of the disease parameters or the patients collected
set of keys.
• The server cannot identify the patient since alerts come via the health
provider.
Authenticity: We present three scenarios where an adversary sends a fake alert,
and show that a recipient is able to verify the authenticity of an alert in these
cases.
• Suppose a malicious user (or an adversary who has control over a user’s
smartphone) attempts to send an alert without being diagnosed by a
health provider. She creates an alert using disease parameters related to
a disease that may cause panic among other ENACT users, and signs the
message using her private key. The application on her phone encrypts
the disease parameters using a series of keys that she collected during
the contagious period specified in the disease parameters, signs the
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encrypted set and sends it to the server, which forwards it to all other
users. The application running on the smartphones of the other users tries
to verify the authenticity of the message, recognizes that the signature is
not from an authorized health provider, discards the message and does
not attempt to decrypt it. So the alert does not reach other users.
• Suppose a user obtains a signature used by a health provider. She gen-
erates a new alert, and uses the signature along with the alert. The
application encrypts the parameters, uses the health provider’s signature
with the encrypted alert set and sends it to the server. On obtaining
the signed and encrypted alert, other users’ smartphones are unable to
verify the signature, since the hash value obtained after decrypting the
signature using the health provider’s public key will not match the hash
value of the encrypted message. The smartphones do not attempt to
decrypt the message they obtained, ensuring that only alerts generated
by health providers reach other users.
• Suppose a malicious user re-sends an authentic alert to all users. To
prevent this scenario, the application on the users’ smartphone checks
for freshness of the alert, and discards the message if its not fresh.
• Suppose the server operator sends a fake encrypted message to all users.
The application on the users’ smartphones discard the message, as it is
unsigned by an authorized health provider.




We developed a prototype of the ENACT system as an Android application and
conducted in-lab experiments on a Nexus 6 smartphone. First, we evaluated how
smartphone battery life is affected by the continuous beacon collection. We expect
users will be less affected by the encryption and decryption of disease alerts as these
occur rarely. Even so, we still evaluate the latency, storage required and bandwidth
consumed by the encryption and decryption of disease alerts.
What is an ideal broadcasting interval for broadcasting devices? Consider two
paths that a user may take, shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. If the broadcast
range of the wireless broadcasting device is w meters and the user is walking at a
speed of v m/s, then the beaconing period b should be less than 2wv , to ensure that a
person walking past the broadcasting device gets a beacon, similar to the user in
Figure 3.3. But what if the user crosses a broadcasting device in a manner shown in
Figure 3.4? Should ENACT reduce the broadcasting period to b << 2wv , to ensure
anyone who passes the wireless broadcasting device gets a beacon? This may not
be unnecessary for ENACT system, since intuitively, it is highly unlikely for a user
who walks quickly past a location to be exposed to the virus in that location. So a
longer broadcasting interval of b > 2wv might also suffice for the ENACT system, so
that people who stay with broadcast range of the device, and who are, intuitively,
more susceptible to virus exposure.
The average walking speed of a person is about 1.4 meters per second [126, 40];
it varies from 0.8 meters per second to 1.8 meters per second, depending on the age,
gender, height and fitness level of the person [40].
We consider two options for wireless broadcasting devices. Typically, the




Figure 3.3: User’s path is closer to the broadcasting device.
w
User's path
Figure 3.4: User’s path is farther away, but still within range of, the broadcasting device.
m/s to receive at least one beacon, the beaconing period should be approximately
42 seconds or less. If the broadcasting device is a Bluetooth beacon, with a typical
range of 15m, the beaconing period should be approximately 21 seconds or less.
Intuitively, viruses are more likely to affect people who stay in the area when
compared to people who walk by. Prior studies have shown that people stay in one
place 85% of the time [50] and on college campuses, individuals tend to stay at one
location for about an hour [93]. We use a beaconing period of one minute for our
experimental setup.
3.5.1 Evaluation: Battery usage
We developed two different Android applications, one that continuously listened for
broadcasts from Bluetooth beacon devices and another from Wi-Fi devices. The goal
of the experiment was to determine how the battery capacity was affected by the
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continuous background service that listened for beacons from nearby broadcasting
devices. We measured the power consumption using the dumpsys tool, available as
part of the Android SDK, and the battery usage tool on the Nexus 6 smartphone.
Bluetooth beacons: The application that listened for advertisements from
Bluetooth beacon devices required Bluetooth to be turned on at all times, and the
application ran as a background process, checking once a minute for Bluetooth bea-
con advertisements. The application consumed 1% of the battery in 12 hours using
the dumpsys tool. The Battery option on the Nexus 6 phone showed that the battery
consumption remained 1% on average for a week. Varying the broadcasting period
and broadcasting power of the beacons did not affect the battery consumption on
the smartphone.
Wi-Fi broadcasts: The application that listened for Wi-Fi packets required
Wi-Fi to be turned on at all time. We implemented Wi-Fi broadcasts as UDP packets,
so it received packets only if the source device and the smartphone were connected
to the same network. To evaluate the battery consumed by listening for Wi-Fi
broadcast packets, we implemented a Python server that computed a hash-chain
using the SHA-256 hash function and broadcasted a 256 bit key (represented as a 64-
byte ASCII string) once every minute; the server was running on a device that was
connected to the same network as the smartphone running the Android application.
The Android application listened continuously for UDP broadcasts and consumed
1% of the battery in 12 hours, similar to the Bluetooth beacon experiments. Varying
the broadcasting period did not affect the battery consumption on the smartphone.
We developed a prototype of the ENACT application for the remaining experi-
ments. For the purpose of the remaining experiments, the application continuously
listens for beacons from Bluetooth beacon devices (and not Wi-Fi broadcasts). We
used Altbeacon APIs for monitoring Bluetooth beacons; the library will wake up
your app when it detects Eddystone-compatible beacons in the background and
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records advertisements from the beacon devices while they are in the vicinity [3].
3.5.2 Evaluation: Storage
Each record in the database of the prototype Android application consists of a times-
tamp of the form “YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm” and a set of 256-bit keys (represented as
64-byte ASCII strings); the application stored only the keys received from the closest
three beacons (determined by the signal strength). If a smartphone received keys
from three broadcasting devices, each with a broadcasting period of one minute, the
application would record a maximum of three keys per minute and store as a set of
three 64-byte ASCII strings along with a 16-byte timestamp, meaning a record of
size 208 bytes. By default, the keys stored on the phone are erased after 30 days. So
the maximum size of the internal database is around 9 MB; the Nexus 6 phone has
an internal storage of 32 or 64 GB, so even the maximum storage required by the
ENACT application is minimal (Typical mail and chat applications require storage
in the order of 100mb).
3.5.3 Evaluation: Encryption and Decryption Time and Bandwidth
Next, we added features to the application that allowed a user’s smartphone to
send and receive an alert. To send an alert, the application requires the following
inputs: parameters specific to the disease, such as number of days the smartphone
owner was contagious; in real operation, the disease parameters would be sent by
an authorized health provider, along with the signature of the message using the
health provider. The smartphone compiles a message from the disease parameters,
which is then encrypted and sent to the health provider. The application tries to
decrypt the encrypted message, on receiving it from the server; if the decryption is
successful, the application displays an alert compiled using the disease parameters.
For the purpose of evaluation, we used the following string as a disease parameter
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input: “Measles,4”, indicating that the patient was diagnosed with measles and was
contagious for the past four days, which is the typical number of days an individual
is contagious before a rash appears.
We made the following assumptions about the application scenario. The
application may be used in a college campus, for example at Dartmouth College,
where Bluetooth beacons were deployed at different locations on campus. We ran
simulations on the prototype, in which the application typically stores two beacons
from one device in an hour, even though it receives one beacon once every minute
from a wireless broadcasting device. The application stores the first beacon they
received when they arrived and the first beacon after the hash chain is reset; other
keys that the smartphone may have received during the stay can be reproduced by
applying the hash function repeatedly on the above-mentioned keys. The scenario
assumes that users stay at a location on average for about an hour; this assumption
is reasonable because students on a college campus typically attend one or two-hour
classes, and the remaining times in labs, library, cafeterias, the gym, and their dorms
for time durations longer than one hour. If the user was present at the location
during the key reset, then the application would also store the seed key for the
next hash-chain. The prototype application stores only the keys received from
three of the closest Bluetooth beacons (determined by their signal strength); so the
application stores about six keys for every hour. Of course, the user may be at
locations where they stay for less than an hour, or more than one hour, and may
receive keys from less or more than three broadcasting devices.
On receiving the input, the application retrieves the keys from its internal
database, for every timestamp within the contagious period. We ran simulations
for cases when no other keys in the hash-chain were computed; these simulations
would denote how encryption/decryption would have worked if ENACT only de-
tected encounters, and not close encounters. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 shows performance
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Figure 3.5: Number of keys, and time required to encrypt an alert varies with respect to dura-
tion when patient was contagious, when only encounters were considered, and hash chains
were not used.

























(a) Encrypted message size























Figure 3.6: Size of the encrypted alert set and time taken to decrypt and view an alert varies
with respect to duration when patient was contagious, when only encounters were considered,
and hash chains were not used.
of the ENACT system without hashing, i.e., if it were to only detect encounters. The
message size increases quadratically because of redundant metadata information.
When testing with hash-chains, the prototype applied hash functions on each
key that was collected during the contagious period; the hash functions were
applied till the end of the reset period. Figure 3.7 – Figure 3.10 show experiments
done with a hash reset period of one and two hours for various contagious periods.
We experimented with different hash reset periods, such as one hour, two hours,
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Figure 3.7: Figure shows how number of keys generated varies with respect to duration when
patient was contagious, when considering hash reset times of one and two hours.
six hours and twelve hours; Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show the time taken to
encrypt an alert and the size of the resulting encrypted alerts for different hash
reset periods. The prototype application assumes the beacons advertise every one
minute, so the number of hashes was equal to the number of minutes left in the reset
period. For example, if the application received three keys at 11:19am, and the hash
chain was reset at 12:00pm, then the prototype generates 120 keys by applying hash
functions 40 times (in sequence for every minute including and between 11:20am
and 11:59am), on each of the three keys. The times and message size shown in the
tables are values averaged over ten simulations. We randomized the times users
spent at different locations, and hence in each simulation, users received beacons at
different times.
The application chooses random numbers to denote the degree (for the pro-
totype, we chose the degree of the polynomial to be one, i.e., the polynomial was
always a line) and coefficients (including the intercept, i.e., the secret key) of a poly-
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Figure 3.8: Figure shows how time to encrypt an alert varies with respect to duration when
patient was contagious, when considering hash reset times of one and two hours.






























Figure 3.9: Figure shows how size of the encrypted alerts varies with respect to duration
when patient was contagious, when considering hash reset times of one and two hours.
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Figure 3.10: Figure shows how time to decrypt and view an alert varies with respect to dura-
tion when patient was contagious, when considering hash reset times of one and two hours.
























Figure 3.11: Figure shows how time to encrypt alerts varies for different hash reset times,
when patient was contagious for one day.
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Figure 3.12: Figure shows how size of encrypted alerts varies for different hash reset times,
when patient was contagious for one day.
nomial, and computes at most three points on the polynomial, corresponding to the
three keys obtained by the application at any given time. The application each key
from the set of three keys obtained for every second during the contagious period
(and the corresponding set of three keys generated using hash functions) to encrypt
each of the three points and the corresponding secret key (i.e., the intercept) is used
to encrypt the disease parameters. A set of encrypted points and the encrypted
message, indexed by the date, in plaintext, when the keys were received by the
smartphone constitute the message sent to the server.
To put the size of encrypted messages in perspective, a text file is usually in
the order of kilobytes, an original photograph taken on a smartphone is typically
about 1-3mb, an application installed on a smartphone can be around 50mb, and
a video file can be in the order of 100 megabytes. Downloads of these sizes are
quite familiar to smartphone users, and the time for encryption and decryption are
reasonable and comparable to the time expected for uploading and downloading
of typical files of similar size in a user’s daily smartphone usage. A patient might
generate the alert only when his smartphone is connected to a Wi-Fi network, such
as the health provider’s office. A user receiving notice of a new alert could use the
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app to choose to download at the present moment (in the background), or delay the
download until they are connected to a Wi-Fi network. Diagnoses of contagious
diseases are rare occurrences, of course so we do not expect users to generate and
receive alerts every day when using the ENACT application.
By not applying hash-chains, the ENACT can only determine encounters,
i.e., match two (or more) users who received the same set of keys at the same
time. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that when hash chains are not used, a patient who
was contagious for an entire week only requires 1.6 seconds to create encrypted
alerts of size 3 MB, which takes a recipient only 136 ms to view. Though the time
taken for encryption and decryption and the size of the encrypted message (and
hence bandwidth required) are considerably less than when hashing is required, the
values for the same parameters are quite reasonable even with hashing. Figure 3.7-
Figure 3.10 show that with a hash-chain reset period of one hour, a patient who
was contagious for four days takes only one minute to create the encrypted alerts of
size 31 MB, using 11,516 keys. For a hash-chain reset period of two hours, however,
a patient who was contagious for four days takes seven minutes to create the
encrypted alerts of size 95 MB, using 34,624 keys. Even with hashing, decryption
takes less than a second. The graphs also show that if a patient is diagnosed early
so that the time they were contagious is less, the less time it takes to create alerts,
and less bandwidth required to send the alert; using ENACT, we expect it may be
possible to diagnose a patient early, because they will be watching for symptoms
after receiving alerts of possible exposure to viruses.
Is one hour an ideal time to reset the hash-chain? Contagious periods are
mostly in the order of hours [19]. Although cold viruses have been shown to
survive on surfaces for several days, their ability to cause an infection reduces
rapidly and they don’t often survive longer than 24 hours. Flu viruses capable of
being transferred to hands and causing an infection can survive on hard surfaces
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for 24 hours. Flu viruses can also survive as droplets in the air for several hours;
low temperatures increase their survival in the air. Stomach bugs survive for
longer periods. Salmonella and campylobacter survive for short periods of around
1-4 hours on hard surfaces or fabrics. Norovirus can survive for days or weeks
on hard surfaces. The Ebola virus has been shown to survive in fluids for days
outside the body of the infected patient, at low temperatures in a laboratory setting.
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 compares the encryption time and size of encrypted
alerts for varying hash reset periods, such as one hour, 2 hours, 6 hours and 12
hours. The hash reset period of one hour seems better in terms of encryption time
and encrypted message size. As the reset period becomes longer, the time taken
for encrypting the message becomes longer and the encrypt message size becomes
larger. In Section 3.7, we discuss ways to extend the protocol so a patient can obtain
the seed key for the next hash-chain for a particular location to alert people who
may have visited the location after the hash-chain reset.
The experimental results are promising and we expect people can use the
ENACT application without any noticeable difference in their regular smartphone
usage.
3.6 Limitations
The ENACT system relies on cryptographic keys sent by wireless broadcasting
devices. Due to vagaries in wireless transmissions, however, smartphones may
not always receive keys from a nearby wireless broadcasting device, even when
in broadcast range, even if they were within the contagious space during survival
time.
The ENACT system relies on users to carry their smartphones at all times, as
the system can only notify recipients who were within spatio-temporal proximity of
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the patient, for the location/times when they both were carrying their smartphones
that were running the ENACT application. The system may lead to false sense of
safety; a user may assume they were not exposed to any virus because they did not
receive any alerts.
The ENACT system relies on the existence of (or deployment of) wireless
beacon devices. Wi-Fi is ubiquitous, so Wi-Fi access points can be used as broad-
casting devices if access points can be set up to receive keys from the key server.
Bluetooth beacons require minimal technical expertise to setup, but greater manual
effort to set up and maintain; batteries need to be replaced every month for current
off-the-shelf beacons.
Our protocol assumes that people who are at (or close to) the same location
as the patient, may be exposed to the airborne virus. However, we do not account
for environmental factors, such as the speed and direction of air currents, that
determine virus survival.
We did not evaluate the prototype with real users; users might have additional
or different privacy concerns.
Finally, we explore a few key issues regarding the ENACT system.
3.7 Discussion
Hash Chain Reset. How can we ensure that a user who arrives near a broadcasting
device at the time of hash-chain reset still receives a alert about the disease, if the
reset happened during a contagious period when a virus was active at that location?
The patient needs to know the seed key for the new hash-chain, so he can generate
keys in the next hash-chain. The patient can retrieve the seed key from the key
server, by proving that he knows the key prior to hash-chain reset, and that he
requires the seed key to send alerts to users who arrived later.
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The application computes for every location the patient was at, during the
contagious period, the keys that may have been generated by all the wireless
broadcasting devices that the smartphone heard when at that location. In some
cases, the application might be unable to generate keys, especially if the hash-chain
was reset during the contagious period. In these cases, the application generates a
list of time durations for which it is missing keys, and sends it to the health provider,
who signs the form after confirming that the times fall within the contagious period;
the health provider sends the signed form to the key server, which (after verifying
the health provider’s signature) returns the requested seed keys so that the patient
can generate the missing keys.
Wi-Fi access points as broadcasting devices. APs operate on different chan-
nels but a mobile device is associated with only one AP at a time and listens only to
one channel. How can we distribute the keys so all the smartphones in vicinity of an
access point can receive the keys, no matter which access point they are associated
to and channel they are listening on? One option could be to have the key server
distribute keys by routing the keys through the Wi-Fi access points.
Bluetooth beacons as broadcasting devices. Bluetooth beacons can exist on
their own, do not need to be connected to the server or to the Internet or require
tight timesync; however, they need to be recharged. At what locations should
Bluetooth beacons be installed to cover all areas that have high user density at some
times, and low user density at all times? A exploratory survey among Computer
Science students revealed that students spend most of their time at dorms (or other
residences), classrooms, library, cafeteria and the gym. According to them, the
cafeterias, common rooms, library, gym, the arts center, outdoors (specifically, the
Green) in summer, and parking lots were the most popular locations. Depending
on the amount of open space and obstacles such as walls and furniture, the number
of Bluetooth beacons will vary.
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No Collusion. Suppose a user shares the keys {k1, k2, . . . kn} she received
at time T with another user who received keys {k′1, k′2, . . . k′n} at the same time T.
When a patient sends an alert, the first user is able to view the alert as she received
the same keys as the patient at time T ∈ C. The second user is unable to view
the alert initially, but after she adds the new set of keys to her database, she can
view the alert. So now the second user has learned that the first user may have
been exposed to the virus. A user may not want other users to learn about their
infectious state, so we expect users will not share keys.
Fake keys. An adversary can set up fake broadcasting devices to broadcast
keys. If the fake beacons never change keys then it will affect the system as any user
who ever visited that location will be able to view all the alerts sent by patients who
were at that location while contagious, even if the user was never in spatio-temporal
proximity to the patient. This problem can be addressed using digital signatures;
the key server issues certificates for all broadcasting devices, and the devices sign
all their beacons with their private key, so the receiving devices accept keys only
if the beacons were signed. Another option is to use ephemeral identifiers as was
recently incorporated in Eddystone protocols [8].
Listening devices. The adversary could also collect keys using listening
devices and broadcast keys collected from other places to smartphones in his
vicinity. This problem could be addressed by using timestamps on all the beacons
sent by a broadcasting devices, and assume a tight timesync between broadcasting
devices and smartphones.
User control over information sharing. ENACT controls who can see the alert
based on the user’s spatial and temporal proximity to the patient. Researchers have
shown that individuals might want some control over who sees their information in
location-based services [128]. Some patients might want to share the alert with only
friends and acquaintances who may have been exposed to the virus or to share the
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alert with more users, i.e., expand the thresholds for spatial and temporal proximity.
Is it useful to give additional sharing controls to ENACT users? If so, what kind
of controls would users want? How can we add feedback to the patients about
who have been alerted, without exposing the identity and location history of the
recipients, so they can make a better judgement about who to share the information
with?
Authorization for serious illnesses. In case of serious illnesses such as Ebola,
the identity of the recipients need to be disclosed to authorized health providers.
What additional privacy concerns will users have when they are required to share
their identity with an authorized health provider? Could ENACT be modified
to provide health providers access to the patient’s location history so the health
providers can reach out to users who may not have carried smartphones with them?
What incentives need to be provided to smartphone users to run the ENACT system
on their smartphone, when their identity and location history may be revealed to
public health officials under certain circumstances?
Scalability. Distributing the ENACT servers may provide scalability and
availability, if the ENACT system needs to be scaled to allow contact tracing across
the entire country or maybe the whole world. When submitting an alert, the
patient’s smartphone could compute the ID of the server to send the alert to by
computing a hash of the broadcasting device identifiers. This protocol would
require the smartphones to keep track of the broadcasting devices they came across,
but only the hash of the identifiers, not the device identifiers themselves.
3.8 Related Work
We describe prior work about location privacy and encounter detection at the end
of the next chapter.
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Researchers have conducted diary-based studies to understand the effect of
social networks on how infections spread among close contacts [137, 117] and others
have modeled how diseases can spread over a large social network [33, 39, 166]. Sun
et al. built a disease propagation model based on social encounter data collected at a
high school [150]. ENACT can be used to alert actual contacts, including strangers,
based on real encounters and close encounters.
Several smartphone applications have been developed to assist contact tracing
and contain airborne diseases. A smartphone-based system in Guinea, built on the
mobile application CommCare [20], allowed for real-time identification of contacts
during the Ebola outbreak who had not been visited and strong accountability
of contact tracers through location traces [138]. A similar system was built using
Open Data Kit [21] and ArcGIS mapping to help responders for following up with
contacts, identifying cases, and also for strategic planning during the response [155].
Smartphones were used to screen for tuberculosis and malaria in Botswana [103],
for contact tracing using text messages [118]. ENACT can be used to find contacts,
reducing the need for manual reporting.
We considered other cryptographic techniques that we considered when de-
signing the systems. Location-based encryption techniques ensure cipher text can
only be decrypted at a specified location [143]. Location-based encryption could be
used for sending location-based alerts, i.e., when a recipient enters the contagious
area during the contagious period, along with hash chains to determine temporal
proximity. We also considered attribute-based cryptography, which could be used to
assign attributes for different locations and time durations, and a patient could use
the attributes corresponding to the contagious area and time period to encrypt the
alert; attribute-based cryptography typically performs poorly when implemented
in smartphone applications, so we decided not to use attribute-based encryption in
our design. For future work, we plan to explore a lightweight attribute-based en-
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cryption library in our prototype [27]. We also considered using secure multi-party
computation between the patient and the recipients [170], however, this technique
required the patient’s smartphone to also take part in the communication and in-
teract with each recipient. Secure multi-party computation techniques also require
substantial resource consumption on both the patient and recipient smartphones,
and are also not anonymous, as the parties know each others’ network identities.
3.9 Summary
We explored scenarios where individuals are likely to share information with
strangers and discovered that sharing based on spatio-temporal proximity may be
useful, but presented interesting privacy challenges. One such scenario was contact
tracing, i.e., to alert people who came in direct contact with a sick patient about
the possibility that they may have been exposed to the virus. In some cases, the
contagious virus can live on a surface and particle aerosols from an infected person
can stay suspended in the air for hours even after the infected person leaves, which
implied that it was not sufficient to notify those users whom an infected person
encountered; it was also necessary to notify the users who were at the same location
as the infected person, hours later. We introduced a new problem: detecting close
encounters, i.e., incidents of spatial and temporal proximity. In this chapter, we
presented the design and implementation of a smartphone-based system called EN-
ACT (Encounter-based Architecture for Contact Tracing) to allow users to send an
alert to other users in close encounters, while providing strong privacy properties.
We described two cryptographic protocols for the ENACT architecture that send
alerts to the users who were in spatial and temporal proximity of the infected user,
without disclosing the identity of users to each other or to the system. Finally, we
presented a security and privacy analysis of the system and the results of experi-
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ments done using a prototype built on an Android smartphone. The experiments
showed that the application only used 1% of the total battery capacity on a normal
day, when there is no diagnosis, and used at most 9.6 MB storage (assuming typical
parameters and that data is erased after a month). Preparing an alert takes a few
minutes on the patient’s smartphone and viewing an alert takes a few seconds after
it arrives on the user’s smartphone. The experiments show that it is feasible for the
ENACT application to be run on a typical smartphone, as long as the broadcasting




In the preceding chapter, we present a privacy-preserving smartphone-based system
called ENACT to allow patients to alert users that may have been exposed to a
contagious airborne virus, due to their spatio-temporal proximity to the patient.
In this chapter, we explore a more general framework to identify close encounters
can allow individuals to obtain data from, or send notifications to, other persons
whose smartphones had recently been in spatial-temporal proximity. Recall from
the previous chapter that two devices are in spatio-temporal proximity of each other
if they were (i) at the same location almost at the same time, (ii) almost at the same
location at the same time, or (iii) almost at the same location at almost the same
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time. For example, one might wish to retrieve context, retrospectively, from other
people whose smartphones had collected the relevant sensor data at about the same
place at about the same time. In some applications, retrospective context may be
used as evidence of compliance, especially by health workers, as I describe towards
the end of this chapter.
A user can log (manually) or collect information about her environment (auto-
matically) from stationary, mobile or wearable sensors (for example, presence of
atmospheric dust, pollen or smoke [13, 12, 2]) and, if the environmental measure-
ments do not vary drastically with space and time, as is the case with these kinds
of urban pollution, other users sharing close encounters with an altruistic user can
benefit from the information collected by her phone. We expect close encounters
will be likely more relevant with the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), where a
plethora of data is sensed by smart devices and it is possible for others to benefit
from data collected by one altruistic user.
We expect people will exhibit community-based trust, i.e., trust that other people
within their own community are unlikely to misuse information. In addition to
the wider community, researchers have discovered that people who shared an
encounter exhibit similar emotions and behavior, referred to as co-presence [46];
we expect people in close encounters may experience co-presence as well. We
anticipate co-presence could lead people to feel connected to each other and want
to share information with each other. However, people still may want to hide
their identity while sharing or requesting information, so our solution protects
the identity of the user contributing the context such that it will be difficult for
users receiving retrospective context to identify the contributing user. The solution
also protects the identity of the user querying the context and indeed the servers
involved need not be trusted with information about the identity of the users
contributing or retrieving context. In this chapter, I describe a proximity-based
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infrastructure that allows people within a community (e.g., academic, corporate,
or residential) to anonymously share useful context. To support this infrastructure,
we design a system called SPICE (Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close
Encounters) that allows a person’s smartphone to collect shared information from
other community devices, after the fact, i.e., at a time long after the person was in
the environment in which the information was collected.
In our scenarios, however, people only want to share information but may
not wish to reveal their identity, so our solution should protect the identity of
both the users contributing the context as well as the users querying the context –
from eavesdroppers, from other users, and from any servers involved. Similarly,
matching users using exchanged keys is difficult as two people in spatial-temporal
proximity may never encounter each other to exchange keys. We expect that user’s
concerns about identity exposure may act as barrier to the adoption of the system,
so we focus on addressing this privacy problem in our solution; however, we also
discuss other complementary privacy problems and attacks that may arise in our
scenarios and suggest solutions in Section 4.9.
4.1 Use cases
We describe three mobile applications that support close encounters. In the first
scenario, users learn about a situation that resulted from being in a close encounter
with another user in the past. In the second scenario, a user can find other people,
as they may have been in a close encounter in the past due to their similar interests.
The other scenarios highlight how users can share context that they collected from
external sensors or logged on their smartphones, anonymously, with another user.
Scenario 1: Social discovery. Alice is new in town and wants to meet people who
have similar interests. She uses a social discovery application that allows her to
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submit her contact information, a pseudonymous email address generated by the
application, so people with similar interests can contact her through the application.
Ann uses the same social discovery application. She wants a friend to go running
with and queries for other female runners who she may have had close encounters
within her residential community where she goes running, as they are likely to take
the same running trails as her. Alice had been running near Ann’s apartment that
morning, so Ann receives Alice’s email from the server.
Scenario 2: Airborne pollutants. Jane is suffering from asthma. She visits a doctor
who asks her whether she was exposed to smoke, dust or pollen in the past three
days. Jane uses the application on her phone, installed by her company’s IT staff,
that allows her to request data from others at her company. The application sends
a query to the application server (set by the company server) for dust and pollen
for all the locations that Jane visited within her company grounds in the past three
days. Jane’s device receives a list of dust and pollen readings submitted by other
users. One of the users is John, who works in the same building as Jane, but who
has never interacted with Jane (John’s identity is hidden from Jane).
Scenario 3: Forensic evidence. When Bob is found dead in an alley one night, the
police use Bob’s phone to collect videos and photos shared by other people who
may have been near the crime scene few hours before and after the predicted time of
death, in the hope of retrieving evidence related to Bob’s death. Suppose there was
a photo-sharing application that implemented the SPICE protocol, which allowed
law enforcement and emergency responders to enter a special code to “break the
glass” on the SPICE application; entering the code enabled the smartphone to
send a request for evidence on behalf of the smartphone owner, in case they are
unconscious or dead.1Currently, there is no standard in law enforcement to acquire
photographs and videos from the public, when a tragedy occurs [18].
1The policy questions around such a feature are beyond the scope of this paper, but the technology
could nonetheless be useful for anonymous data collection of important incidents.
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4.2 The SPICE System
In this section, we present the SPICE system to support query and sharing of
information. First I present the definitions of some key terms used in this chapter.
User: an individual using the SPICE system.
Smartphone: wireless device carried by the user at almost all times. In this chapter,
we primarily refer to a user’s smartphone, but it could also be a tablet or a
laptop. We allude to a user and the user’s smartphone interchangeably in this
chapter.
Context: conditions about a person or their environment.
Helper: a user who collects context, either for her own benefit or for sharing with
the SPICE system.
Querier: a user who requests for retrospective context from the SPICE system. A
user may be both a helper and a querier, at different times.
Context source: a sensor that measures context. It could be an internal sensor
running on the helper’s smartphone or an external wireless device that sends
data to the helper’s smartphone.
Context or sensor readings: individual data points as measured by a source.
Broadcasting device: a wireless device that broadcasts beacons to a SPICE user’s
smartphone; a broadcasting device could be a WiFi access point or a Bluetooth
beacon.
Beacon interval or period: time between two consecutive beacons from a wireless
broadcasting device.
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Beacon: a message that the broadcasting device sends (or “advertises” in case
of Bluetooth beacons) at periodic intervals to all the wireless devices in its
vicinity; note, a “beacon” refers to a wireless packet rather than the device
sending the beacon packet. For clarity, we call the latter a “broadcasting
device”.
4.2.1 System model
The SPICE system comprises five main components: users, sources, smartphones,
broadcasting devices, and a context server.
Users. People who have smartphones with wireless capabilities to connect to
the Internet and to nearby sensors. Although we refer to a user who queries
context as a querier q and a user who shares the context as a helper h, over
time a given user may be both a querier and a helper. The SPICE system
expects that the user carries her smartphone (or tablet) with her at (nearly)
all times. We assume that user smartphones are already paired with their
personal sensors, and that users have installed the SPICE applications on their
smartphones.
Sources. A source s that monitors context could be (i) a stationary or mobile
sensor in public spaces accessible to everyone, (ii) a stationary or mobile
sensor at the user’s home or office paired with the user’s smartphone, or
(iii) a mobile personal wearable device or sensors on the users’ smartphone,
that senses personal information about the wearer and her surroundings,
accessible only to the wearer; the first two types of sources are external, the
latter internal. We assume external sources are aware of what context type
they sense, have a clock to record time, know their location, can define the
spatial and temporal scope for which their sensor readings are valid, and can
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communicate wirelessly with a user’s smartphone. We do not assume that
a personal sensor can determine its location; the smartphone tags context
collected from personal sensors and internal sensors with its own location,
obtained from the location service provided by the phone OS. The SPICE
system assumes that a user’s smartphone is already paired with the user’s
personal sensors; the device pairing step is out of scope.
Smartphones. A user’s smartphone stores context collected from sources, or
entered by the user, and continuously monitors its location.
Broadcasting devices. A broadcasting device distributes cryptographic keys to
SPICE users in its vicinity. The keys are used to encrypt context. By using
a broadcasting device, SPICE ensures that users in the vicinity of the helper
when the context was collected can access and decrypt the context at a later
time.
Context server. The context server stores encrypted context submitted by the
helper devices and responds to querier devices with encrypted context that
matches the request.
Key server. The key server provides seed keys to broadcasting devices, and issues
public-private keys for users.
SPICE also assumes, for now, that the source only sends accurate readings to
smartphones; we discuss more about data accuracy and calibration in Section 4.9.
We also expect helpers to choose an expiration period for data they upload. By
default, all data stored on the server has an expiration period of one month. Users
may delete the data on their phone, after uploading the data to the server.
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4.2.2 Communication steps
The SPICE system works as follows, as shown in Figure 4.1.
1. A helper device collects sensor readings from the source.
2. All smartphones in the vicinity of the broadcasting device collect a key.
3. The helper smartphone encrypts the sensor readings using the key included
in the beacon and submits a combination of the key and context type and the
encrypted data to the context server, which stores the encrypted data, using
the encoded context type as the index.
4. A querier smartphone requests encrypted context from the context server
using a combination of the context type and the key that it received at the
location at the time for which it needs the context.
5. The querier smartphones receive and decrypt the context using the same key.
Other users cannot determine the identity of the helper who submits the
context or the querier who requests and ultimately decrypts the context. A helper
never learns who uses the readings they collected, or if anyone ever downloads the
readings. A recipient, on viewing the context readings, cannot determine which
user collected the data.
4.2.3 Design goals
Our research goal is as follows: How can we help a querier’s smartphone to retrieve
context from helpers’ smartphones, after the fact? To address this question, we pro-


















Figure 4.1: SPICE Model: 1) Helper device collects sensor readings from source S. 2) Wire-
less beacon sends keys to nearby devices. 3) Helper uploads encrypts sensor reading. 4)
Querier requests context. 5) Querier receives and decrypts data.
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Meaningfulness: A context reading is meaningful to a querier if the information
stored on the helper’s smartphone pertains to the same location/time (or close
to the location/time) requested by the querier.
User privacy: Although helpers may be willing to share context with other users
in their community, they will likely wish to do so anonymously. Queriers
may hesitate to request context, unless they are ensured their requests are
anonymous. Adversaries should not be able to link a user’s identity with the
information the user shares (or requests). Privacy goals are described in detail
in the next section.
4.2.4 Security Model
We understand that helpers and queriers will have privacy concerns when using
SPICE to share and query context. SPICE has the following privacy goals:
P1. Anonymity. A matched querier and helper cannot learn each others’ identity.
P2. Unlinkability. No SPICE user or external adversary can link a user to the
location, time or context type mentioned in the user’s context submission
or context query or link together multiple context submissions and context
queries. When a querier’s smartphone receives context from a helper, neither
the querier’s smartphone nor the querier can link it to other information
provided by the same helper, earlier or later.
P3. Confidentiality. Only users who shared a close encounter with the helper
within the meaningful spatial scope in the meaningful temporal period of the
source can receive context readings collected by the helper from the source.
The server learns nothing about any user, and the data they collected and
requested.
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We are concerned about the following threats:
T1. Threat to privacy: An adversary may link a user to a certain location, link one
user to multiple locations, link multiple users at the same location, assemble a
complete location history of a user, or identify a user.
T2. Threat of confidentiality: A malicious user may try to obtain data collected at
locations they never visited.
We assume similar trust model as described for ENACT in the preceding chapter.
TR1. No collusion. We expect users to not share keys with other SPICE users or
with the server.
TR2. Trustworthy sources. SPICE relies on the sources to determine whether the
data they share with users is accurate and to alert the user or administrator
managing the sources when it detects an error or malfunction.
TR3. Proper key generation. The users trust the wireless broadcasting devices to
generate keys according to the SPICE protocol and not to share keys otherwise.
TR4. Proper message routing. The helpers trust the server to forward only relevant
messages to the queriers and the queriers trust the server to determine and
forward all relevant messages.
TR5. Trustworthy app. Users trust the SPICE app not to disclose their location
history except via the SPICE protocol. Similarly helpers trust the app to not
disclose the context they collect except to relevant queriers, and queriers trust
the app to send their queries only to the server.
We assume that all wireless beaconing devices, smartphones, and external sources
have sufficient processing power and storage capabilities to support cryptographic
primitives.
We expect an adversary with the following capabilities.
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A1. Eavesdrop on communications. The external adversary can eavesdrop on com-
munications between smartphones and the server.
A2. Access to data at rest. The server operators may be curious and can read users’
data stored on the server. We assume, for now, that an adversary cannot
compromise a user’s phone and get access to the SPICE application on the
phone; we address this issue in the security analysis section.
A3. Access to application. An adversary can install the application on their smart-
phone and collect keys from broadcasting devices or send alerts. For now, we
assume the adversary cannot set up fake broadcasting devices or send keys to
other smartphones.
A4. Access to keys. We assume a malicious user cannot install malware on smart-
phones to collect keys from all users. A user who visits different locations to
collect keys is not considered an adversary and can receive alerts if they were
in spatio-temporal proximity with a patient at those locations, even if their
reason for collecting the keys was malicious. We also expect a malicious user
may be able to collect some, but not all the keys received by all other users,
simply by visiting the locations.
We make four contributions with SPICE, similar to those for the ENACT system.
• We present the design and implementation of a smartphone-based system
called SPICE (Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters) to
allow users to query data retrospectively based on close encounters, while
providing strong privacy properties.
• We describe two cryptographic protocols for the SPICE architecture that allows
users to share and query data, without disclosing their identity or location
history to other users or to the system.
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• We present a security and privacy analysis of the SPICE system.
• We implement a prototype of the SPICE system on an Android smartphone
and measure the effects of the mobile application on battery life, bandwidth,
latency, and internal storage space.
4.3 Design
As in the earlier chapter, we begin with an outline of the proposed architecture,
for the purpose of exposition, and then refine it to provide the system’s full fea-
ture set. The notations used in the system model are shown in Table 4.1 and the
communication steps are numbered as shown in Figure 4.1.
1. Context collection: s⇒ h: C | C=(c, v, l, t, δs, τs)
The helper’s smartphone h receives from a context source s, the context reading,
which includes the context type c, the reading v, the location l and time t when the
reading was sensed, and the spatial and temporal scope (δs, τs) of the reading. The
scope (δs, τs) defines the extent in space and time within which the value generated
by the source is meaningful. The spatial scope of a source, measured in meters, is a
hypothetical circle of radius δs with the source s located at its center l. For example,
the readings of a dust sensor in a building might be meaningful only within the
room (i.e., δs is about 6 meters). SPICE provides a well-known list of defined context
types c that SPICE supports. The temporal scope τs, stored in seconds, indicates the
duration starting from the sensing time t that could extend to the past, or the future,
or both, depending on the source; for now, we assume a symmetrical temporal
scope, i.e., a reading is meaningful for τs seconds before and after it was sensed. For
example, dust readings could be meaningful for an hour before and after the time
of sensing.







L, T Location and Timestamp




δs Spatial scope of source s
τs Temporal scope of source s
B Broadcasting device
n Number of broadcasting devices at any time
g Threshold of broadcasting devices at any time
b Broadcasting interval
z Key reset period
S SPICE server
PS SPICE key server
S Server database
d Internal database on smartphone
PS, PrS Public/private key of S
h(X) Message digest of X
E(k, X) Encrypt X using key k
D(k, X) Decrypt X using key k
Sig(B, X) B’s signature on text X
Table 4.1: Notations used in the SPICE system model. The type of encryption performed by
E() and D()is implicitly symmetric.
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d consists of a tuple (L, T,kLT, C). Each such record contains the location L the
user was at when it received the context, the time T when it received the context,
the most recent key kLT it received from a broadcasting device, and the context
reading C it collected.2 The location L and time of visit T are the same or close to
the location l and time of collection t in the context reading C. The key kLT is the
key included in the most recent beacon the device received (see step 2 below). The
SPICE user’s smartphone also uploads the received context to the SPICE server, as
described in step 3 below.
The records are retained only for a period defined by the user, based on the
smartphone’s storage limit. The user may choose to delete the collected context
C after uploading it to the SPICE server, and store only a partial record (L, T,kLT)
to save storage space; users might want to retain these (L, T,kLT) records to query
and retrieve missing context at a future time. We expect smartphones to receive
context readings from public ambient sensors, unless the users were only briefly
present near the source and missed the periodic broadcast from the source or the
users chose to discard certain context due to storage and performance concerns.
2. Beacon broadcast: B⇒ u: k
The broadcasting devices B broadcast a random number k. The broadcast occurs
once every b minutes, where b is the broadcast interval for beaconing devices.
The smartphone adds a record (L, T, k) to its internal database d, where k is the
cryptographic key it received when at location L and time T.
3. Context submission: h⇒ S: E(k, c), E(k, C)
The helper uploads an (index, value) pair to the SPICE server. The index is a
ciphertext generated on context type c using a deterministic encryption algorithm,
with the key k. The value is the context reading C, also encrypted using the same key
k. For now, we assume that the smartphone chooses the most recent key it received
2For purpose of exposition, we consider only one context reading for every location/time, but
each location/time record could contain a set of context readings, i.e., (L, T,kLT , {C}).
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from the wireless beaconing device closest to its location at the time of context
collection; we discuss the presence of multiple beaconing devices in Section 4.4.2.
The helper does not explicitly upload location or time of context collection, because
it is implicit in the key and also hidden in the encrypted text, so the server does
not know when and where the context is collected. The server adds a pair to its
database, (I,C), where I = E(k, c) and C = E(k, C).
Throughout this protocol we assume the users’ devices communicate with
the server over an authenticated, confidential, and integrity-preserving channel,
e.g., using HTTPS and, if desired, an anonymity-preserving mix network such as
Tor [22, 62].
4. Query: q⇒ S : E(k, c)
A querier chooses the locations or time duration for which she desires a certain
context type. The querier’s smartphone q searches in its internal database d for the
records corresponding to the location/time values that span the spatial ranges and
temporal durations specified by the user and checks whether the context type c
is available for these locations and times. If the record’s (type, reading) pair does
not contain any context of type c at the desired location/time, the querier sends a
query to the server containing the index, i.e., context type c encrypted with the key
kLT, where kLT is a key recorded at the relevant location and time. If several keys
in d were collected at the desired location and desired time duration, the querier
submits a list of indices.
5. Retrieval: S⇒ q: { E(k, C) | (I, E(k, C)) ∈ S ∧ I = E(k, c)})
The server stores encrypted context in its database S. Each record in S is of the form
(index, encrypted context), where I is the index of the encrypted context, E(k, c), as
submitted by the helper and querier. When the server receives a query, it searches
for all records in S whose index matches the value I submitted in the query. (If the
query includes a set of indexes, the server repeats the search for each index.) The
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server responds with any and all of the encrypted context readings whose indexes
match the submitted index. The server sends the response back to the querier’s
smartphone over the secure channel on which the query arrived.
As in the ENACT system, the SPICE system also relies on the ubiquitous
existence of wireless beacons running the protocol. We expect Wi-Fi access points
(APs) can act as SPICE wireless beaconing devices, as they are capable of sending
broadcasts and can perform cryptographic operations such as key generation. Also,
unlike with contagious airborne viruses, the spatial scope of context readings might
be more than a few meters. More on this issue in Section 4.9.
4.4 Spatial-temporal controls
As in the ENACT system, the SPICE protocol also uses time-varying keys to allow a
helper to share context with anyone who was at the location where the reading was
collected, even when she was not at the location, as long as the querier arrived at
the location during the reading’s meaningful temporal scope, i.e., the querier was
at the location where the reading was collected within τs seconds before or after it
was collected. For now, we allow any user within spatial range of the wireless bea-
coning device to access any readings collected within that range, irrespective of the
meaningful spatial range of the reading; we discuss spatial controls in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Temporal controls
As in the ENACT system, the broadcasting device uses hash-chaining to generate
and broadcast a series of related keys; it broadcasts a new key every b minutes and
the base key is reset every z minutes. The use of hash-chaining allows the helper’s
device to encrypt the context so that users who arrive at a time when the helper
was not present, but within the meaningful temporal duration of the context, can
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decrypt the encrypted context. We begin by adopting the hash-chain technique
from the ENACT protocol, then expand on it.
2. Beacon broadcast:
B⇒ u : k where k = hx(a)
at beaconing period x from moment of base key reset, assuming the broad-
casting device sends a fresh key a at the start of the reset period.
3. Context submission:
h⇒ S : E(k, c), E(k, C)
where k = hp(hx(a))
Suppose hx(a) is the most recent key the helper receives prior to the time she
received the context. She encrypts the context with key hp(hx(a)), where p is
the number of times the hash function should be applied to reach the end of
the meaningful time duration, i.e., p = τb and τ is the temporal range included
in the context reading C. As before, the helper will compute a ciphertext I
of context type c using the key k, and a ciphertext C of the context reading
using the same key k. The helper’s smartphone submits both ciphertexts; the
first ciphertext serves as the index to the second ciphertext on the server. On
receiving the submission, the server adds the (I,C) pair to its database S,
where I = E(k, c) and C = E(k, C).
Consider an example scenario to better understand the key generation process:
suppose a helper collects a context reading, at the time of a hash reset, from a
source whose meaningful temporal scope is three hours; the beacon interval
is one minute and the hash reset interval is four hours. After it gets the first
reading, the application will retrieve the key that it received most recently,
apply the hash function on the key 180 times, encrypt the context type and
the context reading with the new key and send them to the server.
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If the hash reset was two hours (less than the temporal scope of the source),
the helper sends a request to the key server. The request contains the last key
it can generate, i.e., the 120th key in the hash-chain starting at the last key it
received, and the key it needs, in this case, the 60th key in the next hash-chain.
The helper’s application signs the request using the helper’s private key and
sends the request to the key server. The key server, on verifying the signature,
sends the 60th key to the helper.
So the helper generates the key k, which is the last key in the hash chain that
it can generate; if it received hx(a), it can generate zb − x − 1 more keys. It
requests the ith key in the next hash chain, where i is the number of times
the hash function should be applied to reach the end of the meaningful time
duration, i.e., p = τb minus the number of times the hash function should be
applied to reach the end of the hash chain, i.e., zb − x − 1. Once the helper
sends the request with k and i, signed using its private key, the server verifies











h⇒ PS : k||i, Sig(h, k||i)
PS⇒ h : hi(a′)
h⇒ S : E(k, c), E(k, C)||E(k′, c), E(k′, C)
where k = hp(hx(a)) and k′ = hi(a′)
120
4,5. Context Query and Retrieval: A user arrives at a later time (before hash-chain
reset) and receives hy(a) from the broadcasting device. Following the property
of hash-chains, any user with a key hy(a) such that y ≤ x + p can query
and retrieve the context submitted by the helper encrypted using hp(hx(a)).
Suppose user arrives after hash-chain was reset, and receives hy(a′), such that
y ≤ i, the user can query and retrieve the context submitted by the helper
encrypted using hi(a′).
If SPICE used the above hash-chaining technique, a user can decrypt any context of
the same type that was collected in that location after she arrived at that location
until the next key reset period, including context that is not meaningful to her.
Instead we extend the technique to use two hash-chains in opposing directions, so
we can limit access to the context to users who were at the location only during the
meaningful temporal duration. The dual hash-chain technique follows.
2. Beacon broadcast:
B⇒ u : k where k = hx(a) || h zb−x−1(a′))
The broadcasting device sends one key, which is a combination of two parts
generated using two hash chains. At the start of a reset period, the beacon
sends key a and h
z
b (a′). At the end of the broadcasting interval, it sends h1(a)
and h
z
b−1(a′) and so on. At the end of the reset period, it sends key h
z
b−1(a)
and a′. On receiving the beacon, the user’s smartphone stores the key in its
internal database d, along with the most recent location reading and current
time: (L, T, hx(a) || h zb−x−1(a′)).
3. Context submission:
h⇒ S : E(k, c), E(k, C)
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where k = hp(hx(a)) || hp(hy(a′)).
Suppose hx(a) and hy(b) are the keys included in the most recent beacon the
helper received prior to the time she received the context. All users within
range of the wireless beaconing device will have received the same keys and
can use them to access the data submitted by the helper. Instead of encrypting
with just hp(hx(a)), the helper uses the concatenation of the two keys, hp(hx(a))
|| hp(hy(a′)) as the key; we assume E() can support encryption using double-
sized keys. As above, the helper sets p = τb . Here, we assume the reading has
a symmetric temporal meaningful range, i.e., the value is meaningful for p
beacon intervals before and after it was collected.
If the temporal meaningful range is larger than the hash reset, the helper
requests the n′th key from the key server, where n′ = p− ( zb − x− 1).
4. Context Query:
q⇒ S : E(k, c)
where k = hx
′
(a)||hy′(a′).
Assume a user who arrived within the specified time duration, i.e., within a
time range extending from p beacon periods before to p beacon periods after





(b) such that x′ ≤ x + p and y′ ≤ y + p, where the helper received the
keys hx(a) and hy(a′). The user’s smartphone first locates the key k=kLT =
hx(a) || hy(a′) stored in its internal database for the desired location and time
L and T. Since the querier does not know the exact value of p, which is specific
to the context source from which the helper obtained the reading, the querier
can choose a meaningful temporal duration p′ known to be associated with
the context type c. The querier’s smartphone computes up to 2p′ indices and
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sends them as a set of indices to the server; for the purpose of exposition, we
only show one index included in the query.
5. Context Retrieval: S⇒ q: E(k, c), E(k, C)
The server sends back the index that matched the index included in the query,
and the corresponding encrypted context E(k, C) contained in those records
stored in its database S. Once it receives a response, the querier’s device
compares the index with the indices it submitted, and decrypts the message
using the corresponding key k.
Until now, we considered the spatial range for the reading to be the broadcast
range of the wireless beaconing device. But the context reading might not be mean-
ingful throughout this range. Furthermore, especially in academic and corporate
communities, a user could be in the range of multiple beaconing devices, so should
consider the possibility of multiple beaconing devices at any instance. We leverage
the fact that a user sees multiple beaconing devices when discussing spatial range
in the next section.
4.4.2 Spatial controls
The use of this hash-chaining technique allows any user within broadcast range of
the same broadcasting device as the helper to retrieve the reading, if they arrived
within the spatial range of the broadcasting device during the meaningful time
duration of the reading. But the reading might have a spatial meaningful range
that is less than the broadcast range of the beaconing device. To prevent a user
from getting all the context within the broadcasting range of the beaconing device,
when ideally they should be getting less context, we introduce spatial controls.
The distance boundary for spatial controls will be the meaningful spatial scope
of the source, i.e., only those users who were present within a circle of radius δs
meters, the center being the location of the source, can access the reading. For
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distance bounding, we explored several existing methods for outdoor and indoor
localization, but most of the methods are not entirely accurate in determining the
exact distance between mobile devices. SPICE does not need to know the exact
distance, but only whether two devices are approximately within a certain circle
whose radius is the meaningful spatial scope of the context source.
To determine the distance-bounding for meaningfulness, SPICE uses the same
technique as the ENACT system. SPICE uses Shamir’s secret sharing scheme for
encrypting the context, to allow a querier to decrypt the context even when the
querier does not have access to all the keys that the helper used to encrypt the
context [146]. Instead of using the most recent keys it received from broadcasting
devices for encrypting the context, the helper computes a secret message using
the keys it received from the broadcasting devices and uses the secret message to
encrypt the context. For a predetermined threshold, if the querier has at least the
threshold number of keys, the querier will be able to compute the secret message
and use it to decrypt the context.
The revised technique follows.
Initialization: Suppose there are n wireless beaconing devices around the helper.
Each wireless beaconing device sends two keys at every beaconing period. At
the start of every reset period, a wireless beaconing device i sends key ai and
h
z
b−1(a′i), at the next beaconing period it sends h(ai) and h
z
b−2(a′i), and so on.
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3. Context Submission:
keys = ∀i ∈ {1..n}, {ki | where ki = hp(hx(ai))||hp(h
z
b−x−1(a′i))
I = ∀i ∈ {1..n}, {E(ki, c)}
C = E( f (0), C), ∀i ∈ {1..n}, {E(ki, (yi, f (yi))) | yi ∈ R}
h⇒ S : (I,C)
The helper receives a key containing hx(ai) and h
z
b−x−1(a′i) from each broad-
casting device Bi at the xth broadcasting period. The threshold number of
broadcasting devices, g, is chosen by the SPICE system and is known to all
user devices and the server. The helper’s device randomly chooses g − 1
integers as coefficients for the polynomial of degree g− 1. The helper then
computes a random secret message, K, to be used to encrypt the context
reading; K is set as the constant value f (0) of the polynomial. The helper
randomly chooses n integers to compute n points of the form (y, f (y)) on the
curve generated by the polynomial f . The index in the context submission
contains n parts, where the context type is encrypted using each of the keys
obtained from the n broadcasting devices. The querier will need to generate
the function to compute the secret message for decrypting the context reading,
so the helper also includes the n points in the message. The querier must be
able to retrieve only those many points as the number of keys they have in
common with the helper; the helper device encrypts each point (y, f (y)) with
a key, and encrypts the context reading with the constant term, that is also
the secret message. The helper submits the index, and the encrypted context
reading to the server and the server stores the (index, context) pairs.
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4. Context Query:
I = ∀i ∈ {1..n′}, {E(ki, c) | (L, T, ki) ∈ d and T ∈ D}
q⇒ S : I
The querier, on learning the duration D for which the context is desired,
retrieves the keys stored in its internal database d that it obtained from the n′
broadcasting devices it encountered at the specific location/time (L, T), i.e.,





querier’s device will compute the index values by encrypting the context type
using the keys it has for the location and times for which the querier wants
the context.
5. Context Retrieval:
I = ∀i ∈ {1..n′}, {E(ki, c) | {L, T, ki} ∈ d and T ∈ D
C = E( f (0), C), ∀i ∈ {1..n}, {E(ki, (yi, f (yi))) | yi ∈ R}
S⇒ q : I,C
keys = {ki} | E(ki, c) ∈ I
points = ∀i ∈ {1..n′}, {D(ki, E(ki, (yi, f (yi)))}
context = D( f (0), E( f (0), C))
The server sends those records to the querier whose indices have at least g
parts common with the index included in the query. On receiving the response,
the querier’s device will attempt to decrypt the different parts of the secret
messages, i.e., E(ki, (yi, f (yi)), using all the n′ keys it has, and will successfully
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decrypt at least g points. After retrieving g points, the querier’s device can
obtain the secret message by solving for f using linear interpolation of the
shares by following Shamir’s method [146]. Finally, the querier’s device uses
the secret message to decrypt the context reading.
In the next section, we analyze the security of the SPICE system.
4.5 Security Analysis
First we analyse how the SPICE architecture achieves the security properties listed
in Section 4.2.4.
Anonymity: SPICE prevents a matched querier and helper from learning each
others’ identity. Consider the following attack scenarios.
• Suppose a malicious user wants to learn who collected readings from a
specific source at her current location in the past day. She queries context
of the type collected by the source, and submits the keys she received
from the current location. She receives a list of context readings, with the
times when the information was collected; the readings do not contain
any information about the users who collected it.
• Suppose a curious helper wants to learn who downloads the data she
submits. She submits the data, encrypted, to the server, but never receives
any information back from the server about queries to that data.
Unlinkability: SPICE prevents a malicious user, a curious server operator or an
external adversary from linking a user to her location or even assembling a
decoded location history. Consider three attack scenarios.
• Suppose a malicious user wants to learn which other users collected
data at her current location. We know that a user will not be able to
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learn the identity of the helper whose data she received, so she cannot
link the helper to her current location or the type of data. If she had
additional information about the location, such as the identity of the
people who visited the location, she might be able to match their identity
with the times the data was collected and link them to the location; but
this additional information is not provided by the SPICE application.
• Suppose a malicious user wants to learn if she received data from the
same helper, multiple times, in an attempt to assemble the helper’s
location history and identify the helper. The data she receives does not
contain identity of the helper, so without additional information about a
user and their location trace (which is not provided by SPICE), the user
cannot assemble a helper’s location history.
• Suppose a server operator is curious and wants to learn the location
history of users. The server operator may be able to learn the location of
helpers at the time of context submission and query, but if necessary they
can contact the server through an anonymity-preserving mix network
such as Tor [22, 62].
• Suppose an adversary gets unrestricted access to a user’s smartphone.
If this happens, SPICE gives the adversary access to any context data
that was stored on the smartphone, but no information about the user’s
location prior to the compromise. Since the application never collects
or stores the location, the adversary does not get access to the users’
location history, but only to a collection of records, each a set of integers
associated with a timestamp. Even if the adversary had installed the
SPICE application on his own phone and had access to keys that he
collected at different locations at different times and kept track of the
locations he went to, and some of the keys he obtained match the integers
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in the user’s database, the adversary will only be able to guess some of
the locations, not the entire location history of the user, since we assume
it is not possible for the adversary to get access to all the keys ever
broadcasted by all the wireless broadcasting devices.
Confidentiality: Only users who shared a close encounter with the helper (almost
within the meaningful spatial space almost in the meaningful time period)
can decode data collected by the helper; even the server learns nothing about
any user. Consider four attack scenarios.
• Suppose a user who was never near a particular source s wants to retrieve
data it shared at time t. Suppose further that, at time T ∈ {t − τs, t +
τs}, the user heard broadcasting devices {B′1, B′2 . . . B′n′} and a helper
in spatial proximity of s heard broadcasting devices {B1, B2 . . . Bn}. At
time T ∈ {t − τs, t + τs}, she obtained {k′1, k′2, . . . k′n′} and the helper
obtained {k1, k2, . . . kn}. Assuming every broadcasting device follows
the SPICE protocol and generates hash-chain sequences different from
other broadcasting devices, the user cannot use the keys she obtained
at time T to generate the key used by the helper to create the index and
encrypt the data the helper obtained from s at time T (since they both
received keys from different broadcasting devices) and so she will not be
able to retrieve the data from the server.
• Suppose a user who was at the same location as a source s wants a
prior context reading at time t from the source, but was at the location
after the meaningful temporal scope, t′ > t + τs. Both the user and the
helper who collected the desired reading heard broadcasting devices
{B1, B2 . . . Bn}, but the helper heard them at time t, and the user heard
them at time t′ > t + τs. The helper’s device encrypts the reading using
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the keys, generated by applying the hash function τsb times on the keys it
received close to time t; suppose the keys the helper received close to time
t are {k1, k2 . . . kn}. Since the user received keys from the broadcasting
devices at a later time, following the property of the hash-chains, the
user will receive keys that came later in the hash-chain sequence, i.e., of
the form {hi(k1), hi(k2), . . . hi(kn)}, i > τb . Following the one-directional
property of hash-chains, the user cannot determine the keys earlier in the
hash-chain and cannot decrypt the alert message.
• Suppose a helper collected readings from a source at time T. Another
user was at the same location at the same time T but farther away from
the source and the helper, i.e., outside the meaningful spatial scope such
that the context reading is no longer meaningful at his location. Based
on our assumptions, since he is farther away, the user and the helper see
a different set of broadcasting devices; the helper and the user see (at
most) the same g′ = g− 1 broadcasting devices. The user can decrypt
g′ = g− 1 sub parts of the message. But with only g− 1 points, he cannot
use interpolation to determine the coefficients of a polynomial of degree
g− 1. So the user cannot obtain the constant term of the polynomial, i.e.,
the secret message, and thus cannot request the context reading from the
source at time T.
• Suppose a server operator is curious and wants to learn the content of
the submissions and queries. The server operator does not have access to
any keys since we assume users do not collude with the server operator.
So he cannot decrypt the encrypted messages sent by the helper and the
querier, nor decrypt the data stored on the server.
Next, we describe the prototype of the SPICE system that we developed on
the Android platform, the experimental setup and results.
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4.6 Experiments
We developed a prototype of the SPICE system as an Android application and
conducted in-lab experiments on a Nexus 6 smartphone. We evaluate the latency,
storage required and bandwidth consumed by the continuous submission of the
context readings for the helper, and for context query and response for the querier.
4.6.1 Evaluation: Battery consumption
From the evaluations done for ENACT, we discovered that listening continuously
for beacons from Bluetooth or Wi-Fi broadcasting devices (broadcasted at one per
second, and one per minute respectively) consumed only about 1% of the battery
capacity on the Nexus 6 phone, on average over a week. In the case of the SPICE
prototype, we also wanted to determine whether listening for context readings
would consume additional battery capacity. We wrote a different Android applica-
tion that listened for “keys” from one Bluetooth beacon, and context readings from
a different Bluetooth beacon, which acted as a “source”. We measured the power
consumption using the dumpsys tool, available as part of the Android SDK, and the
battery usage tool on the Nexus 6 phone. The Nexus 6 smartphone we used for our
experiments was running Android 6.0 Marshmallow, which has a power-efficient
Bluetooth Low Energy function for scanning, so we found no significant additional
power consumption when scanning for context readings from the “source”.
4.6.2 Evaluation: Storage
We expect context readings to be integer values in most cases; for example, the
Dylos DC1100 Pro air quality monitor reports dust readings in the form of integers
from 0 to 7000 (the lower reading, the higher the dust density). Assuming an integer
reading requires 4 bytes, the context reading includes the following:
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• value (integer of size 4 bytes),
• time (string of 16 bytes, for example ‘2016-04-28 09:30’),
• latitude and longitude (both floats of size 4 bytes)
• spatial scope (integer of 4 bytes, for example 100 to denote 100 meters), and
• temporal scope (string of size 3, for example 2h to denote 2 hours)
So the context reading requires 35 bytes. We expect the keys obtained from broad-
casting devices are stored in ASCII form, so a total of 128 bytes for two 256-bit keys
obtained from one broadcasting device, concatenated together.
Consider a typical usage scenario for the SPICE system. A helper receives a
double-sized key from a broadcasting device once per minute; we assume for this
scenario that the helper never hears more than three broadcasting devices at any
time. One implementation strategy to save storage space could be to store keys that
the user received when they first arrived at a location, and every first key after a
hash chain reset. We assume that people move from one location to another once
an hour, so we expect they receive one context reading once an hour (for example,
the application stores dust readings only when there is a significant change in value
when a location change happens). Since data and keys are stored in the application
at most for a month, the application stores 835 bytes in one hour: two records of size
400 bytes each; each include three keys (represented in ASCII requires 384 bytes)
along with timestamp of 16 bytes, and one context reading of size 35 bytes. So in a
month, the maximum storage space the application will need is 36MB.
4.6.3 Evaluation: Submission
Next, our goal was to evaluate the time taken and the bandwidth required to submit
a context reading to the server. We added features to the application that allowed
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a user’s smartphone to, on receiving a context reading, retrieve keys stored in the
database, apply a hash function repeatedly on the relevant keys, encrypt the context
type and the context reading using the generated key and send the index and the
encrypted data to the server.
To test the time taken and the bandwidth consumed, we simulated a user
who changed locations once an hour, sources that sent random (but similar) in-
teger values once a minute and changed it significantly when the user “moved”,
and broadcasting devices that generated keys once a minute. So the application
received six double-keys (assuming that application receives keys from at most
three broadcasting devices), and one context reading in an hour. We measured time
by recording the time before the keys were fetched from the internal database for
encrypting the context reading, and the time after the reading was encrypted, and
took the difference of the two times. We measured bandwidth by recording the size
of the final message to be sent to the server.
Assume the helper collects (and submits) one context reading per hour. We
compared the time taken to encrypt the reading and the size of the encrypted data
while varying the meaningful time scope for the reading. Figure 4.2 shows the time
taken to encrypt a context reading, depending on the meaningful time scope of the
reading; as expected, the larger the meaningful time scope, the longer it takes to
encrypt. However, the encryption time is minimal, and remains less than a second.
The size of the encrypted message remained about 190 bytes, irrespective of the
meaningful time scope, since there is always a pair of encrypted readings. Both
time to encrypt the reading and the bandwidth required to upload the encrypted
reading is minimal and the submission happens in the background, so we do not
expect the context reading submission to affect the helper’s normal smartphone
usage.
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Figure 4.2: Time taken to encrypt a context reading, depending on the meaningful time scope
of the reading.
4.6.4 Evaluation: Query
Next, our goal was to evaluate the time taken by the application to generate a
query and the bandwidth required to send the query to the server. To send a
query, the application requires as input the context type and the time duration
for which the querier needs the context reading. Once the inputs are received,
the application retrieves all the keys it obtained during the duration, and obtains
the typical temporal scope for a source that records data of the requested context
type. For every double-key it retrieves, it generates 2τb keys, by applying the hash
function τb times on the key-halves. Finally it encrypts the context type with each of
the keys, and sends the encrypted set to the server.
First, we evaluated how the time taken to generate a query and the size of the
encrypted query varied with the meaningful time scope of the requested reading.
Figure 4.3 shows the time taken to generate a query, depending on the meaningful
time scope of the requested reading, for different time durations, as requested
by the querier. As expected, the time taken to generate a query increases with
the meaningful time scope and significantly with the time duration for which the
querier needs the context readings. Even then, generating a query for one day of
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Figure 4.3: Time taken to generate a query, depending on the meaningful time scope of the
requested reading, for different request times.
context readings takes 7.5 minutes for a reading that is valid for 12 hours, but only
a minute for a reading that is valid for 10 mins.
Figure 4.4 shows the size of encrypted query, depending on the meaningful
time scope of the requested reading, for different request times. As expected,
the size of the encrypted query also increases with the meaningful time scope
and significantly with the time duration for which the querier needs the context
readings. Even then, a query generated by a querier requesting one day of context
readings is about 10 MB for a reading that is valid for 12 hours, but only 156 KB for
a reading that is valid for 10 mins.
We expect the time taken to generate a query is minimal so a querier does not
have to wait too long for query results. The bandwidth is not significant enough to
cause any disruption to the querier’s regular smartphone usage experience. For all
the simulations, the time taken to decrypt and recover the readings obtained from
the server remained below 300 ms.
Finally, we also considered hash reset of one hour and two hours, and how it
affects query generation time and size of encrypted query for a reading of mean-
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Figure 4.4: Size of encrypted query, depending on the meaningful time scope of the re-
quested reading, for different request times.



























Figure 4.5: Time taken to generate a query when requesting a reading of meaningful time
scope of one hour, for different request times.
ingful time scope of one hour, for different request times. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6
shows the time taken to generate a query and the size of the encrypted query when
a querier requests a reading of meaningful time scope of one hour, with different
request times. The hash reset of one hour and two hours does not seem to affect the
encryption times, whereas the size of the encrypted query remains the same.
As shown by the experiments, the SPICE prototype is quick to compute context
and queries for submission and decrypt responses, and the bandwidth required for
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Figure 4.6: Size of encrypted query generated when requesting a reading of meaningful time
scope of one hour, for different request times.
submission is minimal and also consumes minimal battery capacity.
4.7 Deployment Feasibility
In this section, we discuss two factors that affect the deployment success of an
application that uses SPICE architecture. For deployment to be successful, there
must be a sufficient number of users willing to share information, so that those
who request context may benefit from using the system. Also, there must be a large
density of wireless beaconing devices to support the mobile users, to ensure the
user devices receive beacons from at least one beaconing device at all times.
User Acceptance: Given the popularity of location-based sharing applications
(such as YikYak, Piximity, and Highlight) that allow users to share information
in real-time with other users near them, we expect users might also want
to retrieve data retrospectively with others who were at the same or similar
locations as them at a different time. Researchers have explored ways to
allow users to leverage sensors and resources on nearby smartphones, and
using SPICE, we allow users to retrieve data retrospectively. In Section 4.1,
we describe four scenarios where users require retrospective context, but we
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expect more data-sharing applications are possible with the advent of more
intelligent sensors and the Internet of Things.
At the same time, we also expect people might be concerned about using the
SPICE system if it discloses their identity, location history or context interests.
As shown in Section 4.5, SPICE provides anonymity and unlinkability, so
a user may share or query context without worrying about disclosing their
identity or linking their identity to the context or query. Users, especially
helpers, may also be concerned about battery life of their smartphones, as
a result of running an application that uses the SPICE protocol, but as we
confirmed in our experiments, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) implementations
allow applications to scan for Bluetooth beacons and sensors, while consuming
minimal battery power.
Wi-Fi access points as broadcasting devices: We expect that BLE beacons, given
their recent popularity, can be used as broadcasting devices. As mentioned
in the preceding chapter, Bluetooth beacons can exist on their own, do not
need to be connected to the server or to the Internet or require tight timesync;
however, their batteries need to be replaced once a month.
An alternate approach is to use Wi-Fi access points as wireless beaconing
devices, especially in an academic, corporate, or residential setting, where a
group of APs will be deployed and maintained by the enterprise. We expect
Wi-Fi access points can be easily modified to allow the key server to route
keys to the smartphones near the access points. One factor that affects SPICE
success would be the density of broadcasting devices; how often can SPICE
users hear a broadcasting device? Achtzehn et al. found a 14-fold increase in
WiFi density in urban residential areas over the last decade [23]. The authors
revealed a Wi-Fi density of 883, 488, 5179, and 6103 APs per km2 for the
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rural residential, industrial, urban retail, and urban residential study areas
in Germany, respectively; only 33 access points are required to give full data
connectivity, assuming a nominal range for standard 802.11b/g to be 100
meters [90]. Given the high density of wireless access points, we expect that
a user will be in the vicinity of multiple access point at any location in an
academic, corporate, or residential setting and so SPICE will be able to support
its users by using access points. Of course, there may be several locations
without any Wi-Fi coverage where users will not see even one access point,
where BLE beacons could perhaps be used as broadcasting devices.
Density of Users: We expect SPICE to be used by people within a community (e.g.,
academic, corporate, or residential) to anonymously share useful context. In
communities such as these, user densities vary with the location, time of day,
day of the week, and the month, as found by other researchers who studied
mobility behavior of people in various communities. Kim et al. discovered the
following from a wireless traces captured at a college campus in 2003-2004:
APs are busiest when school is in session, the visitor count at some APs that
are popular during weekdays drop to zero on weekends, and popular APs (at
different times during the day) were located at buildings where classes were
held, administrative offices, the library, a restaurant, the gym and dorms [93,
94, 95]. Researchers who studied a corporate environment also observed
that, similar to an academic campus, daily and hourly patterns in numbers
of wireless users on a network are closely tied to patterns in the underlying
population; Balazinska et al. found that mobility patterns reflect the office
environment and normal office work hours. Since they were monitoring
laptops and not smartphones, they noticed only slight change in mobility
patterns during lunch time and at night, as people might have left their
laptops at their desk when they left for lunch or went home at night [31]. The
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probability of getting the context a querier desires reduces if the number of
users at a location reduces, but all it takes is one helper to collect and share
the context data for SPICE to be successful; i.e., for a querier to receive data
corresponding to their query. We do not expect user density to be a concern,
as long as the SPICE application has a large user base.
We expect SPICE can be easily deployed. SPICE meets the security properties
and it costs little to nothing for users to run the application on their smartphones;
they do not need to purchase any additional hardware. The enterprise has to
manage two servers, but does not have to install broadcasting devices, if Wi-Fi
access points cover almost all the locations in their community and can support
high user densities. We predict that in the near future, there will be a surge in the
availability of sensor data given the growing popularity of Bluetooth beacons and
smart devices and users will gather lots of information that will be useful to others
in their vicinity.
Finally, we describe how different applications may use the SPICE architecture.
We expect mobile application developers can use a universal SPICE server for their
applications.
Airborne pollutants. The company that Jane and John work at provide a free
social application that provides a platform for employees of the company to
share data, varying from environmental information to photos and videos of
office events, anonymously. Jane and John install the application. On instal-
lation, they receive an alert saying the application will continuously run on
the background to collect information from all the access points within the
company buildings and grounds and if they choose to, they can uninstall the
application and stop receiving the information. John purchases a personal
particle sensor (with Bluetooth capabilities) that he carries with him at all
times, which monitors the particle count near him at all times, specifically
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that of atmospheric dust, pollen and smoke; the sensor is paired with John’s
smartphone, so it periodically notifies the smartphone, when there is a signifi-
cant change in any particle count. John’s smartphone sends the SPICE server
a series of messages containing the particle count separately for each particle
type, encrypted with each of the keys John’s smartphone collects and keys
generated for every minute from 30 minutes before to until 30 minutes after
each reading is collected, as the sensor defines the meaningful time duration
of the particle counts as one hour. Jane wants to collect information about
the atmospheric dust, pollen and smoke count that she was exposed to in the
past three days. Jane uses the application on her phone to choose the types of
information and the duration for which she needs the data. The application
sends a query to the SPICE server for dust and pollen for all the locations
that Jane visited within her company grounds in the past three days; her
smartphone sends the server a series of indexes containing the context types
dust, pollen and smoke, encrypted separately with the keys that it collected
from the access points her device encountered when at work. The server
returns John’s message; John works in the same building as Jane, but has
never interacted with Jane (John’s identity is hidden from Jane). As both
John and Jane’s devices encounter similar access points and hence acquired
keys from the same hash-chain, Jane’s device can decrypt and access the data
shared by John.
Forensic evidence. The city mayor’s office releases a data-sharing application
and asks the city residents to install the application, as it will allow easy and
anonymous data collection when tragedy strikes. Bob installs the application
and it collects keys from all the access points at the locations he visits. When
Bob is found dead in an alley one night, a police detective obtains the password
for Bob’s phone from his relatives and uses the application to send a query
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for photographs and videos for the past five hours. Bob’s smartphone sends
the server a series of indexes containing the context types photographs and
video, encrypted separately with the keys that it collected from the access
points running SPICE in the city that Bob’s device had encountered. The
server returns relevant photographs that the detective can view.
Social discovery. Alice and Ann install a social discovery application on their
smartphones. On installation, they receive an alert saying the application
will continuously run on the background to collect information from any
access point that runs SPICE and if they choose to, they can uninstall the
application and stop receiving the information. The application generates a
pseudonymous email address for them, and provides a mailbox to send and
receive messages to and from other friends they find using the application;
the application server is run by the application developers and various local
enterprises run key generation servers for the APs installed in their enterprise.
Alice wants to find friends among the people who were at the places she
frequented during the past week since when she arrived in the new town. She
chooses the following categories: female, books, movies, cooking, running,
hiking and biking, hoping to find other females with similar interests as
her. Alice’s smartphone sends the server a series of messages containing her
pseudonymous email address separately for each category (which becomes the
index), encrypted with each of the keys Alice’s smartphone collected during
the past week and keys generated for every minute from an hour before to
until an hour after she left the different locations. Ann’s running partner
moved out of town and she wants a friend to go running with, so she uses
the application to query the server for any female runners.3 She wants to find
people who run near her apartment either early in the morning before work
(5am-8am) or in the evening after work (7pm-9pm). Her smartphone sends
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the server a series of indexes containing the categories female and running,
encrypted separately with the keys that it collected during the specified times
for the past week. The server returns Alice’s message, containing her email
address, and since Alice had been running near Ann’s apartment that morning,
Ann’s device can decrypt Alice’s message. Ann retrieves Alice’s email address
and sends her a message using the application.
4.8 Limitations
The SPICE system relies on a high user base. We expect IoT application develop-
ers to build innovative applications that support data sharing in spatio-temporal
proximity.
The protocol relies on existing wireless infrastructure. Wi-Fi access points
can be used as broadcasting devices if access points can be set up to receive keys
from the key server; but there may be locations within the community with no
Wi-Fi coverage. Bluetooth beacons are an alternate option and require minimal
technical expertise to setup, but batteries need to be replaced every month for
current off-the-shelf beacons.
We did not evaluate the prototype with real users; users might have additional
or different privacy concerns. A full evaluation of SPICE’s usefulness and usability
requires deployment with meaningful applications.
4.9 Discussion
In this section, we discuss seven ways to extend the SPICE system.
3The policy questions around such a feature are beyond the scope of this paper, but the technology
could nonetheless be useful for discovering users in close encounters.
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Alternate cryptographic techniques. We plan to explore alternate methods such
as private information retrieval and homomorphic encryption to provide
privacy guarantees [51, 160] instead of using cryptographic keys, but we need
to first determine how to perform queries over a range of location and times.
Optimizing multiple message copies. The SPICE protocols rely on hash-chains
and require the devices to send multiple copies of the same messages in order
to support the meaningful temporal duration of the readings; we make a trade-
off between efficiency and correctness. We plan to explore other cryptographic
techniques that will give us similar time-varying features as the hash-chaining
method, without introducing redundancy.
Removing infrastructure dependency. Eliminating the need for a beacon infras-
tructure can be challenging, as we need a mechanism for two users who
arrive at similar but not overlapping times to get the same information and
which also provides a time-varying characteristic for temporal controls and
space-varying characteristic for spatial controls. For future work, we plan to
explore the usage of a stationary smartphone as a wireless beaconing device.
Computing confidence in context readings. In some cases, there might be multi-
ple helper devices that can provide relevant context and the user might be
interested in the most relevant context. The user should have lower confidence
in the relevance of the information collected further (in time and space) from
the requested position. In the current version, the context readings contain the
location/time of context collection, so the querier’s device can compute the
confidence, based on their location/time with respect to that of the context
source, at the time of collection. It will be challenging, however, to have the
server send only context with high confidence to the querier. One option is
to share with the server some representative of locations of both the context
144
source and the querier, so that the server can compute confidence, but this is
difficult as the context is encrypted when stored on the server.
Authenticity of context sources. We do not address ways for a helper to verify
the authenticity of context sources, to prevent a helper’s device connecting to
a malicious source set up by an adversary. We could easily extend the SPICE
system to also include PKI certificates for authorized SPICE sources, signed
by the SPICE server.
Distributing servers. Decentralizing the context service may provide scalability
and availability, and perhaps additional anonymity features relative to our
current centralized design. It would be simple to compute the ID of the server
where the data will be stored by computing a hash of the index supplied in
the context uploads and queries. This approach partitions the database and
likely spreads the storage and load evenly across servers.
Context collection. SPICE can be used to collect context from other users in spatio-
temporal proximity, similar to the airborne pollutants scenario. Context
information, collected at the time when a user’s health data was collected,
can help recipients (such as doctors, and insurance companies) verify the
accuracy of the health data, by proving the data was collected correctly (for
example, health workers collected data from the right patient) and to interpret
its meaning, using additional information about the context in which the
data was collected; we call this context information contextual evidence. We
developed a framework called Open Contextual Evidence Add-On (Ocean),
to develop flexible mobile applications, to collect context based on the needs
of recipients, in retrospect. Using SPICE in conjunction with OCEAN will
allow mobile applications to obtain context, from other people they shared a
close encounter with, when a recipient requests it.
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4.10 Related work
Content-sharing applications. SPICE allows users to share data with others in
spatio-temporal proximity, similar to other content-sharing applications [71, 153],
including location-based content sharing [165, 114].
Participatory and opportunistic sensing. Researchers have explored sharing of
sensors between phones in an encounter [121, 59, 76, 84], and also proposed privacy-
preserving techniques for opportunistic sensing [52, 55]; SPICE also allows users to
share data they collected from sensors with other users in spatio-temporal proximity
in a privacy-preserving manner.
Delay-Tolerant Networks. SPICE is complementary to work on opportunistic
delay-tolerant networks that attempt to support peer-to-peer content sharing, even
when there is only sporadic connectivity between smartphones [48, 45]; our work
differs in that we introduce a new concept called close encounters, which have not
been explored in the field of delay tolerant networks.
Understanding location privacy. In 2009, Tsai et al. conducted an online survey
of 587 American Internet users to understand users’ perceptions of risk and benefits
related to the use of location-sharing technologies and the privacy controls of
existing location-sharing applications; people reported benefits such as keeping
track of children and risks of stalking [157]. In 2010, Brush et al. collected GPS data
from 32 participants and presented visualizations of the data to the participants,
with the goal of understanding their preferences for location obfuscation and value
of tracking location [42]. Researchers have also conducted studies to understand
the value of location privacy [58, 57].
Location-based services are popular, even though people are concerned about
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sharing their location. Li et al. collected 21 months of data traces from an online
location-based social network, and concluded that users’ privacy preferences were
correlated with age, gender, mobility, and geographic region and were also similar
to that of their friends [101]. Ravichandran et al. developed canonical default
policies for location-sharing applications, to reduce user burden [136]. Researchers
want to build controls to empower users to resolve the tension between the utility of
location sharing and concerns with invasion of privacy [127]; we describe disclosure
policies for controlling exposure of location and other information at the end of
Chapter 2.
Privacy-preserving location tracking Liu et al. presents a survey of concepts,
models and techniques for providing location privacy in mobile systems [104].
Existing systems have mainly taken three approaches to improving location privacy:,
introducing uncertainty into location data ( [77, 72], relying on trusted servers or
intermediaries to apply anonymization to user identities and private data [116],
and by relying on cryptographic or private information retrieval (PIR) techniques
( [74, 119]).
Golle et al. emphasizes the need and provides guidelines for obfuscating lo-
cation traces to avoid identifying users [75]. Iachello et al. provide guidelines for
designers of social mobile applications to address issues such as security, privacy
and data protection [87]. Researchers developed a formal definition of location
privacy that incorporates an adversary’s ability to predict location [113]. Badry et
al. have proposed the Hidden Anchor algorithm to hide the identity and location
of “anchor” nodes, whose broadcasts help other wireless devices in the vicinity
determine their location [64]. Shokri et al. analyzed the effectiveness of k-anonymity
approaches for protecting location privacy [149]. Hashem et al. proposed decentral-
ized algorithms that provide k-anonymous imprecise location and have a randomly
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selected neighbor forward the service request, so that users can enjoy location-based
services with a high degree of privacy [81]. Other methods for providing location
privacy includes path confusion [83], mix zones [38], pseudonyms [43], silent peri-
ods [86], differential privacy [28], and many more listed in the literature survey by
Krumm [98]. Also, researchers have studied techniques to aggregate location-based
user statistics in a privacy-preserving manner [132].
Our work is complementary to prior research on privacy-preserving location
tracking or proofs; our work does not track or require proof of the user’s exact
location, but the SPICE system requires a user to possess or be able to generate
the keys to prove they were within spatial range of a broadcasting device. One of
the first location proof systems, proposed by Waters et al. used round-trip signal
propagation latency to prove location [164]. Similar to SPICE, researchers have
relied a user’s proximity to an access point [141, 107, 106, 131]; however, unlike
the prior work, SPICE requires minimal change to the existing infrastructure. A
Privacy-Preserving Location proof Updating System (APPLAUS) allows co-located
Bluetooth enabled mobile devices mutually generate location proofs,and update
to a location proof server [173]. Ultimately, the privacy-preserving API should be
designed to nudge programmers into making better programming choices when
developing location-based mobile applications to help preserve privacy of their
users [88].
Encounters. SPICE differs from prior work that addresses encounter matching
in that SPICE addresses the problem of finding people (and devices) that shared
a spatially and temporally close encounter and might have never encountered
each other. SMILE helps strangers contact each other if they shared an encounter
(and can prove to each other that they encountered one another) while ensuring
that the central, untrusted server does not learn which pair of users shared an
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encounter (encounter privacy), and at what location (location privacy) [109]. We
offer the same privacy goals, and also provide unlinkability of user and context
and anonymity from other users and the server, while in SMILE, the server can
identify the user across key hash submissions. SmokeScreen allows users to share
their presence with trusted social relations and untrusted strangers while protecting
their privacy [56], but does not provide encounter privacy as an adversary can learn
the identities of the people involved in the encounter. Secure Device Discovery and
Recognition (SDDR) is another protocol for secure encounters, with similar goals of
confidentiality and unlinkability as that of SPICE [99]. SDDR does not use a server
for matching, similar to SmokeScreen; it leverages the spatial proximity of users to
exchange keys for secure communication. Encore leverages secure encounters using
SDDR for privacy-preserving communication among people who participated in
a event [24]. SPICE does not match users, but rather the server matches a context
with a query, thus protecting the identities of the helper and querier from each
other and the server. Meetup supports encounter-based social networks, where
co-location is verified by exchanging certificates that contain the user’s public key
and a photograph [115]; SPICE differs in that one of its fundamental privacy goals
is to prevent the helpers and queriers from learning each other’s identity. Finally,
our work is complementary to techniques used for proximity testing [119, 140, 66];
Narayanan et al. propose private-equality testing of location tags to determine if two
users are close by, while our systems allow users to share data based on common
keys they would have obtained by being spatially and temporally proximate.
4.11 Summary
In this chapter, we explore scenarios where individuals are likely to collect and
share information with strangers and discovered that sharing based on spatial-
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temporal proximity seems useful, but presents interesting privacy challenges. We
present the design and implementation of a smartphone-based system called SPICE
(Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters) that allows users
to collect, share and request for information based on close encounters, while
providing strong privacy properties. We describe two cryptographic protocols for
the SPICE architecture that allow data-sharing, without disclosing the identity of
users to each other or to the system. Finally, we present a security and privacy
analysis of the system and the results of experiments done using a prototype built
on an Android smartphone. The experiments showed that the application only
used 1% of the total battery capacity, when listening for keys and context from
broadcasting devices, and used at most 36 MB storage (assuming data is erased after
a month). Our experiments showed that a context submission, query and decryption
typically took not more than a few seconds and since the submission, query and
decryption happened in the background, the SPICE application requires minimal
user interaction and will not disrupt the user’s smartphone usage experience.





In this chapter, we discuss our efforts in determining the effectiveness of Wi-Fi
and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons as broadcasting devices that support the
ENACT and SPICE systems.
Two users in a close encounter are at (or near) the same location, at (or near)
the same time. In our systems, the broadcasting devices send cryptographic keys
to nearby smartphones; these keys are used to encrypt data. Typically, any user
within broadcast range of the broadcasting device will receive the key. To determine
whether Wi-Fi access points or Bluetooth beacons could be used as broadcasting
devices for our systems, we address the following questions:
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• Do two users at (or near) the same location hear the same Wi-Fi access points
or Bluetooth beacons?
• What factors about Wi-Fi access points and Bluetooth beacons vary depending
on the distance between the users?
• Can we leverage these factors to determine whether two users are “near” each
other, in the sense of the ENACT and the SPICE systems?
One factor important to both the ENACT and SPICE systems is the number
of broadcasting devices; we expect that users hear the same (or similar) set of
broadcasting devices at (or near) the same location. One possibly useful factor is
the received signal strength indicator (or RSSI), a measurement of the power present
in a received radio signal. The closer the value to zero, the stronger the signal.
Researchers have used probabilistic models and filtering techniques for indoor
localization using RSSI [34, 124, 129, 171]; Han et al. presented a survey of indoor
localization techniques [79]. Even though RSSI readings have been used as an
indicator of distance from a wireless transmitter, they have been found to be highly
variable and affected by many environmental conditions and cannot always be
strongly correlated with distance [125].
However, for determining close encounters, we want to know whether two
users are “close” to each other in space, and not the distance of the user from a
broadcasting device. What counts depends on the application; for example, we
expect contagious viruses to be infectious within 2m of the patient, whereas dust
count could be similar for a closed room of 10m, assuming no strong air currents to
carry the virus or dust farther away.
In the following sections, we describe controlled experiments we conducted
to explore how well Wi-Fi access points and Bluetooth beacons could be used to
determine whether two users are close to each other. To understand how smart-
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phones in close spatial proximity hear Wi-Fi access points, we analyse 52 days of
Wi-Fi scans from smartphones [148]. Due to lack of a similar datasets for Bluetooth
beacon scans, especially with close encounters, we conducted a user study to collect
the data: we deployed BLE beacons on the Dartmouth campus, recruited partici-
pants for a EMA-based user study to install our mobile application, and collected
Bluetooth scans for two weeks. Finally, we describe our experiences deploying
BLE beacons, our participants’ experiences using an application that leverages the
beacons, and our findings about how smartphones in close spatial proximity hear
Bluetooth beacons.
First, we introduce Wi-Fi access points.
5.1 Wi-Fi access points
An access point (AP) is a device that transports data between a wireless network
and a wired network infrastructure. They support one or more of the several Wi-Fi
standards established by IEEE, such as 802.11b (operates at 2.4GHz, typical range
of 30–60m), 802.11a (uses higher frequency band at 5Hz, has a lower range of 7–23
meters and is more susceptible to signal loss compared to 802.11b), 802.11g (also
operates at 2.4GHz, similar broadcasting range as 802.11b but provides higher
speeds, and is the most commonly used standard) and 802.11n (typically used in
environments with high user density). A few terms associated with Wi-Fi: Service
Set ID (SSID) is the unique name provided to the network, Basic Service Set ID
(BSSID) is associated with an access point, and is the MAC address of the access
points. Access points broadcast packets that are received by wireless devices in
their vicinity.
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5.1.1 Controlled Experiments with Wi-Fi access points
Our goal was to identify how the factors related to Wi-Fi access point scans can
help us determine whether two users are close to each other in space. To conduct
the experiments, we developed an Android application that performed a scan of
available Wi-Fi access points in the vicinity. A scan of an access point collected the
following information: BSSID (MAC address), SSID (network name), capabilities
(authentication, key management, and encryption schemes supported by the access
point), frequency (in MHz of the channel over which the client is communicating
with the access point), level (RSSI or signal level in dBm), and the timestamp.
We conducted the experiments in the hallway shown in Figure 5.1. During the
experiments, two subjects held smartphones (one used Nexus 6, the other a OnePlus
One) in their hand with the Android application running in the foreground (at
positions shown in the Figure); the corridor was empty (no furniture) and there
were no other people in the corridor or the adjoining rooms within 10 meters (the
experiments were conducted on a Saturday morning, during spring break).
For each experiment set, we recorded 10 Wi-Fi scans one second apart, varying
either the distance between the users (0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters apart) or the
direction they are facing (facing north towards the wall, facing each other in the
east-west direction, and facing away from each other in the east-west direction).
Figure 5.2 shows the number of common Wi-Fi access points seen by the two
subjects during each of the thirty experiment sets. We can notice a slight decrease
or a downward trend in the number of common APs as the distance between the
subjects increased. Based on just these experiments, for this corridor, we could
consider a threshold number of access points as 70 to determine users who are
within 2 meters of each other, and 65 to determine users who are at a spatial
proximity of 10 meters; before choosing any definite thresholds, we must do more
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Figure 5.1: Floor plan of the corridor where experiments were conducted. Two subjects carry-
ing smartphones record Wi-Fi scans while facing the north wall.
155
Figure 5.2: Number of common APs seen by the two subjects when facing the wall, facing
each other and facing away from each other for distance of 0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters be-
tween them.
experiments and collect more data. Of course, even if we settle on a threshold
for a location, the thresholds may not hold for all locations; we need to do more
experiments at different locations to determine a better threshold.
Next, we wanted to determine whether we can use RSSI values to determine if
two or more smartphones are in spatial proximity. To determine whether RSSI can
be used, we used Nexus smartphones to recorded RSSI readings, along with other
information such as SSID, and BSSID, from available access points and wireless
devices in their vicinity. These experiments are complementary to prior work on
identifying wireless devices in proximity by observing the shared time-varying
wireless environment [110, 163].
Figure 5.3 shows the mean and standard deviation of RSSI values of 26 com-
mon Wi-Fi access points heard by the two subjects who are 0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters
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apart; the users are facing each other holding the smartphone in their hand at 1.12m
from the floor. Other readings are shown in Appendix D Figures D.1-D.5. The two
subjects used different smartphones, which may have affected the RSSI readings.
Nevertheless, the RSSI values did not vary much between the two smartphones,
which could imply that the signal strength does not vary significantly at short
distances equal to or less than 10m. Also, since many APs are nearly equidistant to
the two users, any small distance difference is also masked by normal noise in RSSI
data.
The variance of the mean RSSI values of common access points was about
3dBm when users were within two meters of each other, approximately 4dBm when
users were five meters apart, and about 5dBm when the users were ten meters apart.
We expect to determine whether devices are closer than ten meters by setting a
threshold of 5 dBm on the difference between the mean RSSI values of the common
access points.
5.1.2 PhoneLab dataset analysis
To get an estimate of how many access points on average a device sees, and how
the RSSI values vary when the same access points are seen at different times, we
analysed a dataset of Wi-Fi scans captured using smartphones [148]. The smart-
phone users were distributed across the University of Buffalo campus. The dataset
is a collection of Wi-Fi scans obtained from 254 Nexus 5 smartphones, over a period
of 147 days; in this section, we consider only the data from 52 days (the months
of January and February). From the dataset, we extracted different sets of close
encounters: we defined a close encounter as an instance when two devices “heard”
the same access point within a certain duration of time; we consider the devices’
proximity to only one access point, because we do not have any ground truth about
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(a) subjects 0.5m apart














































(b) subjects 1m apart














































(c) subjects 2m apart














































(d) subjects 5m apart














































(e) subjects 10m apart
Figure 5.3: RSSI readings observed by subjects facing each other. Higher bars indicate
weaker signal strength.
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the location of the devices or an estimate of the number of access points available at
the locations. We extracted three types of close encounters, where two users were
at the same location (and heard the same access point) within one minute, fifteen
minutes and one hour.
We found an average of 11,617 close encounters per day, when at least two
devices were near the same access point receiving broadcasts in the same channel
within the same hour. There were 28,982 and 13,696 instances when at least two
devices were within range of the same access point, within the same minute and
same fifteen minutes, respectively. The number of close encounters increased when
the duration reduced, because the same pair or group of devices stayed at the same
location or near the same access point for the entire hour, and so the same pair or
group of devices were counted multiple times when we considered close encounters
within durations of one minute and fifteen minutes.
Next, we compared the RSSI readings seen by the devices in each one-hour
close encounter. Using the thresholds defined above (3dBm for 2 meters or less,
4dBm for 5 meters or less and 5dBm for 10 meters or less), we observe that on
average, for 60% of the total close encounters, the devices received signals of
strength within 5dBm. Out of these 60%, for 65% of the instances, the devices
received signals of strength within 3dBm and the remaining instances, the devices
received signals of strengths between 3 and 5dBm.
Without ground truth, we cannot make any claims that we were able to
determine close encounters accurately. But we were able to find device pairs
or groups that exhibited similar trends as the two smartphones did during the
controlled experiments, i.e., “hear” common access points, and receive signals of
similar strength.




Bluetooth beacons are becoming popular with the introduction of Apple’s iBeacon
technology [4], the open and interoperable AltBeacon specification [3] and the more
recent Eddystone, which is Google’s open beacon format [6]. Consumers envision
using the Bluetooth beacons to provide location information to smartphones and
other mobile devices, so that an app can act on the specific location, for example
by providing department- or aisle-specific coupons or sales pitches in retail stores.
Similar goals were envisioned and many location-based applications were imple-
mented using GPS (such as Foursquare), but localization using GPS usually requires
a clear path to receive satellite signals, implying that the signals are stronger and
localization estimation more accurate when the user is outdoors. Several indoor
localization techniques have been explored in research, including localization using
Wi-Fi, but until the advent of Bluetooth beacons, applications that take advantage of
indoor localization techniques were not as common. The power-efficiency of Blue-
tooth Low Energy technology makes it ideal for devices that run for long periods
on power sources such as coin cell batteries [5].
To conduct the experiments, we developed an iOS application that recorded
BLE beacons in its vicinity. Bluetooth beacons “advertise” their presence or transmit
wireless packets at certain broadcast intervals. The beacons include three identifiers
(IDs) in each packet: a 16-byte Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) allocated for
Bluetooth devices to be used in Bluetooth protocols and applications, and 2-byte
major and 2-byte minor numbers. The identifying information is hierarchical, i.e.,
the major and minor values allow for further dividing beacons that are identified by
the UUID. For example, in our deployment of Bluetooth beacons (described later),
we assigned the same UUID to all the beacons. All beacons in the same building
shared the same major value, but different minor values. The three identifiers allow
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smartphone applications to identify the location of users at various granularities; in
a process similar to geofencing, region monitoring algorithms allow apps to detect
when a user enters or exits the range of any beacon associated with a certain UUID
(any building with beacons on campus), a certain major (one specific building) and
minor value (one specific location within the building).
The smartphone tracks the beacons it encounters and queries Apple’s UUID
database to see what apps the beacon is associated to, then alerts the app that a
relevant beacon has been found. The apps must implement Apple’s iBeacon API to
communicate beacon status with the OS.
The Eddystone alternatively allows beacon deployers to configure a beacon
to show a URL to a user, when the user enters or leaves its range, as well as
display information about the beacon such as its voltage, temperature and number
of broadcast packets. Eddystone incorporates the Google Places API to associate
a beacon with the latitude/longitude of the location, as well as the floor level.
Eddystone also provides a cloud service to manage deployed beacons.
Both iBeacon and AltBeacon APIs provide a “ranging” feature that uses filters
to estimate, based on the RSSI, the distance of the smartphone from the beacon.
iBeacon defines four proximity states:
Immediate represents a high level of confidence that the device is physically very
close (0–0.5m) to the beacon.
Near indicates a clear line of sight from the device to the beacon, and a distance of
approximately 1–3 meters.
Far indicates that a beacon device can be detected but the confidence in the accuracy
is too low to determine either Near or Immediate. Far does not imply the
beacon is physically far; in this case, the app needs to take into account another
value called accuracy, which denotes the approximate distance in meters from
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the beacon.
Unknown indicates proximity of the beacon cannot be determined. This may indi-
cate that ranging has just begun, or that there are insufficient measurements
to determine the state.
Both APIs acknowledge the challenges involved in computing distances ac-
curately, stating that accuracy is higher when the device is closer to the beacon.
The RSSI value increases as the device gets closer to the beacon; the signal strength
drops when obstacles appear between the device and the beacon; obstacles such
as walls, buildings, human beings, and cloth (smartphone placed in backpacks,
purses and pockets). We conducted experiments to determine the variation in
RSSI during such situations, in an attempt to better understand how well the BLE
beacons might work as broadcasting devices for determining close encounters to
support the ENACT and SPICE systems.
For experiments, we used a popular BLE beacon called RadBeacon Dot, shown
in Figure 5.4. RadBeacon Dot uses iBeacon, AltBeacon and Eddystone technology,
and is powered by a coin-cell battery. It has a typical line-of-sight range of 5m to
50m, configurable advertisement rate of 1Hz to 10Hz, transmit power of 4dBm to
-20dBm, and a battery life of a month at high power setting. The RadBeacon Dot has
single button, which can be pressed (or clicked) to put the beacon in different modes:
clicking the beacon (button) once reveals a blinking green light, which indicates that
the beacon is transmitting, as shown in Figure 5.4b; clicking the beacon again reveals
a blinking red light, indicating the beacon has stopped transmitting, as shown in
Figure 5.4c; and pressing the button for a few seconds reveals a continuous blinking
green light, which puts the beacon in configurable mode. By using the RadBeacon
mobile application (developed by Radius Networks for iOS and Android devices),
we can change the transmit power, advertisement rate, the identifiers, and check
the remaining battery capacity on the beacon, when it is in configurable mode. Each
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(a) RadBeacon Dot.
(b) Beacon blinks with green light,
implies it started transmitting.
(c) Beacon blinks with red light, im-
plies it stopped transmitting.
Figure 5.4: RadBeacon Dot, the BLE beacon we used for our experiments.
beacon can also be assigned a 8-digit pin number for additional security, so only
the person who knows the pin can configure the beacon.
5.2.1 Controlled Experiments with BLE beacons
We conducted the following experiments to determine the variation of RSSI values
under different situations, to give us better insights as to how to use signal levels of
BLE beacons for detecting close encounters. These experiments are complementary
to prior work on determining the ideal positions for placing Bluetooth devices for
indoor localization [47, 67]. In the following experiments, one single RadBeacon
dot was placed at a height above 2m from the floor on the east wall of a hallway, as
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shown in Figure 5.5; the corridor was empty (no furniture) and there were no other
people in the corridor or the adjoining rooms within 10 meters (the experiments
were conducted on a Saturday morning, during spring break). During the experi-
ments, the two subjects stood in the hallway, one with an iPhone 6S, and the other
with an iPad Mini, both devices running our iOS application; our iOS application
used the RadBeacon Proximity API, which leverages the iBeacon API, to record the
RSSI values observed in the advertisements received from the RadBeacon Dots in
range.
For each experiment set, we recorded 10 RSSI values observed one second
apart, varying either the distance from the beacon (0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters away)
or the direction the user was facing (facing east towards the beacon, facing north
perpendicular to the beacon, and facing west away from the beacon).
Distance and orientation w.r.t the beacon. First, we wanted to understand how
signal level changed depending on the distance, position, and orientation of the
smartphone w.r.t the beacon.
In the first set of experiments, one subject held the iPad mini in her hand, at
1.12 meters above the ground. Our observations are shown in Figure 5.6. The RSSI
values recorded by the smartphone when facing the beacon were similar, beyond
2m. As expected, when turning away from the beacon, the RSSI values decreased
in most cases, since the human body acted as an obstacle for the signals.
Height w.r.t the beacon. Next, we placed the iPhone 6S phone (running our appli-
cation) at different depths from the beacon, close to the wall. In all the experiments,
the beacon was at 2m above the ground, and the phone was kept at 88cm (in hand),
50cm, and 1m lower than the beacon; 11 continuous RSSI readings one second apart
were recorded. We observed that the farther away the phone is (in vertical distance)
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Figure 5.5: Floor plan of the corridor where experiments were conducted with the BLE bea-
con. Beacon placed at 2m above floor on east wall and the subject(s) stood in front of the



















Figure 5.6: Mean and standard deviation of 10 continuous RSSI readings taken one second
apart when facing towards, perpendicular to or facing away, at distances of 1m, 2m, 5m and
10m from a wall where the Bluetooth beacon is placed at 2m height from the floor.
from the beacon, the lower the signal strength; Figure 5.7 shows our observations.
So the relative height of the phone and beacon may affect the signal strength.
Position of the phone w.r.t the beacon. Next, one subject stood next to the wall,
right under the beacon, which was placed at 2m on the wall. 10 RSSI readings
were recorded, one second apart, when an iPhone 6S phone running the application
was placed in the user’s pocket and then in her hand. As expected, signal strength
was lower when phone was in user’s pocket when compared to in hand, as shown
in Figure 5.8. The pocket was at a height of 80cm from the floor, and the hand was
at 1.12m.
Spatial proximity. Next, we wanted to learn whether we could leverage similari-
ties in RSSI readings on advertisements from one BLE beacon to determine if two
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Figure 5.7: RSSI values obtained by a smartphone at different depths from the beacon.














Figure 5.8: RSSI values obtained by a smartphone at different heights from the ground
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users were spatially close. Two subjects, one carrying the iPhone 6S and the other
with the iPad Mini, remained in front of the east wall under the BLE beacon (Fig-
ure 5.5). For each experiment set, we recorded 10 scans one second apart, varying
either the distance between the users (0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters apart), the direction
they are facing (facing east towards the beacon, facing each other in the north-south
direction, and facing west away from the beacon) or the distance from the beacon.
Figures 5.9 shows the RSSI values captured by two smartphones 2m apart
facing each other, at 1, 2, 5, and 10m away from the beacon. The RSSI readings are
similar irrespective of the direction the subjects are facing, as shown in Figure 5.10.
Other readings from the experiments are shown in Appendix E Figures E.1-E.10.
When the subjects were within 2m of each other, they typically receive similar
RSSI values within 5dBm of each other, and when the subjects were between 2
and 10 meters, the difference in RSSI values were up to 10dBm. Based on this
preliminary data, we expect to identify devices in spatial proximity of less than or
equal to ten meters by setting a threshold of 5 dBm on the difference between the
mean RSSI values of the common access points.
The set of beacons subjects could hear depended on the beacon layout. For
example, consider a different corridor, where multiple beacons were deployed close
to each other, as shown in Figure 5.11. All three beacons are placed at 2.15m height,
each above a different window. There was no one in the corridor or in the rooms
(the experiments were conducted at night during spring break). The corridor was
empty and devoid of furniture; the rooms may have had other Bluetooth devices,
such as BLE beacons, smartphones, laptops, and desktops. During the experiment,
the subject stood in front of beacon B1 (which was placed at a height of 2.15m above
a window), holding her iPhone 6S in her hand; our iOS application in her phone
recorded 10 scans one second apart. Figure 5.12 shows the RSSI readings observed
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(a) 1m from beacon














(b) 2m from beacon














(c) 5m from beacon
Figure 5.9: RSSI values captured by subjects facing each other with 2m in between the sub-
jects
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(a) Subjects facing each other














(b) Subjects facing beacon














(c) Subjects facing away from beacon
Figure 5.10: RSSI values captured by subjects facing different directions at a distance of 1m








Figure 5.11: Floor plan of corridor with three beacons at 2.15m height.
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Figure 5.12: RSSI readings observed in advertisements from three beacons in the same
corridor, when subject was standing next to the middle beacon B1. B2 is seven meters to the
right and B3 is more than 10 meters away to the left, and around a corner.
by the iPhone 6S of the subject, when standing in front of B1. Since signal levels
decrease with distance, and signal levels from B1 are lowest and strongest, followed
by B2 and, finally B3, it is possible to determine which beacon the subject is closest
to. Our observations indicate that it is easy to determine which beacon the user is
closest to based on the RSSI values. Thus, in addition to the set of BLE beacons a
subject can hear at a location, we may be able to choose a threshold for the RSSI
reading to determine how far a subject was from a beacon and estimate spatial
proximity between users depending on which beacon they are closest to, since the
distance between two beacons can be determined during set-up.
In the above experiment, the user was standing still during the measurements.
We wanted to learn whether beacon signals may be received by a person who was
walking past a beacon. During this experiment set, our application took 10 scans
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Figure 5.13: Subject starts taking readings 6m before 1st beacon and continues until 6m after
the 2nd beacon.
one second apart, when the subject was walking down the corridor from B1 to B2
(floor plan shown in Figure 5.11) at a normal pace of 1.5m/s, with the iPhone 6S
smartphone in her hand. The scans started when the subject was 6m away from
beacon B1 and stopped 6m to the right of the beacon B2. Figure 5.13 show how
signal strength varied as a person walked towards the first beacon, walked away
from the first beacon and towards the second beacon, and finally walked away from
the second beacon.
We also observed that beacons were being seen in other floor levels. The build-
ing layout is symmetric on all floor levels. We conducted three sets of experiments
to determine how beacon signals transmit between floor levels. Figure 5.14 shows
signal levels of beacon B3; the subject stood at the position in front of the window
(above which B3 was located on the second floor), but on the first and ground floors.
The farther away the subject was in depth from the beacon, the lower the signal
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Figure 5.14: Signal levels of beacon B3, as heard by subject standing at the first and ground
floor window, directly below B3.
level became; so we can use the proximity states provided by the iBeacon API to
determine how close the subject is to the beacon.
In the earlier set of experiments, the subject was near the window. We also
checked if proximity to stairs or open spaces affected the probability of a subject
hearing advertisements on a different floor. Figure 5.15 shows signal levels observed
by the subject’s smartphone when she stood at a position on the first and ground
floor, directly under B1; B1 was about 15m from stairs that started on the second floor
and went all the way down to the ground floor. To confirm whether advertisements
“pass” through ceilings, the subject did more scans directly under a different beacon
further to the left of B3, on the first and ground floors; no advertisements were
received from any of the beacons both on the second and ground floor.
So windows and open spaces such as stairs must be considered when deploy-
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Figure 5.15: Beacon at second floor, seen at 1st and ground floor
ing beacons. However, the iBeacon (and Altbeacon) API takes these factors into
account when deciding how close the smartphone is to a beacon, so we can leverage
the proximity states as detected by the iBeacon API to determine proximity to a
beacon, and similarity of RSSI values (within a threshold of 5dBm) to determine
whether two users are within 2 meters of each other.
Accuracy To determine how accurately we can use RSSI to identify users in a close
encounter, we conducted the following experiments. We set up beacons and one
user in the following manner; user U1 was set up at the center of a circle of size 5m,
as shown in Figure 5.16. We placed four beacons at distances 0.5m, 1m, 2m and
5m from the user, as shown in the figure; U1 continuously recorded information
from the four beacons. The beacons used the lower transmission power, and an










Figure 5.16: Experiment setup to test accuracy of using RSSI for determining spatial and
temporal proximity.
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devices, people, or obstacles within the 5 meter circle around U1.
User U2 took 20 one-second readings for each of these scenarios:
• Standing at 1m from U1, along lines drawn towards north, south, east and
west.
• Standing at 2m from U1, along lines drawn towards north, south, east and
west.
• Standing at 5m from U1, along lines drawn towards north, south, east and
west.
• Standing within the 5m circle, 5 readings in each quadrant, i.e., NW, NE, SW
and SE.
• Standing outside the 5m circle, 5 readings in each quadrant, i.e., NW, NE, SW
and SE.
• Walking from west to east, north to south, NW to SE, NE to SW at a pace of
1.5m/s.
We used the data obtained to train a random forest model, and then used
a binary random forest classifier to determine accuracy of determining spatial
proximity using RSSI, in three different cases: by considering only the data when
U2 was stationary, when U2 was walking and all of U2’s data. When training the
model, we divided the data into two classes: all readings obtained when U2 was
within the 5m circle was considered to be spatially proximate and belonged to the
first class and everything outside was considered not proximate and belonged to
the second class. (For the walking scenarios, we recorded when U2 entered and
exited the circle.) We used 10-fold cross validation technique to compute accuracy.
We also calculated how accuracy changed when considering RSSI readings from






























Figure 5.17: Accuracy of determining spatial proximity using one, two, three and four beacons
accurate predictions made by the classifier, as to which class the test data belonged
to. Figure 5.17 shows the mean and standard deviation of the accuracy values for
all beacons and set of two, three and four beacons.
As expected, accuracy increases when we consider the RSSI readings from
more beacons. The model was able to better determine whether a user was spatially
proximate when she was stationary than when she was walking. Overall, we found
that using RSSI readings, we were able to achieve an accuracy of 80% when using
four beacons and taking into account both the times when user was stationary and
walking. When considering only one beacon, we got the highest accuracy when
using the beacon 0.5m towards the south of U1. When considering two beacons,
the system was able to determine spatial proximity better when using the two close
beacons 1m and 2m on the west. When considering three beacons, the system was






























Figure 5.18: Accuracy of determining a close encounter using one, two, three and four bea-
cons; U2 is in a close encounter with U1, when U2 is within 5m of U1 at least for one second,
within the same 10, 20 or 30 minutes.
(0.5 meters from U1) and west (1 and 2 meters from U1). We need to do more
experiments to understand what distances beacons should be placed at from each
other to more accurately determine when users are in spatial proximity.
Next, we also consider temporal proximity to compute the accuracy of using
RSSI readings to identify users in a close encounter, i.e., whether the system could
determine whether U2 was within 5m of U1 at least for one second within the
same 10 minute, 20 minute and 30 minute periods. We compared the RSSI readings
observed by U2 with the RSSI readings observed by U1 in the past 10, 20 and 30
minutes. We also calculated how accuracy changed when considering RSSI readings
from one, two, three and four beacons.
Figure 5.18 shows the mean and standard deviation of the accuracy values
across all the beacons and set of two, three and four beacons.
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Surprisingly, accuracy decreased when we consider the RSSI readings from
more beacons. We got the highest accuracy of 73% when using only one beacon to
determine when U2 was within 5 meters of U1 at least for a second within the same
ten minutes. When considering two beacons, the system was able to determine close
encounters better when using the closest beacons on the west. When considering
three beacons, the system was able to determine close encounters better when using
the beacons on the north and west. This could be because the beacons in the west
were placed closer to each other; we need to do more experiments to understand
what distances beacons should be placed at from each other to more accurately
determine when users are in spatial proximity.
The experiment gave us an understanding of how to use Bluetooth beacons
to determine whether two users shared a close encounter. The experiment was
conducted only for a short duration with four beacons and two users, but it gave
an estimate of the accuracy of using RSSI readings to determine close encounters.
It also helped us better understand how we could consider subsets of common
Bluetooth beacons to determine spatial proximity. However, we need to do more
experiments at different locations with more beacons, and obstacles in path of
broadcasting devices, before making any conclusions about the accuracy of using
Bluetooth beacons to support the ENACT and SPICE systems.
5.2.2 Beacon deployment study
Finally, the above experiments were conducted in controlled settings, and we
wanted to determine how the Bluetooth beacons can be used in real settings. We
deployed RadBeacon Dots at various places on the Dartmouth campus, recruited
students to install our application on their smartphones and used an Ecological
Momentary Assessment (EMA) technique to determine ground truth about the
participants’ location. The goal of our study (approved by Dartmouth’s Institutional
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Review Board) was to measure whether our thresholds could be used to accurately
determine spatial proximity, and hence close encounters.
We assigned the same UUID to all the beacons, so our application only scanned
for beacons with our UUID. We assigned beacons installed in the same building
the same major number to distinguish between buildings, and different minor
numbers to distinguish between the beacons in the same building. We installed the
Dots in four different cafeterias, the fitness center, the library, and the Computer
Science building on the Dartmouth College campus. In the cafeterias, the Dots were
positioned under counters (about 1m height) and over fire alarms (about 3m height).
In the fitness center, they were positioned above hand towel dispensers (at about
2–2.5m height). In the library, they were positioned on walls at 2m height. In all
the locations, the beacons were more than 8m apart, and no more than two beacons
were placed in the same room.
We recruited 20 undergraduates and 16 graduate students for the study;
participants carried 27 iPhones and 9 Android phones. Each participant also placed
one beacon in their dorm room or apartment. We assigned the same major number
to all the beacons given to participants.
The participants installed our mobile application (different from the applica-
tion used in the controlled experiments) on their iPhone or Android smartphones,
and participated in our study for two weeks. After registering as a user, the par-
ticipant chose a random beacon and registered the beacon assigning her dorm
room/apartment as the beacon’s location. She placed the beacon in her dorm
room/apartment (the location she assigned for the beacon) for two weeks. During
this time, the application ran continuously in the background on their smartphones,
and recorded advertisements every time their smartphone entered or exited the
range of a RadBeacon Dot that was assigned our UUID; the smartphone recorded
the major and minor values, RSSI and proximity states and sent it to a server. We
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developed a Django server that received the beacons and periodically sent out EMA
notifications. Every few hours, participants would receive a notification that listed
a certain time in the recent past, along with a list of locations associated with the
beacons their smartphone “heard” at that time. The students selected the location
they were at from the list or added a different location if the list did not contain the
location they were at. We used their input as ground truth to estimate the accuracy
of Bluetooth beacons in determining the location of users as well as close encounters
between users. Screenshots of the EMA notifications on the iOS application are
shown in Figure 5.19.
The server sent notifications at most nine times a day, approximately every two
hours from 9am to 9pm. Every alternate survey was about the last location when
their smartphone observed beacons. The other surveys were about the locations
where they had a close encounter with another participant in the past one and half
hour.
When an EMA notification was available, the user received an alert from
the app. Clicking the alert revealed a list of uncompleted surveys, as shown in
Figure 5.19a. On selecting a survey, the user sees a list of locations, associated with
the beacons the user’s smartphone had submitted at the specific time shown in the
survey, as shown in Figure 5.19b. If the one of the locations matches her location at
that time, then the user selects the bubble next to the correct location. If not, she can
click on “Next”, and go to the next page, to add the location she was at, as shown
in Figure 5.19c.
Throughout the duration of the study, there were 259 inferred close encounters
in total, with mostly two participants, though occasionally three; a heat map of
the close encounters between two participants is shown in Figure 5.20. The close
encounters happened mostly in the CS building, the library, or between roommates
at their apartments. Figure 5.21 shows the total number of close encounters across
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(a) List of surveys. (b) Selecting a location
(c) Adding correct location
Figure 5.19: Surveys on the Encounter App (only iOS application shown)
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Figure 5.20: Heat map showing inferred close encounters between participants.
all participants during the study at different days of the study; each participant
participated in the study for two weeks, but in the figure the number of days in the
study is more than fourteen because not all participants began the study on Day 1.
The number of close encounters increased during the middle, when all participants
were registered and active. Among our participants, some were more social than
others, as indicated by Figure 5.22, which shows the number of encounters for each
participant during the study.
Out of the EMA notifications that participants responded to, 83.5% were
correct (standard deviation of 13% across the participants), i.e., the participant
confirmed that they were at one of the given locations. Accuracy of the location-
detection based on participant responses are shown in Figure 5.23.
In the remaining cases, the participants either chose a room within the same
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Figure 5.21: Total number of inferred encounters in a day.















































































Figure 5.22: Total number of inferred close encounters per participant.
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Figure 5.23: Percentage of locations that were determined using the BLE beacons.
building within the same floor or the adjacent floor, provided a generic name for
the same building, and in some cases in the adjacent building. Some of the errors in
guesses occurred because the participants carried the beacons we gave them in its
advertising state to different locations, before placing it in their apartments.
For the study, we did not take into account the RSSI values when suggesting
locations in the EMA notifications; the options shown were locations associated
with all the beacons seen.
During analysis, however, we did consider the RSSI values to determine how
close participants in an encounter were to each other; we also recorded the proximity
states (Immediate, Near, Far and Unknown), as determined by the iBeacon and
Altbeacon API. We used the thresholds determined from our controlled experiments,
along with the proximity states, to consider three different types of spatial proximity:
• Very close: Proximity state=Immediate (RSSI values within threshold of 5dBm),
implying subjects are within 2 meters of each other and in unrestricted field
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Location Very close close
Sudikoff (CS) 62% 37%
Collis Cafe 50% 50%
HOP Cafe 67% 33%
Library 40% 48%
Dorm rooms/ apartments 33% 61%
Table 5.1: Percentage of very close (<2m) and close(>2m and <10m), among close encoun-
ters within field-of-view of beacon.
of view (i.e., no obstacles in between) of beacon.
• Close: Proximity state=Near (RSSI values within thresholds of 5 and 10dBm),
implying subjects are between 2 and 10 meters of each other and in unre-
stricted field of view of beacon, and
• Probably close: Proximity state=Far (RSSI values within threshold of 10dBm),
implying subjects may be in restricted field of view (i.e., beacon and subject
are separated by an obstacle) but might still be spatially close.
We considered all the close encounters within one day at every beacon, i.e., we
considered every case where at least two subjects were near one beacon at least once
that day. Our findings are shown in Table 5.1; “Very close” and “Close” indicate
percentage of close encounters where the subjects were very close and close, among
the close encounters that were within the unrestricted field of view (i.e., Proximity
state=near) of the beacon. For all the close encounters that were in restricted field of
view (Proximity state=far) RSSI values as recorded by the participants’ smartphones
differed by less than 10dBm, which implied that they may have been spatially close,
within 10 meters of each other. At one of the dining locations (FOCO), all the close
encounters were outside field-of-view of the beacons; this may have been because
of the locations of the beacons, which were placed under counters.
One of the limitations of the study is that our accuracy detection relies entirely
187
on self-reported locations of participants, which may not entirely be accurate, since
participants might not remember their exact location in the past. We had logistical
issues such as where to place the beacons; to make it easily accessible for configuring
and replacing batteries, we kept it within reach (hence 2m height). But since the
beacons were at low heights, people accidentally knocked down beacons or turned
them off. Irrespective of these issues, we were still able to get reasonable number of
close encounters and an accurate estimate (mean = 83.5%, sd = 13%) of participants’
locations, and can conclude that BLE beacons are a promising technology for use in
determining close encounters.
Post-study questionnaire
At the end of the study, the participants returned the beacons and completed a
survey about their experience interacting with the beacons, privacy concerns, and
expectations about hypothetical applications based on ENACT and SPICE systems.
The post-study questionnaire is provided in Appendix C. Following are the findings
from the post-study questionnaire.
Experience with BLE beacons and EMA: 90% of the participants did not find the
EMA alerts disruptive in any way; the remaining 10% of the participants found
the EMA notifications to be disruptive. In an actual ENACT or SPICE application,
however, there will not be any EMAs; in our study, the EMA notifications were to
collect self-reported ground truth to measure Beacon’s effectiveness in detecting
location and close encounters. 79% of the participants had no privacy concerns
about beacons being placed in their dorm rooms and apartments and all around
Dartmouth campus; 16% of the participants were not even sure that these Beacons
pose any privacy risk!
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Hypothetical application using the ENACT system: 90% of the participants said
they would use a system that alerted them about possible contagious diseases in
their area. We also asked participants whether they thought such an application
would be useful: 68% of the participants responded as such an application being
useful, while the remaining 32% were not sure. Participants suggested it would be
useful if the application also shared with them, “classes in which students are getting
sick and the nature of their illness, to better anticipate possible illnesses”, “risk of infection”,
“percentage of people infected”, “how far am I from the infected person, how many infected
people there are”, “number of people who have also been near an infection”, “most viral
strains”, “outside weather conditions which plays a major part in spreading infections”,
“information [about] potential disease”, “protection tips”, and “paths on map to avoid that
have high number of people with infection”.
Privacy concerns regarding location sharing: We asked participants whether
they would use a system that recorded and stored their location locally, on their
phone, but did not share the information with others. 74% of the participants said
they would use such as system, 10% of the participants said they would not use
such a system, while the remaining 16% were unsure. We further asked the partici-
pants whether they would be willing to use the system if their location history was
shared with health providers such as Dick’s House (Dartmouth’s student health
services) or NH public health authorities but only in the event they were diagnosed
with an extremely contagious disease; 74% of the participants said they would use
the system, 5% of the participants responded that they would not use the system,
and the remaining 21% were unsure. However, if the authorities could identify
everyone who the user was in contact with in the past week, all the participants
expressed concerns about their privacy: 26% of the participants said they would
not use the system in this scenario, 53% of the participants expressed discomfort
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using the system, while the remaining 21% were unsure whether they would use
the system in this scenario. Participants expressed concerns about unwarranted
quarantine and the duration for which the location information would be stored.
Hypothetical application using the SPICE system. We asked participants whether
they would be willing to use a system that lets them browse relevant data (social
media posts, photos, news, messages from a health clinic) based on their location.
79% of the participants said they would use such system, 11% of the participants
said they would not use the system, while the remaining 10% were unsure. Based
on their responses, participants seem more willing to use an ENACT-based appli-
cation than a SPICE-based application. We also asked participants whether they
thought a SPICE-based application would be useful to them; 68% of the participants
responded that they would find the system useful, while the remaining 32% were
unsure. Participants suggested it would be useful to them if applications using the
SPICE system would present weather conditions, air quality, presence of infections, local
environment and health issues (contaminated water or pollution), sales or events in the
neighborhood, trending topics and social media posts, and photos or news. 90% of the
participants said they would use the system if it recorded location on their phone,
but did not share it with others; 5% of the participants said they would not use the
system, while the remaining 5% were unsure. One participant was concerned about
who had access to the location, collected by the application.
5.3 Conclusion
The experiments and the analysis of the dataset show that it is feasible to use Wi-Fi
access points for detecting close encounters, especially if we are not as concerned
about the distance between the devices in the close encounters. Wi-Fi access points
might be sufficient in many SPICE scenarios but not for the ENACT scenario, as for
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the ENACT scenario, we prefer only those people who were spatially very close
to the patient (< 5m) to be alerted about the possibility of infection. BLE beacons
seem to be better suited to identify whether people were spatially very close, such
as < 5m.
5.4 Related Work
In this section, we discuss prior work that leverages wireless technologies for
tracking users’ location; our work is complementary as we do not attempt to devise
a new method for tracking location but rely on wireless technologies to determine
whether two users are spatially close. We also cite prior research that has explored
privacy-preserving techniques for determining a users’ location, as well as work
that proposed systems for connecting users who shared encounters.
Advantages of location-tracking. Knowing where a user is can allow applications
running on smartphones to provide the user with information about content at that
location, such as find nearby store locations, receive real-time traffic updates or
weather reports, receives ads or coupons, help them connect with friends nearby, or
track loved ones or employees, or obtain roadside services. A user can also submit
their past location to get benefits, for example, unduly brag about their performance
in physical activities in fitness applications [131], obtain coupons for places they
claimed to have visited, or provide proof of job performance (for example, health
workers visiting patients). In some cases, users might be tempted to cheat by having
his device transmit a fake location, which might enable the user to access a restricted
resource erroneously, gain benefits that they are not entitled to or provide bogus
alibis, so it might not be enough for a smartphone to provide a user’s location, but it
also needs to provide authentic location proofs to obtain the location-based service.
Hang et al. proposed another advantage of recording location – use location-based
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security questions as a secure fallback authentication scheme [80].
Indoor localization. Researchers have used Wi-Fi systems for generating unique
location signatures for indoor localization [144, 162]. Similarly, others have con-
sidered Bluetooth as an alternative for indoor localization [32, 36, 67, 68, 130]. We
expect indoor localization techniques, such as triangulation, can also be used to de-




In this dissertation, we present the design and findings from our user study to
understand people’s privacy preferences regarding mobile health devices. We
recommend a flexible design for sharing controls that narrows the gap between
controls and the information being shared, allowing patients to visualize how they
are sharing their health information with others.
We also introduce the concept of close encounters, which can be leveraged in two
kinds of mobile applications: i) an application that alerts others about the presence
of a contagious airborne virus that they may have been exposed to, and ii) an
application that allows users to collect information retrospectively about the places
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they visited. We presented two smartphone-based systems for these applications,
ENACT and SPICE, that detect close encounters in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e.,
without sharing the location of the users with the cloud server or with each other.
These systems allow users to send alerts to others they shared a close encounter
with, as well as share and receive information from others in a close encounter.
Our experiments showed that processing alerts and data on smartphones took no
more than a few seconds and our applications consumed less than 1% battery of
the smartphone.
Our experiments and analysis of a Wi-Fi scan dataset and show that it is
feasible to use Wi-Fi access points for detecting close encounters. We also conducted
controlled experiments to study variation of BLE beacon RSSI with different pa-
rameters, and conducted a user study leveraging BLE beacons that we deployed
on Dartmouth campus. In our controlled experiments, we could determine when
a close encounter occured with 80% accuracy, and in our deployment study, we
could identify users’ location with 84% accuracy; we expect BLE beacons are bet-
ter suited for identifying close encounters where subjects are spatially very close
(within distances < 5m), while Wi-Fi access points may be better for identifying
close encounters of spatial proximity more than 5 meters.
6.1 Future Work
Finally, we present ideas for future work. The immediate extension of this thesis is
applying the systems for a real application and improving the trust and security of
the beacons in the system.
Smartwatches. We plan to extend the ENACT and SPICE systems to a smartwatch,
as a smartwatch always stays on the user.
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Applications of close encounters. We could build health-related applications
based on the ENACT system in collaboration with Dartmouth College Health Ser-
vices. In addition to the alerts that our ENACT system would send notifying users
about their close encounter with a patient, we would also promote tips on managing
their health and lifestyle and incorporate other feedback from participants in our
post-study survey.
Time-varying identifiers for Bluetooth beacons. The BLE beacons we used in
our study broadcast a static beacon, which could be misused to spoof a stationary
beacon or track users that carry a beacon. Recently, Google introduced a scheme
consisting of cloud-based Ephemeral Identifiers (EID) that allows only authorized
parties to properly identify the broadcasted beacons [8]. We plan to explore the
possibility of using EID in our ENACT and SPICE systems to make it difficult for
an adversary to spoof or track the BLE beacons in the system.
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A
Scenarios for focus group participants
Following are the scenarios we used during the focus groups to understand people’s
privacy concerns about sharing health information.
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Figure B.1: Fitbit Study: Flyer to recruit Dartmouth students
Trying to lose weight? 
Dreaming about becoming healthy and fit? 
Finding it hard to keep track of the 
calories burned?	  
PARTICIPANTS* NEEDED FOR FITNESS DEVICE STUDY 
YOU carry a device that record your steps, calories 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. How was your experience with the Fitbit?
2. Did wearing the device affect how you thought about your sleep, steps or
calories? (Were you more aware of these?)
3. Were there instances when you took off the device to prevent it from recording
any information? If so:
(a) What type of information did you not want the device to record?
(b) Was there a specific person(s) that you did not wish to see any data?
Why?
4. Were there instances when you took off the device to hide information about
(a) Your sleep?
(b) Your physical activities?
5. Did you ever feel the need to change your habits when you were carrying the
device with you? If yes:
(a) Were there instances when you changed your habits to hide your normal
routine?
(b) What influenced you to change your habits?
(c) Did you ever feel the need to lie about your habits?
6. Did you change the sharing controls on the interface at any point?
(a) If so, what influenced that decision?
(b) Did you change the sharing controls for a particular person(s)? Why?
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7. Did your choice of sharing recipients (family/friends) affect how you shared
the recorded information?
(a) If so, how?
8. Did the sharing controls on the interface allow you to set your sharing prefer-
ences easily? If no:
(a) Why not?
(b) What changes/omissions/additions would you suggest to make the
interface more usable?
(c) If it had been easier to change the privacy preferences, would you have
shared differently?
9. Do you want any more control over your information? If so:
(a) Over which types of information-all, or some?
(b) Was there information that you felt was more important to control the
privacy settings for than others.
10. On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being highly unlikely and 10 being highly likely),





We asked participants to answer the following questions, at the end of the study.
• Did the beacons disrupt your life in any way? Options: Yes, No
• If yes, how were they disruptive?
• Did you have any privacy concerns regarding the beacons and their placement
in your room and other places at Dartmouth? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• Did you charge your phone more than usual during the study? Options: Yes:
1 additional time per day, Yes: 2 or more additional times per day, No, Not
sure
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• Would you be willing to use a system that alerts you about a possible infection
in your area? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• Would this system be useful to you? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• What other useful data could an infection-tracking application share with
you?
• Would you use a system that recorded and stored your location on your own
phone, but did not share the information with anyone? Options: Yes, No, Not
sure
• What if health providers at Dick’s House or NH public health authorities could
examine your location history, but only in the event you were diagnosed with
an extremely contagious disease? Would you still be willing to use such a
system? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• In that same situation, what if those authorities could use the system to
identify everyone you were in contact with the past week? Would you still be
willing to use this system? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• What other privacy concerns would you have regarding an infectious disease-
tracking application?
• Would you be willing to use a system that lets you browse relevant data
(social media posts, photos, news, messages from a health clinic) based on
your location? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• Would this system be useful to you? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
• What data could the application convey, which might be useful to you?
• Would you use this system if it recorded your location on your own phone,
but did not share the location with anyone? Options: Yes, No, Not sure
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• What privacy concerns would you have regarding this application?
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D
Controlled experiments with Wi-Fi APs
To identify whether the factors related to Wi-Fi access point scans can help us
determine if two users are spatially proximate, we performed Wi-Fi scans of access
points in the vicinity using an Android application. We recorded 10 Wi-Fi scans
one second apart, varying either the distance between the users (0.5, 1, 2, 5, and
10 meters apart) or the direction they are facing (facing north towards the wall,
facing each other in the east-west direction, and facing away from each other in
the east-west direction). The figures in this chapter show the mean and standard
deviation of RSSI readings obtained as a result of the experiments.
Figure D.1 shows mean and standard deviation of RSSI readings from 26
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(a) Both facing wall














































(b) Both facing each other














































(c) Both facing away from each other
Figure D.1: Mean and standard deviation of Wi-Fi RSSI values of 26 common APs when two
subjects are 0.5 meters from each other
common APs recorded by two smartphones 0.5m from each other.
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(a) Both facing wall














































(b) Both facing each other














































(c) Both facing away from each other
Figure D.2: Mean and standard deviation of Wi-Fi RSSI values of 26 common APs when two
subjects are 1 meter from each other
Figure D.2 shows mean and standard deviation of RSSI readings from 26
common APs recorded by two smartphones 1m from each other.
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(a) Both facing wall














































(b) Both facing each other














































(c) Both facing away from each other
Figure D.3: Mean and standard deviation of Wi-Fi RSSI values of 26 common APs when two
subjects are 2 meters from each other
Figure D.3 shows mean and standard deviation of RSSI readings from 26
common APs recorded by two smartphones 2m from each other.
210














































(a) Both facing wall














































(b) Both facing each other














































(c) Both facing away from each other
Figure D.4: Mean and standard deviation of Wi-Fi RSSI values of 26 common APs when two
subjects are 5 meters from each other
Figure D.4 shows mean and standard deviation of RSSI readings from 26
common APs recorded by two smartphones 5m from each other.
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(a) Both facing wall














































(b) Both facing each other














































(c) Both facing away
Figure D.5: Mean and standard deviation of Wi-Fi RSSI values of 26 common APs when two
subjects are 10 meters from each other
Figure D.5 shows mean and standard deviation of RSSI readings from 26
common APs recorded by two smartphones 10m from each other.
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E
Controlled experiments with BLE
beacons
Similarly, we conducted controlled experiments using BLE beacons, to determine
whether RSSI values of BLE beacons are better at identifying spatial proximity of
users. For each experiment set, we recorded 10 RSSI values observed one second
apart, varying either the distance from the beacon (0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10 meters away)
or the direction the user was facing (facing east towards the beacon, facing north
perpendicular to the beacon, and facing west away from the beacon).
Figure E.1 shows RSSI readings recorded by two smartphones 1m from the
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(a) 0.5m in between














(b) 1m in between














(c) 2m in between














(d) 5m in between














(e) 10m in between
Figure E.1: At one meter from wall where beacon was placed.
beacon.
Figures E.2, E.3 and E.4 shows RSSI readings recorded by two smartphones
2m from the beacon.
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(a) 0.5m apart facing each other














(b) 1m apart facing each other














(c) 2m apart facing each other
Figure E.2: At two meters from wall, when facing each other.
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(a) 0.5m apart facing beacon














(b) 1m apart facing beacon














(c) 2m apart facing beacon
Figure E.3: At two meters from wall, when facing the beacon.
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(a) 0.5m apart facing away














(b) 1m apart facing away














(c) 2m apart facing away
Figure E.4: At two meters from beacon, when facing away from the beacon.
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(a) 0.5m apart facing each other














(b) 1m apart facing each other














(c) 2m apart facing each other
Figure E.5: At five meters from beacon, facing each other
Figures E.5, E.6 and E.7 shows RSSI readings recorded by two smartphones 5
meters from the beacon.
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(a) 0.5m facing beacon














(b) 1m facing beacon














(c) 2m facing beacon
Figure E.6: At five meters from beacon, facing the wall where beacon was placed.
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(a) 0.5m apart facing away














(b) 1m apart facing away














(c) 2m apart facing away
Figure E.7: At five meters from beacon, facing away from beacon
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(a) 0.5m facing each other














(b) 1m facing each other














(c) 2m facing each other
Figure E.8: At ten meters from beacon, facing each other.
Figures E.8, E.9 and E.10 shows RSSI readings recorded by two smartphones
10m from the beacon.
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(a) 0.5m facing beacon














(b) 1m facing beacon














(c) 2m facing beacon
Figure E.9: At ten meters from beacon, facing the beacon
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(a) 0.5m facing away














(b) 1m facing away














(c) 2m facing away
Figure E.10: At ten meters from beacon, facing away from beacon
223
Bibliography
[1] 9 things everybody should know about measles. Online at http://www.
vox.com/2015/1/26/7907707/measles-symptoms-vaccine, visited Apr. 2016.
Citation on page 55.
[2] Air Quality Egg. Online at https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/edborden/
air-quality-egg., visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 103.
[3] Android Beacon Library. Online at https://altbeacon.github.io/
android-beacon-library/, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on pages 86 and 160.
[4] Apple iBeacon. Online at https://developer.apple.com/ibeacon/, visited
Apr. 2016. Citation on page 160.
[5] Bluetooth low energy. Online at https://www.bluetooth.com/
what-is-bluetooth-technology/bluetooth-technology-basics/low-energy,
visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 160.
[6] Eddystone. Online at https://developers.google.com/beacons/, visited Apr.
2016. Citation on page 160.
[7] Emotion Sense. Online at http://emotionsense.org/, visited Apr. 2016. Cita-
tion on page 1.
224
[8] Growing Eddystone with Ephemeral Identifiers: A Privacy Aware and Se-
cure Open Beacon Format. Online at https://security.googleblog.com/2016/
04/growing-eddystone-with-ephemeral-identifiers.html, visited Apr. 2016.
Citation on pages 97 and 195.
[9] Health Workers Head in to Contain Fresh Ebola Outbreak in Guinea.
Online at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/
health-workers-head-contain-fresh-ebola-outbreak-guinea-n541411, visited
Apr. 2016. Citation on page 54.
[10] Highlight. Online at http://highlig.ht/about.html, visited Apr. 2016. Citation
on page 54.
[11] iHealth Wireless Blood Pressure Wrist Monitor. Online at https://ihealthlabs.
com/blood-pressure-monitors/wireless-blood-pressure-wrist-monitor/, vis-
ited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 1.
[12] Libelium for Smart Cities. Online at http://www.libelium.com/smart_cities.,
visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 103.
[13] Speck. Online at http://specksensor.org/., visited Apr. 2016. Citation on
page 103.
[14] The Best Fitness Trackers for 2016. Online at http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/0,2817,2404445,00.asp, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 1.
[15] Transmission of measles. Online at http://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/
transmission.html, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 55.
[16] 79 Online at http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/smartphones/480485,
visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 60.
225
[17] Heartsense. http://www.ibabylabs.com/product/heartsense, August 2013.
Online at http://www.ibabylabs.com/product/heartsense, visited Apr. 2016.
Citation on page 1.
[18] In Boston bombing, flood of digital evidence is a blessing and
a curse. Online at http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/tech/mobile/
boston-bombing-evidence-search-verge/, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page
105.
[19] How long do bacteria and viruses live outside the
body? Online at http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/
how-long-do-bacteria-and-viruses-live-outside-the-body.aspx, visited
Apr. 2016. Citation on page 93.
[20] Commcare. Online at https://www.commcarehq.org/home/, visited Apr.
2016. Citation on page 99.
[21] Open data kit. Online at https://opendatakit.org/, visited Apr. 2016. Citation
on page 99.
[22] Tor. Online at https://www.torproject.org/, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on
pages 69, 72, 79, 117, and 128.
[23] A. Achtzehn, L. Simic, P. Gronerth, and P. Mahonen. Survey of IEEE 802.11 Wi-
Fi deployments for deriving the spatial structure of opportunistic networks.
In Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2013 IEEE 24th
International Symposium on, pages 2627–2632, Sept 2013. DOI 10.1109/PIMRC.
2013.6666591. Citation on page 138.
[24] P. Aditya, V. Erdélyi, M. Lentz, E. Shi, B. Bhattacharjee, and P. Druschel.
Encore: Private, context-based communication for mobile social apps. In
226
Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Ap-
plications, and Services (MobiSys), pages 135–148, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM. DOI 10.1145/2594368.2594374. Citation on pages 54 and 149.
[25] Affectiva. http://www.affectiva.com/, January 2011. Online at http://www.
affectiva.com/, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 1.
[26] J. L. F. Alemán, I. C. Señor, P. Á. O. Lozoya, and A. Toval. Security and
privacy in electronic health records: A systematic literature review. Journal of
Biomedical Informatics, 2013. Citation on page 50.
[27] M. Ambrosin, M. Conti, and T. Dargahi. On the feasibility of attribute-based
encryption on smartphone devices. CoRR, abs/1504.00619, 2015. Online at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1504.00619, visited Apr. 2016. Citation on page 100.
[28] M. E. Andrés, N. E. Bordenabe, K. Chatzikokolakis, and C. Palamidessi.
Geo-indistinguishability: Differential privacy for location-based systems. In
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer &#38; Communica-
tions Security, CCS ’13, pages 901–914, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM. DOI
10.1145/2508859.2516735. Citation on page 148.
[29] D. Anthony, T. Henderson, and D. Kotz. Privacy in location-aware computing
environments. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 6:64–72, 2007. DOI 10.1109/MPRV.
2007.83. Citation on pages 7 and 46.
[30] P. Bahl and V. N. Padmanabhan. Radar: An in-building rf-based user location
and tracking system. In Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communi-
cations Societies (InfoCom), volume 2, pages 775–784. Ieee, 2000. Citation on
page 75.
[31] M. Balazinska and P. Castro. Characterizing mobility and network usage in a
corporate wireless local-area network. In International Conference on Mobile
227
Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys), pages 303–316. ACM, 2003. DOI
10.1145/1066116.1066127. Citation on page 139.
[32] M. S. Bargh and R. de Groote. Indoor localization based on response rate
of bluetooth inquiries. In Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Mobile entity
localization and tracking in GPS-less environments, pages 49–54. ACM, 2008.
Citation on page 192.
[33] C. L. Barrett, K. R. Bisset, S. G. Eubank, X. Feng, and M. V. Marathe. Episim-
demics: An efficient algorithm for simulating the spread of infectious disease
over large realistic social networks. In Proceedings of the Conference on Super-
computing, SC ’08, pages 37:1–37:12, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2008. IEEE Press.
DOI 10.1145/1413370.1413408. Citation on page 99.
[34] P. Barsocchi, S. Lenzi, S. Chessa, and G. Giunta. A novel approach to indoor
rssi localization by automatic calibration of the wireless propagation model.
In Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2009. Citation on
page 152.
[35] D. Baumer, J. Earp, and J. Poindexter. Quantifying privacy choices with
experimental economics. In Workshop on Economics of Information Security
(WEIS), 2005. Citation on page 47.
[36] A. Bekkelien, M. Deriaz, and S. Marchand-Maillet. Bluetooth indoor position-
ing. Master’s thesis, University of Geneva, 2012. Citation on page 192.
[37] M. Benisch, P. G. Kelley, N. Sadeh, T. Sandholm, J. Tsai, L. F. Cranor, and
P. H. Drielsma. The Impact of Expressiveness on the Effectiveness of Privacy
Mechanisms for Location-Sharing. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security. ACM, 2009. DOI 10.1145/1572532.1572561. Citation on
page 48.
228
[38] A. R. Beresford and F. Stajano. Mix zones: user privacy in location-aware ser-
vices. In Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 2004. Proceedings
of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on, pages 127–131. IEEE, Mar. 2004. DOI
10.1109/percomw.2004.1276918. Citation on page 148.
[39] K. R. Bisset, J. Chen, X. Feng, V. Kumar, and M. V. Marathe. Epifast: a fast
algorithm for large scale realistic epidemic simulations on distributed memory
systems. In Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Supercomputing,
pages 430–439. ACM, 2009. Citation on page 99.
[40] R. C. Browning, E. A. Baker, J. A. Herron, and R. Kram. Effects of obesity
and sex on the energetic cost and preferred speed of walking. Journal of
Applied Physiology, 100(2):390–398, 2006. DOI 10.1152/japplphysiol.00767.2005.
Citation on page 83.
[41] A. Brush, J. Krumm, and J. Scott. Exploring end user preferences for location
obfuscation, location-based services, and the value of location. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, pages 95–104. ACM,
2010. DOI 10.1145/1864349.1864381. Citation on pages 57 and 64.
[42] A. J. B. Brush, J. Krumm, and J. Scott. Exploring end user preferences for
location obfuscation, location-based services, and the value of location. In
Proceedings of the 12th ACM international conference on Ubiquitous computing,
Ubicomp ’10, pages 95–104, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. DOI 10.1145/
1864349.1864381. Citation on page 146.
[43] L. Buttyán, T. Holczer, A. Weimerskirch, and W. Whyte. Slow: A practical
pseudonym changing scheme for location privacy in vanets. In 2009 IEEE
Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), pages 1–8. IEEE, Oct. 2009. DOI 10.
1109/vnc.2009.5416380. Citation on page 148.
229
[44] K. Caine and R. Hanania. Patients want granular privacy control over
health information in electronic medical records. Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Informatics Association : JAMIA, 20(1):7–15, Jan. 2013. DOI
10.1136/amiajnl-2012-001023. Citation on pages 48 and 50.
[45] C. Caini, P. Cornice, R. Firrincieli, M. Livini, and D. Lacamera. Dtn meets
smartphones: Future prospects and tests. In International Symposium on
Wireless Pervasive Computing (ISWPC), pages 355–360. IEEE, 2010. Citation on
page 146.
[46] C. Campos-Castillo and S. Hitlin. Copresence: Revisiting a building block
for social interaction theories. Sociological Theory, 31(2):168–192, 2013. DOI
10.1177/0735275113489811. Citation on page 103.
[47] S. S. Chawathe. Beacon placement for indoor localization using bluetooth.
In IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, pages 980–985. IEEE,
2008. Citation on page 163.
[48] H. Chenji, A. Hassanzadeh, M. Won, Y. Li, W. Zhang, X. Yang, R. Stoleru, and
G. Zhou. A wireless sensor, adhoc and delay tolerant network system for
disaster response. Technical report, Citeseer. Citation on page 146.
[49] E. Chin, A. P. Felt, V. Sekar, and D. Wagner. Measuring user confidence in
smartphone security and privacy. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’12, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. DOI
10.1145/2335356.2335358. Citation on page 47.
[50] Y. Chon, H. Shin, E. Talipov, and H. Cha. Evaluating mobility models for
temporal prediction with high-granularity mobility data. In Pervasive Comput-
ing and Communications (PerCom), 2012 IEEE International Conference on, pages
206–212. IEEE, 2012. Citation on page 84.
230
[51] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan. Private information
retrieval. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 45(6):965–981, 1998. Citation on page
144.
[52] D. Christin, A. Reinhardt, S. Kanhere, and M. Hollick. A survey on privacy
in mobile participatory sensing applications. Journal of Systems and Software,
84(11):1928–1946, Nov. 2011. DOI 10.1016/j.jss.2011.06.073. Citation on page
146.
[53] K. Connelly, A. Khalil, and Y. Liu. Do i do what i say?: Observed versus stated
privacy preferences. In C. Baranauskas, P. Palanque, J. Abascal, and S. Barbosa,
editors, Human-Computer Interaction âĂŞ INTERACT 2007, volume 4662 of
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